<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>This paper investigates inconsistencies between countries’ official exchange rate regime declarations (the so-called <italic>de jure</italic> exchange rate regimes) and their actual policy (<italic>de facto</italic> exchange rate regimes). These exchange rate regime gaps decrease the credibility of monetary policy and are considered an overall negative economic phenomenon. In this paper, I attempt to disclose the determinants of these gaps using the data on several <italic>de facto</italic> classifications and a wide array of explanatory variables of economic and institutional nature. The results suggest that a number of macroeconomic factors such as foreign exchange reserves, current account balance and economic openness influence the probability of monetary authorities breaking commitment to their official exchange rate regime. At the same time, I also discover that the exchange rate regime gaps are less frequent in more democratic and institutionally advanced countries although the results tend to differ depending on the <italic>de facto</italic> classification used and the nature of gap (either <italic>de jure</italic> floating – <italic>de facto</italic> fixed or <italic>de jure</italic> fixed – <italic>de facto</italic> floating).</p>
</abstract>

This paper investigates inconsistencies between countries’ official exchange rate regime declarations (the so-called de jure exchange rate regimes) and their actual policy (de facto exchange rate regimes). These exchange rate regime gaps decrease the credibility of monetary policy and are considered an overall negative economic phenomenon. In this paper, I attempt to disclose the determinants of these gaps using the data on several de facto classifications and a wide array of explanatory variables of economic and institutional nature. The results suggest that a number of macroeconomic factors such as foreign exchange reserves, current account balance and economic openness influence the probability of monetary authorities breaking commitment to their official exchange rate regime. At the same time, I also discover that the exchange rate regime gaps are less frequent in more democratic and institutionally advanced countries although the results tend to differ depending on the de facto classification used and the nature of gap (either de jure floating – de facto fixed or de jure fixed – de facto floating).

Determinants of De Jure – De Facto Exchange Rate Regime Gaps

Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Determinants of De Jure \u2013 De Facto Exchange Rate Regime Gaps"}

This paper investigates inconsistencies between countries’ official exchange rate regime declarations (the so-called de jure exchange rate regimes) and their...

Determinants of De Jure – De Facto Exchange Rate Regime Gaps

Data publikacji: 18 sty 2022

Zakres stron: 151 - 177

Otrzymano: 05 cze 2020

Przyjęty: 28 wrz 2020

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2022-0007

Słowa kluczowe
exchange rate regime, de facto exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rate, floating exchange rate

© 2022 Viktar Dudzich, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Determinants of De Jure – De Facto Exchange Rate Regime Gaps

Data publikacji: 18 sty 2022

Zakres stron: 151 - 177

Otrzymano: 05 cze 2020

Przyjęty: 28 wrz 2020

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2022-0007

Słowa kluczoweexchange rate regime, de facto exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rate, floating exchange rate

© 2022 Viktar Dudzich, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
exchange rate regime, de facto exchange rate regime, fixed exchange rate, floating exchange rate