Mappism: formalizing classical and artificial life views on mind and consciousness
Data publikacji: 28 mar 2019
Zakres stron: 55 - 99
Otrzymano: 08 paź 2018
Przyjęty: 21 lis 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/fcds-2019-0005
Słowa kluczowe
© 2019 Iwo Bładek et al., published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
Throughout centuries philosophers have attempted to understand the disparity between the conscious experience and the material world – i.e., the problem of consciousness and the apparent mind–body dualism. Achievements in the fields of biology, neurology, and information science in the last century granted us more insight into processes that govern our minds. While there are still many mysteries to be solved when it comes to fully understanding the inner workings of our brains, new discoveries suggest stepping away from the metaphysical philosophy of mind, and closer to the computational viewpoint. In light of the advent of strong artificial intelligence and the development of increasingly complex artificial life models and simulations, we need a well-defined, formal theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate this, in this work we introduce