Since 2012, Chinese financial system reform has been further deepened, and the regulatory authorities have gradually loosened financial control. In particular, the interest rate marketisation reform has the most direct impact on Chinese financial institutions in two aspects: First, it can promote the transformation of traditional financial institutions from a single deposit and loan, premium and other business to various innovative profit models that can be harnessed by businesses. And through mergers and acquisitions, reorganisation of financial institutions and other means aimed at promoting the current financial system based on separate operations, the change is gradually being made towards mixed operations [1]. Second, it can promote the rapid development of various financial innovations and financial derivative products and connect different market participants such as banks, securities companies and insurance companies more closely. This significant change in the financial sector has brought about extensive relevance and crossover of financial service businesses, dramatically increasing systemic financial risks. At this stage, Chinese systemic financial risks are becoming increasingly prominent.
In contrast, the risk prevention awareness of relevant market entities is relatively weak, and the level of risk management is weak. Which sector of the Chinese financial market has the most substantial contagion effect on other markets? Which sector contributes the most to overall financial risk? What are the internal risk transmission laws and internal mechanisms of the financial system? These issues help investors make optimal investment portfolio decisions based on the correlation of sectors and provide a theoretical basis and practical guidance for policymakers and market regulators on preventing systemic risks more effectively.
Some scholars believe that the market volatility is positively correlated with the value at risk, while the stock price in the financial market has a significant volatility clustering effect. Then the value at risk closely related to volatility should also have similar properties. For this reason, the author proposes a CAViaR model with autocorrelation characteristics based on the idea of quantile regression to directly measure the value at risk of financial markets [2]. However, the CAViaR model is mainly suitable for analysing the dynamic risk characteristics of a single sector. Still, it cannot capture the complex relationship of risk contagion between different sectors (or different markets). Some scholars have extended the traditional CAVi-aR model to the MVMQ-CAViaR model to overcome the shortcomings of the above models. This model extends the idea of single-equation quantile regression to the structured equation of vector autoregression. At the same time, the model reveals that the value at risk of a single sector (or a single market) is affected by its market and risk spillovers from other markets. The specific expression is as follows:
Model (1) assumes that the market shock item does not have a ‘leverage effect’. The positive shocks and adverse shocks of this market and other markets have equivalent effects on the value at risk. In real life, the investor’s utility function often puts a greater weight on the negative utility of losses while giving a smaller weight to the positive utility of returns. Therefore, this paper expands Eq. (1) to the asymmetric MVMQ-CAViaR model. The model is expressed as follows:
(
From Eqs (1)–(3), we can see that risks between different financial industry sectors will be transmitted to each other. The market shock item (namely
First, suppose that the formation process of the return rate data of two different sector indexes satisfies
Second, at time t, a one-time positive or negative impact of 1 unit of new interest
Finally, the Δ
The MVMQ-CAViaR model belongs to the category of multiple quantile regression. We can use the Least Absolute Deviation Method (LAD) estimation, and the objective function it needs to optimise is:
This article takes the conditional quantile of
The in-sample performance of the model cannot simply be extended outside the sample. To further demonstrate the effect of this model on predicting VAR, we must also perform an out-of-sample robustness test. Some scholars have assumed that the model can effectively predict risk, proving that the sequence of ‘hit events’ obeys the Bernoulli distribution. Scholars construct unconditional test statistics of likelihood ratio as the following:
where p is the significance level, N is the total number of predicted samples and n is the number of hits in the prediction sample. When the LR statistic is greater than the critical value of the chi-square distribution under a given confidence level, the original model is rejected. On the contrary, when the statistic is less than the critical value, the model is accepted.
Eq. (5) shows that the Kupiec likelihood ratio test quantity is an index that characterises the degree to which the actual number of hits is close to the theoretical number of hits. In addition to testing the failure rate, it should also be tested whether there is a correlation between hit events. If there is a significant correlation between the observations that fail to predict the VaR, then a loss that continuously exceeds the VaR may occur. This will bring huge losses to investors [8]. The hit sequence of an accurate and reliable risk measurement model should be unbiased and non-autocorrelation. Therefore, some scholars proposed a dynamic quantile test. They used the bullish risk as an example to define a new hit sequence:
We express the above model as a matrix form,
From the results in Table 1, we can see that in the sample interval selected in this article, the average yields of banks and securities are both positive. Among them, the average yield of securities reached 0.033, while the insurance industry was hostile. Thus, if the stock price index changes reflect the overall expectations of the industry’s operating performance, from this perspective, the securities industry is more prosperous than the insurance industry. At the same time, the standard deviation of the securities sector is relatively the largest, and the high risk also brings a higher risk premium [9]. This is in line with the ‘small-cap stock effect’ in finance.
Descriptive statistical results of the sample
bank | 0.026 | 9.551 | -10.506 | 6.32 | 0 | 0 |
Securities | 0.033 | 9.531 | -10.537 | 4.685 | 0 | 0 |
Insurance | -0.006 | 9.545 | -10.536 | 5.196 | 0 | 0 |
Furthermore, the three plate indices all have typical ‘negative bias’ and ‘sharp peaks and thick tails.’ Finally, according to the P-value of the J-B statistic and the ADF statistic, we further found that all the index returns are non-normal and stationary time series. Thus, the trends of banking, securities and insurance remained the same.
Table 2 shows the mutual risk transmission results of banks and securities, securities and insurance, and banks and insurance at the 5% quantile level. All the coefficients
Estimated results of the MVMQ-CAViaR model in the financial industry
c1 | -0.013 | -0.162 | c1 | 0.005 | -0.035 | c1 | -0.006 | -0.031 |
a11 | -0.106 | -0.08 | a11 | -0.091 | -0.05 | a11 | -0.068 | -0.038 |
a12 | -0.028 | -0.04 | a12 | -0.007 | -0.033 | a12 | -0.053 | -0.068 |
b11 | 0.952 | -0.161 | b11 | 0.961 | -0.028 | b11 | 0.949 | -0.082 |
b12 | 0.011 | -0.142 | b12 | 0.003 | -0.027 | b12 | 0.031 | -0.023 |
c2 | -0.042 | -0.131 | c2 | -0.013 | -0.033 | c2 | -0.022 | -0.037 |
a21 | -0.042 | -0.033 | a21 | -0.039 | -0.041 | a21 | 0.01 | -0.043 |
a22 | -0.089 | -0.048 | a22 | -0.047 | -0.045 | a22 | -0.087 | -0.083 |
b21 | 0.041 | -0.022 | b21 | 0.022 | -0.012 | b21 | 0.022 | -0.133 |
b22 | 0.96 | -0.114 | b22 | 0.973 | -0.029 | b22 | 0.934 | -0.179 |
First, the coefficient
Second, for the regression results of banking and insurance, we can find that the coefficient
Third, from the empirical results between securities and insurance, it can be seen that the extreme risks of insurance have a significant one-way spillover effect on securities, and securities do not have the function of actively transmitting risks.
Table 2 does not distinguish between the different effects of the rise and fall of the sector index on Var. To further explore the leverage effect of VaR in the financial industry, Table 3 gives the empirical results of the asymmetric MVMQ-CAViaR model. It can be seen from this that the estimation results of the three multi-quantile regression models are consistent with Table 2, and the main difference is reflected in the asymmetric coefficient. From the significance of the coefficients
Estimated results of the asymmetric MVMQ-CAViaR model
c1 | 0.082 | -0.245 | c1 | -0.013 | -0.027 | c1 | -0.003 | -0.023 |
a11 | -0.058 | -0.055 | a11 | -0.047 | -0.03 | a11 | 0.016 | -0.013 |
a12 | -0.178 | -0.106 | a12 | -0.129 | -0.078 | a12 | -0.072 | -0.03 |
d11 | -0.039 | -0.035 | d11 | 0.02 | -0.026 | d11 | -0.011 | -0.04 |
d12 | -0.076 | -0.128 | d12 | -0.052 | -0.049 | d12 | -0.067 | -0.04 |
b11 | 0.824 | -0.112 | b11 | 0.856 | -0.011 | b11 | 0.865 | -0.022 |
b12 | 0.078 | -0.182 | b12 | -0.005 | -0.021 | b12 | 0.018 | -0.013 |
c2 | -0.666 | -0.419 | c2 | -0.025 | -0.041 | c2 | -0.037 | -0.032 |
a21 | 0.029 | -0.147 | a21 | 0.007 | -0.049 | a21 | -0.019 | -0.038 |
a22 | -0.065 | -0.043 | a22 | -0.073 | -0.055 | a22 | 0.028 | -0.031 |
d21 | -0.026 | -0.02 | d21 | -0.054 | -0.061 | d21 | 0.001 | -0.051 |
d22 | -0.086 | -0.029 | d22 | -0.038 | -0.035 | d22 | -0.113 | -0.069 |
b21 | 0.037 | -0.022 | b21 | -0.015 | -0.011 | b21 | -0.001 | -0.034 |
b22 | 0.849 | -0.09 | b22 | 0.905 | -0.03 | b22 | 0.881 | -0.047 |
Figures 1 and 2 show the quantile impulse response results of the banking and securities sectors, respectively. Whether it is a standard deviation information shock from the banking sector or the securities sector, we find that a negative information shock has a more significant impact on the original market than a positive information shock. The positive impact of the banking sector has an initial positive effect on securities and then quickly decays to negative [12]. Comparing Figures 1 and 2, we can find that when there is a joint negative information shock, the intensity of this shock is significantly greater than the negative shock of a single market. The risk expansion value of the more volatile securities sector is significantly greater than that of the bank.
To summarise, this part explains the significant asymmetry of risk transmission between different sectors of the Chinese financial industry according to the two methods of coefficient value and quantile impulse response of the regression results. It is further discovered that Chinese banks have significant risk contagion effects on other sectors, while securities are at a disadvantageous position to receive risks from other sectors passively.
The estimation results of the joint asymmetric MVMQ-CAViaR model
c1 | 0.001 | -0.045 | c1 | -0.001 | -0.034 | c1 | -0.021 | -0.04 |
a11 | -0.04 | -0.053 | a11 | -0.035 | -0.02 | a11 | 0.023 | -0.015 |
a12 | -0.173 | -0.12 | a12 | -0.134 | -0.044 | a12 | -0.075 | -0.041 |
d11 | -0.032 | -0.033 | d11 | 0.015 | -0.02 | d11 | -0.03 | -0.048 |
d12 | -0.053 | -0.056 | d12 | -0.072 | -0.033 | d12 | -0.084 | -0.045 |
e1 | -0.081 | -0.066 | e1 | -0.078 | -0.05 | e1 | 0.003 | -0.013 |
b11 | 0.847 | -0.023 | b11 | 0.839 | -0.009 | b11 | 0.869 | -0.06 |
b12 | -0.013 | -0.015 | b12 | -0.024 | -0.016 | b12 | -0.016 | -0.011 |
c2 | -0.013 | -0.034 | c2 | -0.032 | -0.033 | c2 | -0.004 | -0.109 |
a21 | 0.004 | -0.045 | a21 | 0.013 | -0.029 | a21 | -0.08 | -0.062 |
a22 | -0.178 | -0.047 | a22 | -0.093 | -0.062 | a22 | -0.04 | -0.09 |
d21 | -0.012 | -0.025 | d21 | -0.022 | -0.017 | d21 | 0.106 | -0.095 |
d22 | -0.062 | -0.048 | d22 | -0.046 | -0.058 | d22 | -0.140 | -0.084 |
e2 | -0.123 | -0.074 | e2 | -0.095 | -0.071 | e2 | -0.011 | -0.033 |
b21 | -0.028 | -0.016 | b21 | -0.023 | -0.011 | b21 | 0.093 | -0.09 |
b22 | 0.851 | -0.017 | b22 | 0.820 | -0.013 | b22 | 0.862 | -0.092 |
Table 5 shows the backtest results of different sectors under the 5% quantile. At the 5% significance level, the Kupiec likelihood ratio results of the three models all passed the robustness test. Judging from the accuracy of prediction, the asymmetric
Backtest results of the model
Bank-securities | Bank | 0.641 | 0.016 | 0.641 | 0.112 | 0.838 | 0.258 |
Securities | 0.289 | 0.146 | 0.838 | 0.249 | 0.836 | 0.898 | |
Bank- insurance | Bank | 0.838 | 0.428 | 0.838 | 0.562 | 0.838 | 0.862 |
Insurance | 0.289 | 0.003 | 0.289 | 0.013 | 0.641 | 0.222 | |
Securities-insurance | Securities | 0.678 | 0.16 | 0.678 | 0.351 | 0.678 | 0.331 |
Insurance | 0.199 | 0.001 | 0.289 | 0.195 | 0.289 | 0.076 |
The relevant research conclusions have important policy implications for suggesting the means to prevent Chinese systemic financial risks. First, we conduct differentiated monitoring and prevention of financial institutions of different systems importance. Second, we view the risks of the entire Chinese financial system from a global perspective, strengthen macro-prudential regulatory requirements and establish an early warning system for different industries to respond to risks jointly. Finally, we must focus on monitoring the impact on the entire financial system when negative news is encountered in different financial industry sectors at the same time, and the impact of local risks is relatively small. However, the simultaneous occurrence of risk events in different financial sectors will severely damage the public’s investment confidence, thus easily causing market panic. It will drastically expand the risk level of the market.