Revista y Edición

Volumen 24 (2020): Edición 1 (December 2020)

Volumen 23 (2020): Edición 1 (December 2020)

Volumen 22 (2019): Edición 1 (December 2019)

Volumen 21 (2019): Edición 1 (June 2019)

Volumen 20 (2018): Edición 1 (June 2018)

Volumen 19 (2017): Edición 1 (December 2017)

Volumen 18 (2017): Edición 1 (April 2017)

Volumen 17 (2016): Edición 1 (December 2016)

Volumen 16 (2016): Edición 1 (October 2016)

Volumen 15 (2016): Edición 1 (April 2016)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
1647-659X
Publicado por primera vez
01 Mar 2016
Periodo de publicación
3 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

Volumen 18 (2017): Edición 1 (April 2017)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
1647-659X
Publicado por primera vez
01 Mar 2016
Periodo de publicación
3 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

7 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Is Science Really What Naturalism Says it is?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 1 - 30

Resumen

Abstract

In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.

Palabras clave

  • Naturalism
  • Normativity
  • Quine
  • Epistemology
  • Scientific Explanation
Acceso abierto

How Our Biology Constrains Our Science

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 31 - 53

Resumen

Abstract

Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of influential philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that science is constrained by human nature. How exactly our genetic constitution constrains scientific representations of the world remains unclear. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it often leads to the unwarranted conclusion that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects or properties of the world. Secondly, it stands in the way of a nuanced account of the relationship between our cognitive and perceptual wiring and scientific theory. In response, I propose a typology or classification of the different kinds of biological constraints and their sources on science. Using Boden’s (1990) notion of a conceptual space, I distinguish between constraints relating to the ease with which we can reach representations within our conceptual space (which I call ‘biases’) and constraints causing possible representations to fall outside of our conceptual space. This last kind of constraints does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world cannot be represented by us – as argued by advocates of ‘cognitive closure’ – merely that some ways of representing the world are inaccessible to us. It relates to what Clark (1986) and Rescher (1990) have framed as ‘the alien scientist hypothesis’ (the possibility that alien scientists, endowed with radically different cognitive abilities, could produce representations of the world that are unintelligible to us). The purpose of this typology is to provide some much needed clarity and structure to the debate about biological constraints on science.

Palabras clave

  • Cognitive Constraints
  • Sensory Constraints
  • Scientific Scope
  • Cognitive Scaffolding
  • Conceptual Space
  • Cognitive Closure
Acceso abierto

Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 54 - 83

Resumen

Abstract

According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.

Palabras clave

  • Enactivism
  • Radical enactivism
  • Predictive processing
  • Mental representations
  • Mental content
  • Conceptual revolution
Acceso abierto

Anatomia da Linguagem: Podemos Compreender Jogos de Linguagem a Partir de Redes Corticais?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 84 - 109

Resumen

Abstract

There is today much interest in research of neuronal substrata in metaphor processing. It has been suggested that the right hemisphere yields a key role in the comprehension of figurative language (non-literal) and, particularly, in metaphors. Figurative language is included in pragmatics, a branch of linguistics that researches the use of language, in opposition to the study of the system of language. There lingers, though, an open debate in respect to the identification of the specific aspects concerning semantics, as opposed to those dominated by pragmatics. Can studies from neuronal correlates clarify questions that relate to semantics/pragmatics representation? I shall analyze neuroscientific developments about implicit language to attempt to understand, in section 2, scientific techniques available and more suitable to the phenomenology of the act of understanding an implicit, figurative or implicated message in a certain language game. To do so, I shall start by reviewing the studies in philosophy of language, and accommodate the development of the research in pragmatics underlying metaphor, particularly, in Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein. Finally, I discuss the possibility of interpretative capabilities being socioculturally grounded. I expect this methodological analysis to contribute to the enlightenment of the problem of phenomenology of intersubjective pragmatics, and to its future experimental paradigms.

Palabras clave

  • pragmatics
  • figurative language
  • metaphor
  • language games
  • neuronal correlates
  • neuroimage
Acceso abierto

Pode Sustentar-se o Argumento de Que Exista uma Dialéctica Quântica da Natureza?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 110 - 142

Resumen

Palavras-Chave

  • física quântica
  • complementaridade
  • indeterminaoção
  • dialéctica
  • realismo
Acceso abierto

Rosto e Mãos: Em torno de Deleuze, Derrida e Schiele

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 143 - 173

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Sobre O Bailado da Alma de Pio Abreu. À Procura da Alma Perdida. Ensaio Filosófico-Científico-Artístico Sobre as Danças e Outras Desventuras

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 174 - 179

Resumen

7 Artículos
Acceso abierto

Is Science Really What Naturalism Says it is?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 1 - 30

Resumen

Abstract

In spite of the relevance of a scientific representation of the world for naturalism, it is surprising that philosophy of science is less involved in the debate on naturalism than expected. Had the viewpoint of philosophy of science been duly considered, naturalism could not have overlooked the established lesson, according to which there is no well-defined recipe for what science must or must not be. In the present paper I address some implications of this lesson for (some forms of) naturalism, arguing that a radically naturalistic outlook fails to pay sufficient attention to some of the main lessons that philosophy of science has taught us concerning the nature of scientific theories. One of these lessons is that real scientific theories are far more normative than ordinary scientific naturalism is ready to accept, a circumstance that at a minimum is bound to force most naturalization strategies to re-define their significance.

Palabras clave

  • Naturalism
  • Normativity
  • Quine
  • Epistemology
  • Scientific Explanation
Acceso abierto

How Our Biology Constrains Our Science

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 31 - 53

Resumen

Abstract

Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of influential philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that science is constrained by human nature. How exactly our genetic constitution constrains scientific representations of the world remains unclear. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it often leads to the unwarranted conclusion that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects or properties of the world. Secondly, it stands in the way of a nuanced account of the relationship between our cognitive and perceptual wiring and scientific theory. In response, I propose a typology or classification of the different kinds of biological constraints and their sources on science. Using Boden’s (1990) notion of a conceptual space, I distinguish between constraints relating to the ease with which we can reach representations within our conceptual space (which I call ‘biases’) and constraints causing possible representations to fall outside of our conceptual space. This last kind of constraints does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world cannot be represented by us – as argued by advocates of ‘cognitive closure’ – merely that some ways of representing the world are inaccessible to us. It relates to what Clark (1986) and Rescher (1990) have framed as ‘the alien scientist hypothesis’ (the possibility that alien scientists, endowed with radically different cognitive abilities, could produce representations of the world that are unintelligible to us). The purpose of this typology is to provide some much needed clarity and structure to the debate about biological constraints on science.

Palabras clave

  • Cognitive Constraints
  • Sensory Constraints
  • Scientific Scope
  • Cognitive Scaffolding
  • Conceptual Space
  • Cognitive Closure
Acceso abierto

Enactivism, Radical Enactivism and Predictive Processing: What is Radical in Cognitive Science?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 54 - 83

Resumen

Abstract

According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem (section 2), we will argue (section 3) that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this (section 4), we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity.

Palabras clave

  • Enactivism
  • Radical enactivism
  • Predictive processing
  • Mental representations
  • Mental content
  • Conceptual revolution
Acceso abierto

Anatomia da Linguagem: Podemos Compreender Jogos de Linguagem a Partir de Redes Corticais?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 84 - 109

Resumen

Abstract

There is today much interest in research of neuronal substrata in metaphor processing. It has been suggested that the right hemisphere yields a key role in the comprehension of figurative language (non-literal) and, particularly, in metaphors. Figurative language is included in pragmatics, a branch of linguistics that researches the use of language, in opposition to the study of the system of language. There lingers, though, an open debate in respect to the identification of the specific aspects concerning semantics, as opposed to those dominated by pragmatics. Can studies from neuronal correlates clarify questions that relate to semantics/pragmatics representation? I shall analyze neuroscientific developments about implicit language to attempt to understand, in section 2, scientific techniques available and more suitable to the phenomenology of the act of understanding an implicit, figurative or implicated message in a certain language game. To do so, I shall start by reviewing the studies in philosophy of language, and accommodate the development of the research in pragmatics underlying metaphor, particularly, in Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein. Finally, I discuss the possibility of interpretative capabilities being socioculturally grounded. I expect this methodological analysis to contribute to the enlightenment of the problem of phenomenology of intersubjective pragmatics, and to its future experimental paradigms.

Palabras clave

  • pragmatics
  • figurative language
  • metaphor
  • language games
  • neuronal correlates
  • neuroimage
Acceso abierto

Pode Sustentar-se o Argumento de Que Exista uma Dialéctica Quântica da Natureza?

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 110 - 142

Resumen

Palavras-Chave

  • física quântica
  • complementaridade
  • indeterminaoção
  • dialéctica
  • realismo
Acceso abierto

Rosto e Mãos: Em torno de Deleuze, Derrida e Schiele

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 143 - 173

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Sobre O Bailado da Alma de Pio Abreu. À Procura da Alma Perdida. Ensaio Filosófico-Científico-Artístico Sobre as Danças e Outras Desventuras

Publicado en línea: 06 Jun 2017
Páginas: 174 - 179

Resumen

Planifique su conferencia remota con Sciendo