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Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
1647-659X
Publicado por primera vez
01 Mar 2016
Periodo de publicación
3 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

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Volumen 17 (2016): Edición 1 (December 2016)

Detalles de la revista
Formato
Revista
eISSN
1647-659X
Publicado por primera vez
01 Mar 2016
Periodo de publicación
3 veces al año
Idiomas
Inglés

Buscar

8 Artículos
Acceso abierto

From Toys to Games: Overcoming the View of Natural Selection as a Filter

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 1 - 24

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Presentation of the Dossier ‘Models and Fictions’

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 25 - 27

Resumen

Acceso abierto

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 28 - 55

Resumen

Abstract

In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.

Palabras clave

  • fiction/nonfiction
  • fictional/nonfictional works
  • utterance approach
  • minimally contextualist account
  • metarepresentation
Acceso abierto

Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 56 - 72

Resumen

Abstract

Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and especially his account of impossible objects has proved itself to be decisive in a wide range of fields, from logic up to ontology of fiction. Rejecting the traditional ‘prejudice in favour of the real’, Meinong investigates what there is not: a peculiar non-existing object is precisely the fictional object, which exemplifies a number of properties (like Sherlock Holmes, who lives in Baker Street and is an outstanding detective) without existing in the same way as flesh-and-blood detectives do. Fictional objects are in some sense incomplete objects, whose core of constituent properties is not completely determined. Now, what does it imply to hold that a fictional object may also occur in true statements? We shall deal with the objections raised by Russell and Quine against Meinong’s view, pointing out limits and advantages of both perspectives.

Palabras clave

  • Ontology of fiction
  • Meinong
  • classical quantification
  • Quine
  • meta-ontology
Acceso abierto

Scientific Models and Games of Make-Believe: A Modal-Logical Perspective

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 73 - 109

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Hypothetical, not Fictional Worlds

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 110 - 136

Resumen

Abstract

This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which exploits presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. The basic idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are created. The paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific thought experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary movements like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail over the similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types used in science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in science because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and the hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized in the fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish between inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the contrast the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of constraints.

Palabras clave

  • Abstraction
  • constraints
  • fiction-view
  • hypothetical worlds
  • idealization
  • models
  • representation
Acceso abierto

The question of Fiction – nonexistent objects, a possible world response from Paul Ricoeur

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 137 - 153

Resumen

Abstract

The question of fiction is omnipresent within the work of Paul Ricoeur throughout his prolific career. However, Ricoeur raises the questions of fiction in relation to other issues such the symbol, metaphor and narrative. This article sets out to foreground a traditional problem of fiction and logic, which is termed the existence of non-existent objects, in relation to the Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative. Ricoeur’s understanding of fiction takes place within his overall philosophical anthropology where the fictions and histories make up the very nature of identity both personal and collective. The existence of non-existent objects demonstrates a dichotomy between fiction and history, non-existent objects can exist as fictional objects. The very possibility of the existence of fictional objects entails ontological status considerations. What ontological status do fictional objects have? Ricoeur develops a concept of narrative configuration which is akin to the Kantian productive imagination and configuration frames the question historical narrative and fictional narrative. It is demonstrated that the ontological status of fictional objects can be best understood in a model of possible worlds.

Palabras clave

  • Ricoeur
  • fiction
  • nonexistent object
  • configurational narrative
  • ontological status
Acceso abierto

Review of Alfredo Ferrarin, The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 154 - 158

Resumen

8 Artículos
Acceso abierto

From Toys to Games: Overcoming the View of Natural Selection as a Filter

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 1 - 24

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Presentation of the Dossier ‘Models and Fictions’

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 25 - 27

Resumen

Acceso abierto

The Nature of Fiction/al Utterances

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 28 - 55

Resumen

Abstract

In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic terms. Finally, I want to hold that what makes a fictional utterance, hence a fictional work, properly fictional is the contextually pre-semantic fact that its utterer entertains an act of make-believe, where such an act is accounted for in metarepresentational terms. This ultimately means that the fiction/nonfiction distinction is not clarified in terms of the fictional works/nonfictional works distinction, for things rather go the other way around.

Palabras clave

  • fiction/nonfiction
  • fictional/nonfictional works
  • utterance approach
  • minimally contextualist account
  • metarepresentation
Acceso abierto

Centaurs, Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes: Against the Prejudice in Favour of the Real

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 56 - 72

Resumen

Abstract

Meinong’s thought has been rediscovered in recent times by analytic philosophy: his object theory has significant consequences in formal ontology, and especially his account of impossible objects has proved itself to be decisive in a wide range of fields, from logic up to ontology of fiction. Rejecting the traditional ‘prejudice in favour of the real’, Meinong investigates what there is not: a peculiar non-existing object is precisely the fictional object, which exemplifies a number of properties (like Sherlock Holmes, who lives in Baker Street and is an outstanding detective) without existing in the same way as flesh-and-blood detectives do. Fictional objects are in some sense incomplete objects, whose core of constituent properties is not completely determined. Now, what does it imply to hold that a fictional object may also occur in true statements? We shall deal with the objections raised by Russell and Quine against Meinong’s view, pointing out limits and advantages of both perspectives.

Palabras clave

  • Ontology of fiction
  • Meinong
  • classical quantification
  • Quine
  • meta-ontology
Acceso abierto

Scientific Models and Games of Make-Believe: A Modal-Logical Perspective

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 73 - 109

Resumen

Acceso abierto

Hypothetical, not Fictional Worlds

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 110 - 136

Resumen

Abstract

This paper critically analyzes the fiction-view of scientific modeling, which exploits presumed analogies between literary fiction and model building in science. The basic idea is that in both fiction and scientific modeling fictional worlds are created. The paper argues that the fiction-view comes closest to certain scientific thought experiments, especially those involving demons in science and to literary movements like naturalism. But the paper concludes that the dissimilarities prevail over the similarities. The fiction-view fails to do justice to the plurality of model types used in science; it fails to realize that a function like idealization only makes sense in science because models, unlike works of fiction, can be de-idealized; it fails to distinguish sufficiently between the make-believe (fictional) worlds created in fiction and the hypothetical (as-if) worlds envisaged in models. Representation characterized in the fiction-view as a license to draw inferences does not sufficiently distinguish between inferences in fiction from inferences in scientific modeling. To highlight the contrast the paper proposes to explicate representation in terms of satisfaction of constraints.

Palabras clave

  • Abstraction
  • constraints
  • fiction-view
  • hypothetical worlds
  • idealization
  • models
  • representation
Acceso abierto

The question of Fiction – nonexistent objects, a possible world response from Paul Ricoeur

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 137 - 153

Resumen

Abstract

The question of fiction is omnipresent within the work of Paul Ricoeur throughout his prolific career. However, Ricoeur raises the questions of fiction in relation to other issues such the symbol, metaphor and narrative. This article sets out to foreground a traditional problem of fiction and logic, which is termed the existence of non-existent objects, in relation to the Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative. Ricoeur’s understanding of fiction takes place within his overall philosophical anthropology where the fictions and histories make up the very nature of identity both personal and collective. The existence of non-existent objects demonstrates a dichotomy between fiction and history, non-existent objects can exist as fictional objects. The very possibility of the existence of fictional objects entails ontological status considerations. What ontological status do fictional objects have? Ricoeur develops a concept of narrative configuration which is akin to the Kantian productive imagination and configuration frames the question historical narrative and fictional narrative. It is demonstrated that the ontological status of fictional objects can be best understood in a model of possible worlds.

Palabras clave

  • Ricoeur
  • fiction
  • nonexistent object
  • configurational narrative
  • ontological status
Acceso abierto

Review of Alfredo Ferrarin, The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015

Publicado en línea: 25 Jan 2017
Páginas: 154 - 158

Resumen

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