Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options

Balmaceda, Felipe (2020): Contracting with Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Risk Neutrality: When Does One Size Fit All? International Journal of Game Theory 49(2), 601–637. BalmacedaFelipe 2020 Contracting with Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Risk Neutrality: When Does One Size Fit All? International Journal of Game Theory 49 2 601 637 Search in Google Scholar

Blair, Roger; Francine Lafontaine (2005): The Economics of Franchising. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. BlairRoger LafontaineFrancine 2005 The Economics of Franchising Cambridge Cambridge University Press Search in Google Scholar

Bommaraju, Raghu; Sebastian Hohenberg (2018): Self-Selected Sales Incentives: Evidence of their Effectiveness, Persistence, Durability, and Underlying Mechanisms. Journal of Marketing 82(5), 106–124. BommarajuRaghu HohenbergSebastian 2018 Self-Selected Sales Incentives: Evidence of their Effectiveness, Persistence, Durability, and Underlying Mechanisms. Journal of Marketing 82 5 106 124 Search in Google Scholar

Bower, Anthony (1993): Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency. International Economic Review 34(4), 873–901. BowerAnthony 1993 Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency. International Economic Review 34 4 873 901 Search in Google Scholar

Bull, Clive (1987): The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(1), 147–160. BullClive 1987 The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 1 147 160 Search in Google Scholar

Escobar, Juan; Carlos Pulgar (2017): Motivating with Simple Contracts. International Journal of Industrial Organization 54, 192–214. EscobarJuan PulgarCarlos 2017 Motivating with Simple Contracts. International Journal of Industrial Organization 54 192 214 Search in Google Scholar

Gary-Bobo, Robert; Alain Trannoy (2015): Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Rand Journal of Economics 46(3), 546–576. Gary-BoboRobert TrannoyAlain 2015 Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Rand Journal of Economics 46 3 546 576 Search in Google Scholar

Hallock, Kevin; Craig Olson (2009): Employees Choice of Method of Pay. ILR School at Cornell University discussion paper. HallockKevin OlsonCraig 2009 Employees Choice of Method of Pay ILR School at Cornell University discussion paper. Search in Google Scholar

Hart, Oliver; John Moore (1999): Foundations of Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 115–138. HartOliver MooreJohn 1999 Foundations of Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66 1 115 138 Search in Google Scholar

Hellwig, Martin; Dominik Schober; Luis Cabral (2020): Low-powered vs High-powered Incentives: Evidence from German Electricity Networks. International Journal of Industrial Organization 73(6), Article 102587. HellwigMartin SchoberDominik CabralLuis 2020 Low-powered vs High-powered Incentives: Evidence from German Electricity Networks International Journal of Industrial Organization 73 6 Article 102587. Search in Google Scholar

Joskow, Paul (2014): Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks, in: Nancy Rose (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 291–344. JoskowPaul 2014 Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks in: RoseNancy (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? Chicago University of Chicago Press 291 344 Search in Google Scholar

Lipsey, R. G.; Kelvin Lancaster (1956): The General Theory of Second Best. Review of Economic Studies 24(1), 11–32. LipseyR. G. LancasterKelvin 1956 The General Theory of Second Best. Review of Economic Studies 24 1 11 32 Search in Google Scholar

Lundberg, Shelly (1991): The Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws Under Imperfect Information: Affirmative Action and Alternatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(1), 309–326. LundbergShelly 1991 The Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws Under Imperfect Information: Affirmative Action and Alternatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 1 309 326 Search in Google Scholar

Maskin, Eric; Jean Tirole (1999): Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 83–114. MaskinEric TiroleJean 1999 Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66 1 83 114 Search in Google Scholar

McAfee, R. Preston (2002): Coarse Matching. Econometrica 70(5), 2025–2034. McAfeeR. Preston 2002 Coarse Matching. Econometrica 70 5 2025 2034 Search in Google Scholar

Myerson, Rogerson (1979): Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47(1), 61–74. MyersonRogerson 1979 Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47 1 61 74 Search in Google Scholar

Ollier, Sandrine; Lionel Thomas (2013): Ex Post Participation Constraint in a Principal-Agent Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Journal of Economic Theory 148(6), 2383–2403. OllierSandrine ThomasLionel 2013 Ex Post Participation Constraint in a Principal-Agent Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Journal of Economic Theory 148 6 2383 2403 Search in Google Scholar

Pal, Debashis; David Sappington; Iryna Topolyan (2022): Technical Appendix to Accompany Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options. https://people.clas.ufl.edu/sapping. PalDebashis SappingtonDavid TopolyanIryna 2022 Technical Appendix to Accompany Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options https://people.clas.ufl.edu/sapping. Search in Google Scholar

Reichelstein, Stefan (1992): Constructing Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts: An Application of Agency Theory. The Accounting Review 67(4), 712–731. ReichelsteinStefan 1992 Constructing Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts: An Application of Agency Theory. The Accounting Review 67 4 712 731 Search in Google Scholar

Rietzke, David; Yu Chen (2020): Push or Pull? Performance-pay, Incentives, and Information. Rand Journal of Economics 51(1), 301–317. RietzkeDavid ChenYu 2020 Push or Pull? Performance-pay, Incentives, and Information. Rand Journal of Economics 51 1 301 317 Search in Google Scholar

Rogerson, William (2003): Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation. American Economic Review 93(3), 919–926. RogersonWilliam 2003 Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation. American Economic Review 93 3 919 926 Search in Google Scholar

Sappington, David (2002): Price Regulation, in: Cave, Martin; Sumit Majumdar; Ingo Vogelsang (eds.), The Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. Volume I: Structure, Regulation, and Competition, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 225–293. SappingtonDavid 2002 Price Regulation in: CaveMartin MajumdarSumit VogelsangIngo (eds.), The Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. Volume I: Structure, Regulation, and Competition Amsterdam Elsevier Science Publishers 225 293 Search in Google Scholar

Tropman, John (2001): The Compensation Solution: How to Develop an Employee-Driven Rewards System. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass. TropmanJohn 2001 The Compensation Solution: How to Develop an Employee-Driven Rewards System San Francisco, CA Jossey-Bass Search in Google Scholar

Zoltners, Andris; Prabhakant Sinha; Sally Lorimer (2006): The Complete Guide to Sales Force Incentive Compensation: How to Design and Implement Plans that Work. New York: AMACON. ZoltnersAndris SinhaPrabhakant LorimerSally 2006 The Complete Guide to Sales Force Incentive Compensation: How to Design and Implement Plans that Work New York AMACON Search in Google Scholar