This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Balmaceda, Felipe (2020): Contracting with Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Risk Neutrality: When Does One Size Fit All? International Journal of Game Theory 49(2), 601–637.BalmacedaFelipe2020Contracting with Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection and Risk Neutrality: When Does One Size Fit All?International Journal of Game Theory492601637Search in Google Scholar
Blair, Roger; Francine Lafontaine (2005): The Economics of Franchising. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.BlairRogerLafontaineFrancine2005The Economics of FranchisingCambridgeCambridge University PressSearch in Google Scholar
Bommaraju, Raghu; Sebastian Hohenberg (2018): Self-Selected Sales Incentives: Evidence of their Effectiveness, Persistence, Durability, and Underlying Mechanisms. Journal of Marketing 82(5), 106–124.BommarajuRaghuHohenbergSebastian2018Self-Selected Sales Incentives: Evidence of their Effectiveness, Persistence, Durability, and Underlying Mechanisms.Journal of Marketing825106124Search in Google Scholar
Bower, Anthony (1993): Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency. International Economic Review 34(4), 873–901.BowerAnthony1993Procurement Policy and Contracting Efficiency.International Economic Review344873901Search in Google Scholar
Bull, Clive (1987): The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102(1), 147–160.BullClive1987The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts.Quarterly Journal of Economics1021147160Search in Google Scholar
Escobar, Juan; Carlos Pulgar (2017): Motivating with Simple Contracts. International Journal of Industrial Organization 54, 192–214.EscobarJuanPulgarCarlos2017Motivating with Simple Contracts.International Journal of Industrial Organization54192214Search in Google Scholar
Gary-Bobo, Robert; Alain Trannoy (2015): Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection. Rand Journal of Economics 46(3), 546–576.Gary-BoboRobertTrannoyAlain2015Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.Rand Journal of Economics463546576Search in Google Scholar
Hallock, Kevin; Craig Olson (2009): Employees Choice of Method of Pay. ILR School at Cornell University discussion paper.HallockKevinOlsonCraig2009Employees Choice of Method of PayILR School at Cornell University discussion paper.Search in Google Scholar
Hart, Oliver; John Moore (1999): Foundations of Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 115–138.HartOliverMooreJohn1999Foundations of Incomplete Contracts.Review of Economic Studies661115138Search in Google Scholar
Hellwig, Martin; Dominik Schober; Luis Cabral (2020): Low-powered vs High-powered Incentives: Evidence from German Electricity Networks. International Journal of Industrial Organization 73(6), Article 102587.HellwigMartinSchoberDominikCabralLuis2020Low-powered vs High-powered Incentives: Evidence from German Electricity NetworksInternational Journal of Industrial Organization736Article 102587.Search in Google Scholar
Joskow, Paul (2014): Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks, in: Nancy Rose (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 291–344.JoskowPaul2014Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networksin:RoseNancy(ed.),Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?ChicagoUniversity of Chicago Press291344Search in Google Scholar
Lipsey, R. G.; Kelvin Lancaster (1956): The General Theory of Second Best. Review of Economic Studies 24(1), 11–32.LipseyR. G.LancasterKelvin1956The General Theory of Second Best.Review of Economic Studies2411132Search in Google Scholar
Lundberg, Shelly (1991): The Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws Under Imperfect Information: Affirmative Action and Alternatives. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(1), 309–326.LundbergShelly1991The Enforcement of Equal Opportunity Laws Under Imperfect Information: Affirmative Action and Alternatives.Quarterly Journal of Economics1061309326Search in Google Scholar
Maskin, Eric; Jean Tirole (1999): Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts. Review of Economic Studies 66(1), 83–114.MaskinEricTiroleJean1999Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts.Review of Economic Studies66183114Search in Google Scholar
McAfee, R. Preston (2002): Coarse Matching. Econometrica 70(5), 2025–2034.McAfeeR. Preston2002Coarse Matching.Econometrica70520252034Search in Google Scholar
Myerson, Rogerson (1979): Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47(1), 61–74.MyersonRogerson1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.Econometrica4716174Search in Google Scholar
Ollier, Sandrine; Lionel Thomas (2013): Ex Post Participation Constraint in a Principal-Agent Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard. Journal of Economic Theory 148(6), 2383–2403.OllierSandrineThomasLionel2013Ex Post Participation Constraint in a Principal-Agent Model with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.Journal of Economic Theory148623832403Search in Google Scholar
Pal, Debashis; David Sappington; Iryna Topolyan (2022): Technical Appendix to Accompany Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Options. https://people.clas.ufl.edu/sapping.PalDebashisSappingtonDavidTopolyanIryna2022Technical Appendix to Accompany Pareto Gains from Limiting Compensation Optionshttps://people.clas.ufl.edu/sapping.Search in Google Scholar
Reichelstein, Stefan (1992): Constructing Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts: An Application of Agency Theory. The Accounting Review 67(4), 712–731.ReichelsteinStefan1992Constructing Incentive Schemes for Government Contracts: An Application of Agency Theory.The Accounting Review674712731Search in Google Scholar
Rietzke, David; Yu Chen (2020): Push or Pull? Performance-pay, Incentives, and Information. Rand Journal of Economics 51(1), 301–317.RietzkeDavidChenYu2020Push or Pull? Performance-pay, Incentives, and Information.Rand Journal of Economics511301317Search in Google Scholar
Rogerson, William (2003): Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation. American Economic Review 93(3), 919–926.RogersonWilliam2003Simple Menus of Contracts in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation.American Economic Review933919926Search in Google Scholar
Sappington, David (2002): Price Regulation, in: Cave, Martin; Sumit Majumdar; Ingo Vogelsang (eds.), The Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. Volume I: Structure, Regulation, and Competition, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers, 225–293.SappingtonDavid2002Price Regulationin:CaveMartinMajumdarSumitVogelsangIngo(eds.),The Handbook of Telecommunications Economics. Volume I: Structure, Regulation, and CompetitionAmsterdamElsevier Science Publishers225293Search in Google Scholar
Tropman, John (2001): The Compensation Solution: How to Develop an Employee-Driven Rewards System. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.TropmanJohn2001The Compensation Solution: How to Develop an Employee-Driven Rewards SystemSan Francisco, CAJossey-BassSearch in Google Scholar
Zoltners, Andris; Prabhakant Sinha; Sally Lorimer (2006): The Complete Guide to Sales Force Incentive Compensation: How to Design and Implement Plans that Work. New York: AMACON.ZoltnersAndrisSinhaPrabhakantLorimerSally2006The Complete Guide to Sales Force Incentive Compensation: How to Design and Implement Plans that WorkNew YorkAMACONSearch in Google Scholar