International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

José Antonio Alonso; Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga

Open Access

International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

José Antonio Alonso

and

Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga

| Nov 30, 2020

IZA Journal of Development and Migration

Volume 11 (2020): Issue 1 (January 2020)

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Page range: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2020-0020

Keywords
international migration, unskilled and skilled migration, adverse interest, factor endowments, asymmetric migration effects, migratory agreements

© 2020 José Antonio Alonso, Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Relation between democracy in host countries and rights of admitted migrants.

Relation between rights of migrants and openness.

Relationship between openness and the income gap.

Kernel distribution of the normalized income levels difference index.Note: var1 describes the differences in GDP per capita (in PPP) between two partner countries relative to the differences between the richest and poorest country in the world in the year being considered. The variable has been estimated for each five-year period. The vertical axis describes the number of BLAs per income gap.

HD (γD,ηS,η) and HD (γD) functions for ηS = 1 – η.

HU (γU, ηS, η) and HU(γμ,ηS_,η¯)−k(ηS−η−S)${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{\mu }},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right)-k\left( {{\eta }^{S}}-\eta _{-}^{S} \right)$when ηS = 0.9 and ηS_=0.8.$\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}}=0.8.$In order to simplify the presentation, we have assumed: ϵ = 4; Δ = 2; ξ = 2; δ = 3, for all developing countries.

ηs thresholds obtained for different (ϵ;Δ;ξ,δ) variables and (γD,γU) values.

Threshold values	γ^U = 0.7	γ^U = 0.8	γ^U = 0.9
(ϵ = 2;Δ = 2,ξ =1;δ = 2)	0.9	0.931	0.964
(ϵ = 2;Δ = 2,ξ =1;δ = 3)	0.87	0.913	0.955
(ϵ = 4;Δ = 2,ξ = 2;δ = 3)	0.79	0.855	0.922

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.003.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab1b5b9c15Aa

	Open	Close
Coop	H^U (γ^U ,η^S ,η); H^D (γ^D ,η^S ,η)	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)
Defect	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}) - k (η^{S} - η_{-}^{S}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η})$ ${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{U}},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right)-k\left( {{\eta }^{S}}-\eta _{-}^{S} \right);{{H}^{D}}\left( {{\gamma }^{D}},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right)$	$H^{U} (γ^{U}) - k (η^{S} - η_{-}^{-}); H^{D} (γ^{D})$ ${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{U}} \right)-k\left( {{\eta }^{S}}-\eta _{--}^{S} \right);{{H}^{D}}\left( {{\gamma }^{D}} \right)$

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.001.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab1b5b3Aa

		Host

		Open	Close
Home	Coop	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, η^{S}, η); H^{D} (γ^{D}, η^{S}, η)$ ${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{U}},{{\eta }^{S}},\eta \right);{{H}^{D}}\left( {{\gamma }^{D}},{{\eta }^{S}},\eta \right)$	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)
	Defect	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η})$ ${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{U}},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right);{{H}^{D}}\left( {{\gamma }^{D}},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right)$	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.004.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab2b1b5b3Aa

	Open	Close
Coop	H^U (γ^U ,η^S ,η); H^D (γ^D ,η^S ,η)	H^U (γ^U); H^D (γ^D)
Defect	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \underline{η^{S}}, \bar{η})$ ${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{U}},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right);{{H}^{D}}\left( {{\gamma }^{D}},\underline{{{\eta }^{S}}},\bar{\eta } \right)$	$H^{U} (γ^{U}, \bar{η}); H^{D} (γ^{D}, \bar{η})$ ${{H}^{U}}\left( {{\gamma }^{U}},\bar{\eta } \right);{{H}^{D}}\left( {{\gamma }^{D}},\bar{\eta } \right)$

eISSN:: 2520-1786
Language:: English

Publication timeframe:: Volume Open
Journal Subjects:: Business and Economics, Political Economics, Microeconomics, Macroecomics, Economic Policy, Mathematics and Statistics for Economists, Econometrics

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International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

Published Online: Nov 30, 2020

Page range: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2020-0020

Keywords
international migration, unskilled and skilled migration, adverse interest, factor endowments, asymmetric migration effects, migratory agreements

© 2020 José Antonio Alonso, Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

ηs thresholds obtained for different (ϵ;Δ;ξ,δ) variables and (γD,γU) values.

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.003.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab1b5b9c15Aa

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.001.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab1b5b3Aa

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.004.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab2b1b5b3Aa

International migratory agreements: the paradox of adverse interest

Published Online: Nov 30, 2020

Page range: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2020-0020

Keywordsinternational migration, unskilled and skilled migration, adverse interest, factor endowments, asymmetric migration effects, migratory agreements

© 2020 José Antonio Alonso, Francisco Javier Santos Arteaga, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

ηs thresholds obtained for different (ϵ;Δ;ξ,δ) variables and (γD,γU) values.

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.003.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab1b5b9c15Aa

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.001.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab1b5b3Aa

j.izajodm-2020-0020.tab.004.w2aab3b7d257b1b6b1ab2b1b5b3Aa

Keywords
international migration, unskilled and skilled migration, adverse interest, factor endowments, asymmetric migration effects, migratory agreements