<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>In the paper, we discuss the possibilities of alternative provision of public goods using the individual voluntary contributions. We use the data from the behavioral public goods game based on the model of voluntary contribution mechanism. We examine how people’s decisions about voluntary contributions to public goods change when the environment changes. The participants of the game were divided into small (5 persons) and large (10 persons) groups. During the game participants were asked to invest experimental money to different types of accounts, i.e. private account, Group account 1 and Group account 2. Using the game, we also examine the impact of a provision point on voluntary contributions. Based on the analysis of the data from this behavioral game, we found that the provision point is effective only if the participants are members of a small group. When the participants were members of both a small group and of a large group the provision point was not effective. When the income of participants was considered, we found that participants with higher experimental income were less willing to voluntarily contribute to financing of a public good.</p>
</abstract>

In the paper, we discuss the possibilities of alternative provision of public goods using the individual voluntary contributions. We use the data from the behavioral public goods game based on the model of voluntary contribution mechanism. We examine how people’s decisions about voluntary contributions to public goods change when the environment changes. The participants of the game were divided into small (5 persons) and large (10 persons) groups. During the game participants were asked to invest experimental money to different types of accounts, i.e. private account, Group account 1 and Group account 2. Using the game, we also examine the impact of a provision point on voluntary contributions. Based on the analysis of the data from this behavioral game, we found that the provision point is effective only if the participants are members of a small group. When the participants were members of both a small group and of a large group the provision point was not effective. When the income of participants was considered, we found that participants with higher experimental income were less willing to voluntarily contribute to financing of a public good.

Are People Willing to Voluntarily Contribute to Public Goods? The Results from the Behavioral Game Experiment.

Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

In the paper, we discuss the possibilities of alternative provision of public goods using the individual voluntary contributions. We use the data from the...

Are People Willing to Voluntarily Contribute to Public Goods? The Results from the Behavioral Game Experiment.

Data publikacji: 12 lut 2022

Zakres stron: 63 - 75

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/zireb-2021-0020

Słowa kluczowe
behavioral economics, voluntary contribution mechanism, public goods game, online experiment, provision point, small and large groups

© 2021 Eva Sirakovová et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Are People Willing to Voluntarily Contribute to Public Goods? The Results from the Behavioral Game Experiment.

Data publikacji: 12 lut 2022

Zakres stron: 63 - 75

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/zireb-2021-0020

Słowa kluczowebehavioral economics, voluntary contribution mechanism, public goods game, online experiment, provision point, small and large groups

© 2021 Eva Sirakovová et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
behavioral economics, voluntary contribution mechanism, public goods game, online experiment, provision point, small and large groups