<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In this paper, the theory of necessity proposed by Robert Grosseteste is presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of determination discussed by him (connected with: (1) one’s knowledge about the future, (2) predestination, (3) fate, (4) grace, (5) sin and temptation), a different context of Grosseteste’s use of the notion of necessity is analyzed (within logical and metaphysical approaches). At the heart of his theory lie: the definition of necessity, which is that something lacks the capacity (<italic>posse</italic>) for its opposite, and the distinction between two perspectives within which we can consider necessity: (1) the one according to which the truthfulness of a <italic>dictum</italic> determines that it cannot be the opposite, (2) a pre- or atemporal one, as if something had not yet begun. On these grounds, Robert explains that God’s omniscience is compatible with contingency, including human free decisions. Robert’s theory is still relevant and useful in contemporary debates, as it can provide strong arguments and enrich discussions, thanks to the twoperspectives approach, which generates nine kinds of positions on the spectrum of determinism and indeterminism.</p></abstract>

In this paper, the theory of necessity proposed by Robert Grosseteste is presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of determination discussed by him (connected with: (1) one’s knowledge about the future, (2) predestination, (3) fate, (4) grace, (5) sin and temptation), a different context of Grosseteste’s use of the notion of necessity is analyzed (within logical and metaphysical approaches). At the heart of his theory lie: the definition of necessity, which is that something lacks the capacity (posse) for its opposite, and the distinction between two perspectives within which we can consider necessity: (1) the one according to which the truthfulness of a dictum determines that it cannot be the opposite, (2) a pre- or atemporal one, as if something had not yet begun. On these grounds, Robert explains that God’s omniscience is compatible with contingency, including human free decisions. Robert’s theory is still relevant and useful in contemporary debates, as it can provide strong arguments and enrich discussions, thanks to the twoperspectives approach, which generates nine kinds of positions on the spectrum of determinism and indeterminism.

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s <italic>De libero arbitrio</italic>

Studia Humana

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s 

In this paper, the theory of necessity proposed by Robert Grosseteste is presented. After showing the wide range of various kinds of determination discussed by...

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Data publikacji: 11 lis 2020

Zakres stron: 165 - 176

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2020-0035

Słowa kluczowe
necessity, contingency, determination, God’s omniscience, future contingents, Robert Grosseteste, Jan Woleński

© 2020 Marcin Trepczyński, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Necessity and Determinism in Robert Grosseteste’s De libero arbitrio

Data publikacji: 11 lis 2020

Zakres stron: 165 - 176

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/sh-2020-0035

Słowa kluczowenecessity, contingency, determination, God’s omniscience, future contingents, Robert Grosseteste, Jan Woleński

© 2020 Marcin Trepczyński, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
necessity, contingency, determination, God’s omniscience, future contingents, Robert Grosseteste, Jan Woleński