Fight For Media Pluralism Or Just “JanŠA’S War On Media”?

‘There cannot be a war between one person and the media, just as there cannot be a war between one person and the army of a country’ (Janša in the web Portal GOV.SI 2020), were the introductory words of a storyline entitled‘War with the Media’ written by the Prime Minister of Slovenia, Janez Janša. This soon triggered a real hurricane of responses in the mainstream media (e.g., 24ur.com 2020, Dnevnik 2020b, rtvslo.si 2020) as the storyline openly questions the imbalance and partiality of Slovenian media, targeting, in particular, those funded by taxpayers whilst offering public service.

In his storyline, Janša revealed memories from a conversation he had with a friend of the former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Based on example about the assumedinvincibility of the Roman legions, Kohl’s friend explained to the Slovenian Premier that fear is stronger than swords and spears. To illustrate, he described how the premise of invincible Romans, spread by word of mouth, sowed fear among barbarian tribes, by creating belief that Roman legions could not be defeated. According to the former Chancellor’s old colleague, the same applies to the media. Instead of presenting the truth, the media create a belief in line with their particular interest. If someone critisizes or disagrees with them, they may be labeled as insane or, reckless, or be, accused of starting a war with them.

Based on this example, Janša drew a parallel with the minority groups which deal with the dominant view of the mainstream media. Whilst mainstream media look at issues through the lens of the majority, it is obvious that the perspective of minority groups will, as a rule, be neglected or even presented as false. According to the Prime Minister, the neutral perspective does not exist and therefore, ‘(…) different values and beliefs (…)’, created by an individual or a group of people ‘(…) should enjoy the equal opportunities of expressing and defending one’s ideas to the greatest extent possible’. He continues that this is only achievable with the competitiveness of the media, which is seen as the ‘(…) prerequisite of a democratic social system and a free society in general’ (ibid.).

This storyline serves as an introduction to the sensitive question of media pluralism and the issues Janša’s government has regarding approval of proposed bills amending media legislation. It also gives us an insight into Janša’s understanding of media pluralism, ressed in the last, section of this article, which presents both a historical review and perspectives about right-wing media policy in the future. The following section deals with the conceptualization of media pluralism in the context of politics. Some issues that have appeared with the rise of digital media are also discussed. Taking into account the insights of all authors included in the theoretical part, we derive three basic assumptions that guide our research. The first and principal assumption refers to the relationship between the extensive, freely accessible information sources and democracy as the most desirable and prominent social order in the Western world. The flood of information that constantly bombards our awareness and shapes our behaviour, interests, values, and political perspectives, makes it utmost priority, at least in democratic societies, to provide us, citizens of diverse backgrounds, with the plurality of media. The second assumption is based on the first one and is set in the context of politics. It says that in democratic societies, no one political perspective, neither the right-wing or the left-wing, should receive greater attention in the media, even less so when favoured by a specific journalist, editor, or any third person with a particular political interest. The precondition of the third assumption is that any government, being empowered to propose, decide and implement media policy, does not abuse its role imposing legal mechanisms that would rather undermine than uphold media pluralism. Putting it differently, in representative democracies, it is the responsibility and accountability of the government to preserve, promote and praise the plurality of media.

The mixture of qualitative and quantitative techniques is considered as the most appropriate for our research, as it encompasses three different topics, namely political pluralism, media pluralism and right-wing media policy. The latter is included in our research because we want to (1) present the historical background of amending bills proposed by the current coalition led by the right-wing SDS, and (2) explain why the content of changes has triggered such a sharp response both at the national as well as the European level. Furthermore, only the right-wing media policy is taken into account for a simple reason, which is the fact that (3) media legislation is one out of three previously discussed topics taken into account by the annotators of the Media landscape research (Tomšič et al., 2020) considered as the basis for our research). Last but foremost, referring to the storyline written by the Prime Minister, we want to (4) draw a comparison between Janša’s abstract understanding of the concept of media pluralism and the content of proposed bills as well as the already adopted laws.

The methodology of the research is explained in three subsections listed below. Based on the introduction, the theoretical part and all three of the above-mentioned basic assumptions, we continue the research with the following two hypotheses, H1 and H2.

H1: Relating to the fact that we are living in an information-saturated world, and in consideration of the role digital media play in terms of shaping citizens’ political perspective, we presume that the state of media pluralism in Slovenia, measured in terms of the attitude expressed toward political authorities or political parties by mainstream media, reflects the level of political pluralism, referring to the number of days either the right-wing or left-wing political parties have executed the responsibilities and duties of the Slovenian government.

H2: Referring to the responsibilities and duties, governments are supposed to have representative democracies; we presume that there must be a certain media policy that explains the continuous efforts carried out by the right-wing political parties, expressed through the proposed bills and amended laws, to improve the level of pluralism in media and consequently, increase their chances to be elected more often, whereby the period of their governance shall be evaluated in a more neutral and balanced way.

One can hardly disagree with the premise that public opinion comprises many different political perspectives, values and interests, represented by citizens of various backgrounds. The same applies to politics. The numerosity of political perspectives, values and interests, in a narrow sense, and the diversity of people, in a broader sense, calls for the conceptualisation of the word pluralism.

Plurality, media and political pluralism

As noticed by Raeijmaekers and Maeseele (2015), pluralism has become a buzzword in political, public and academic discourses. The latter, however, does not come as a surprise as the word pluralism is considered to be an undisputed value (Karppinen 2007) and one of the pillars of democracy (Tomšič 2007). Nevertheless, a great deal of interest in pluralism does not mean that this term is any closer to a clear definition. Disperate perspectives and understandings of pluralism isand its function in a democratic society isarise from the ambiguity of the concept itself (Karppinen 2007). On the one hand, it deliberates over the question of how to be inclusive about the existing diversity of groups and views in civil society (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015) whereas, on the other hand, it is concerned with the question of how to enable these differences to be expressed in politics in a balanced way, meaning that no one political view would dominate others (B. Hrvatin and Petković 2008). To be more specific, plurality in politics can be understood in a sense that not a single political perspective or political ideology has an unearned advantage or privilege to be heard, to rule, or manage public affairs.

In a democratic policy, political pluralism is ensured when all political perspectives or political ideologies have an equal chance to be heard, to be elected and to be changed, which can be understood as the circulation of political elites (Tomšič 2007).

One can define elites as an eminent group of tightly interrelated individuals who hold strategic positions in key social institutions (Kramberger and Vehovar 2000), allowing them to exert control over such spheres as the judiciary, academia and, the economy, let alone media (Tomšič 2011, Adam and Tomšič 2012). Kubik (2003) defines elites as most prominent cultural entrepreneurs who ‘(…) may not choose to “transmit” certain types of cultural narratives built upon certain historical events, thereby muting or even eliminating their impact on current political behaviour’ (ibid.,). In order to prevent such ‘indoctrination’, Adam (1999) advocates for the greater extent of flow among elites of different political views. The so-called ‘”flow dynamics’” is also what is meant in this article with the concept of elite’s circulation.

The fact is that we are living in an information-saturated world. Exposure to information and the possibility for active participation is something as natural as drinking water or eating food nowadays. This, in particular, applies to democratic societies. Referring to Barber (1989), one can say that information and communication with and through media is the essence of democracy as it represents means of making informed political decisions (O’Neil 1998).

The media are able to reflect both, the plurality of civil society and the plurality of politics. In consideration of the existing diversity of society, either in the civil sphere or in politics, the first and foremost function of media is to be inclusive in the sense that they enable all the voices to be heard. As stipulated in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations 1948), the media play a significant role both in terms of fulfiling the right of freedom as well as fulfilling the right of freedom of expression. In this connection, we can also understand the second paragraph (Article 11) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (European Union 2010), which stipulates that the freedom of media, along with media pluralism, shall be respected. Relating to Slovenian Constitution (Ustava Republike Slovenije 1991), this means that every entity (e.g. media) shall be provided with freedom of gathering, receiving and transmitting information (see Article 19).

Tomšič (2007) understands media as mediators between civil society and political authorities, whereby the media have a double nature. On the one hand, they serve as the environment for the articulation of opinions, ideas or critiques arising from civil society, whereas on the other hand, they can be considered as the messenger of their own opinions, ideas or critics.

Referring to Erzikova (2018), we can understand the media as the gatekeeper of information, meaning that they play the role of information filters. As explained by Bayer (2019), the inner structure of media outlets functions in such a way that every single piece of content written by a journalist is first checked by the editor before being published. B. Hrvatin and Petković (2008) add that editors are not just gatekeepers but also explainers of information.

Nevertheless, even editors of media outlets can sometimes find themselves in a subordinated position, which means that the decision regarding which aspect to highlight and which to neglect is made by someone else. According to Erzikova (2018), exercising gatekeeping in a media is a role that can be attributed either to individuals, organisations, or a government. In this regard, Habermas (1989) warns that the content of such media is not only reduced but also narrowed in a sense that it presents the issue from only one perspective, or as illustrated by Lombardi (2018): ‘(…) information sources frequently have an innate bias explained by an intellectual, political, or market affiliation, which may benefit the information source both in its relationships up-stream (e.g., with a political party) and on the demand side.’ Such content is mainly succumbed to a personalisation of customers’ experience, is considered to be out of the context, and is simple to consume, meaning that there is no need for rational thinking (Habermas 1989).

With the rise of digital media, there is one more thing to consider: the creation of echo chambers. As stated by Lombardi (2018), each internet user succumbs to algorithms that provide for such media environments where an internet user is exposed only to content which confirms and solidifies his or her existing beliefs, values and perspectives. To put it in simpler terms, we are bombarded with content based on our personal experiences. In the past, there were neither algorithms nor echo chambers. Still, the concept remains the same: ‘What better criterion does the man at the breakfast table possess than the newspaper version checks up with his own opinion?’ (Lippmann 2004, 178).

In this respect, B. Hrvatin and Petković (2008) warn that the lack of exposure to different information sources can result in the limitation of an individual’s political or cultural choice and, therefore, represent a direct threat to democracy. However, even frequent exposure to different information sources can sometimes bring more harm than good. The study conducted by A. Bail et al. (2018) has shown that exposure to opposite views has no significant impact on the pre-existing beliefs, values or perspectives by an online user, whilst increased political polarisation was not proved.

On the other hand, the creation of the so-called echo chambers is not unfamiliar to political authorities, whereby this can be achieved with strict media legislation. Haraszti provides such an example from Belarus where the government is stipulated to give a warning or even cease those media outlets misusing freedom of the press. As Haraszti (2011) adds, this stipulation is often used just to get rid of the media that are negatively disposed towards political authorities. By way of illustration, just on 21st August 2020, amid a huge wave of demonstrations, the Belarusian government decided to block 85 online news sources, labeling them as extreme (Gigitashvili 2021). The cessation of media outlets is not something new to the Hungarian government, which blocked the operation of a radio station due to the violation of compulsory registration law (Wiseman 2021).

Both the Hungarian and Belarusian political elites have in common a long period of ruling the state. In the case of Belarus, one can think of President Alexander Lukashenko, who has been in the office since 1994, whilst in Hungary, the title goes to Viktor Orban, whose Fidesz Party has been leading the government since 2010. Referring to Tomšič (2007), the long-term rule of one political option, either left or right

As regards the differentiation between the right and left political spectrum in the context of Slovenia, see for instance, Adam and Tomšič (2012).

To understand what it means to operate media in unfavoured conditions, for instance, under the communist regime of Yugoslavia, one can think of the case of the Slovenian weekly magazine Mladina during the 1980s. This media outlet was very progressive in the sense that it enabled journalists and intellectuals to articulate Slovenian national questions. Whereas in democratic societies: such a practice would hardly raise any concern, this did not apply to political authorities of the Yugoslav Communist Party. That is to say, Mladina was risking the intervention of the state. With the revelation of the secret documents of the Yugoslav federal army, which took place in 1988, the Slovenian weekly magazine stepped out of the line as its journalists violated the infamous Article 133 written in the Criminal Code. As the outcome, three of them (among whom was Janez Janša) were accused of betraying military secrets and thus, arrested (Istenič 2012).

The Conteptualisation of media pluralism

The easiest way to conteptualise media pluralism is to get the impression of what it is not. Based on Haraszti (2011), media pluralism is anything but the domination of a couple of media outlets that turn either into ‘propaganda mouthpieces’ or ‘unethical money-making machines’. In this regard, Gaur (2014) explains how media can intentionally frame content in a way to induce negative sentiments toward the government. Media pluralism also has nothing to do with the above-mentioned echo chambers as well as gatekeeping philosophy, although the latter is hard to regulate. The same also applies to the concentration of ownership and the creation of a monopoly (Bayer 2019).

An independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States (Directorate-General Information Society and Media 2009) defines media pluralism as ‘(…) diversity of media supply, use and distribution, in relation to (1) ownership and control, (2) media types and genres, (3) political viewpoints, (4) cultural expressions and (5) local and regional interests’. Given the foregoing, B. Hrvatin and Kučić (2005) suggest that the definition of media pluralism stands on two fundamental premises:

Media pluralism is created for, and is in interaction with, people of diverse cultures, beliefs, values and interests (Calderaro and Dobreva in CMPF 2013). According to this, we can understand media pluralism as an idea aiming to mirror the diversity of society with and through media. Referring to theHutchins Commission Report (Metzgar and Hornaday 2013), one can evaluate the plurality of media by asking these five questions: (1) do they provide truthful and comprehensive coverage of news; (2) do they enable the expression of comments and criticism; (3) do they portray social groups in a representative way; (4) do they present and explain social values and norms; and (5) do they provide full access to information for every member of society?

Further, media pluralism can be divided into two broad categories. The first is internal pluralism which refers to the diverse, balanced and impartial content within a singular media outlet, meaning that journalists look at the issue from different perspectives, whereby no perspective is favoured over another or covered to a greater extent. The second is external pluralism. The latter concerns diversity of the media environment within a certain market, composed of independent media outlets, whereby the ownership is dispersed and separate from one another (Haraszti 2011, Czepek et al. 2019).

As far as the first category is concerned, the emphasis has to be given to journalists whose objective should be to cover news in a way to induce rational debates (Haraszti 2011) whilst not hesitating to accept comments and critics of others (Metzgar and Hornaday 2013). Referring to deliberate scholars (Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015), journalism should be two-way rather than one-way and participatory instead of professional. In this vein, one can also understand the right of reply or the right of correction, which not only equates the relationship between journalists and consumers but also contributes to a more inclusive discussion on different issues (Youm 2008).

Concerning external pluralism, it has to be stressed that a larger number of media outlets does not necessarily mean a greater variety of content. In this regard, we are referring to the issue when a group of private media, although separated in terms of ownership, mainly rely on the same source of information, namely national press agency, controlled by the state. For instance, the study conducted by Boumans et al. (2018) has shown that almost a quarter of Dutch print media mainly rely on a national news agency whilst the percentage is even higher among online media, namely circa 70%. According to Boumans et al. (ibid.) the danger of extreme reliance on one information source can result in the homogeneity of the content in terms of lack of diverse viewpoints (ibid.).

Everything considered, this article is based on the following three assumptions:

The present section is based on the statistical data gathered by Zeilhofer and Zajc (2020), Media landscape research (Tomšič et al. 2020) and data collection available on MOSS (2021). To draw parallels with the situation in recent history, qualitative material is used. It must be pointed out that we only consider the most dominant (print and broadcasting) media in terms of market share (print media) and audience share (broadcasting media). Since the Media landscape research (Tomšič et al. 2020) focused on the online content only, we also take a brief look at how these so-called mainstream media are performing in terms of the website’s daily reach.

4.1.

The Plurality of the Print Media Market

As far as print media is considered, there were four daily newspapers (Delo, Dnevnik, Večer and Slovenske novice) in the 1990s, which controlled more than 90% of the daily newspaper market. Interestingly, besides Slovenske novice, all the newspapers were established and operating already at the time of the communist regime (Istenič 2012), which is one of the reasons why Delo, Dnevnik, Večer and Slovenske novice are labeled as left-leaned newspapers.

In light of this, it is possible to explain the attempts by the right-wing parties to establish new daily newspapers such as Slovenec and Jutranjik, whereby the main idea was to balance the media market. The daily newspaper Slovenec was the project launched and financially supported by Slovene Christian Democrats (SKD) led by Lojze Peterle; due to lack of political will and low initial capital Slovenec held on the market only for 5 years (1991–1996). The story of Jutranjik is even more miserable as it ceased to exist after only one month of operation (May 1998–June 1998) (B. Hrvatin and Milosavljević 2001).

At the other end, the left-political wing did not stand aside. The daily newspaper Republika was established in 1992 and was considered a response to the foundation of Slovenec. For its operation, Republika counted on the money provided by Gianni de Michelis, a member of the Italian Socialist Party, who was, at that time, also the minister of foreign affairs. This had never happened before. Instead, Republika followed the same tragic path as its rival Slovenec (and later Jutranjik) and ceased to exist in 1996 (B. Hrvatin and Kerševan 1999, B. Hrvatin and Milosavljević 2001).

Nowadays, the print media market is still dominated by the same players as in the 90s. According to the statistical data considering the sold circulation of newspapers in 2017, Delo (21%), Dnevnik (16%), Slovenske novice (42%) and Večer (16%) together covered 95% of the market share whereas only 5% remained for other newspapers.

The fact of the matter is that more and more Slovenians consume news digitally. In other words, daily newspapers in order to keep in step with the times, had to move their content online. The same applies to Delo, Dnevnik, Večer and Slovenske novice, whereby their daily reach share is less dominant yet still influential. Part of the reason for lower ranking may be the reliance on pay-per-view articles. According to data collection that measures daily reach, all four internet sites can be found in the top 15 of the most visited Slovenian websites for June 2021. Slovenske novice is in 4th place with 43,1% of daily reach whilst Delo is in 7th place (36,3%). Further on, Večer is placed in 10th position (29,6%) and Dnevnik with 21,0% in 15th place. It has to be stressed that the research encompasses all the websites and not only those providing general information (MOSS 2021).

Picture 1.

Source: Adjusted after (Zeilhofer and Zajc 2020).

Picture 2.

Source: Adjusted after Tomšič et al. (2020).

As can be observed, Delo, Dnevnik, Slovenske novice and Večer are considered as important and influential news sources. For precisely that reason, they were also chosen for the Media landscape research conducted by the Faculty of Media in 2020 (see Tomšič et al. 2020). Below we present the main findings of the research, adjusted to our needs.

As one can see, the neutral stance prevails among all four media outlets. In this regard, we have to emphasise the performance of Slovenske novice (69,8%) and Delo (60%), where more than two-thirds of the articles were evaluated as neutral. In the remaining part, both Slovenske novice (30,2%) and Delo (36,7%) represent a left-wing standpoint. This, in particular, applies to Večer (46,2%) and Dnevnik (48,2%), where almost half of the collected articles look at issues (Covid-19, media legislation, migration) from the point of view of the left. It becomes clear that the right-wing perspective is underrepresented and marginalised. Considering all four media outlets together, only 9,2% of articles represented the view of the right.

Picture 3.

Source: Adjusted after (Zeilhofer and Zajc 2020).

The Plurality of the Broadcasting Market

As regards the broadcasting market, things were a little bit different as there were even fewer players competing for the attention of the television viewers. Literally, up until 1995, the broadcasting market was more or less controlled by RTV Slovenia. Things significantly changed with the establishment of the Pro Plus media company and the ambitious entrance of the commercial television programme POP TV. Moreover, with the merger of another commercial channel Kanal A (which happened in 2001), Pro Plus developed into the most dominant and influential player on the commercial broadcasting market and a serious competitor for RTV Slovenia. If Pro Plus and RTV Slovenia solidified their positions, commercial TV 3 played a marginal role. According to B. Hrvatin and Milosavljević (2001), one of the reasons for the failure of this commercial television was its image of the right-wing channel linked to politics and the Church (ibid.).

From the beginning of the century up until recently, the situation remained unchanged. Except for Planet TV, established in 2012, RTV Slovenia and Pro Plus (with television channels POP TV and Kanal A) still dominate the broadcasting market. Whilst the audience share of all three RTV television programmes was 22,7%, the audience share of Pro Plus programmes (taking into account POP TV and Kanal A only) was 34%. Together with Planet TV (4%), these media cover more than two-thirds (60,7%) of the broadcasting market (Zeilhofer and Zajc 2020).

Let us now take a look at the webpages. Equal to daily newspapers, the broadcasting media also move their activities online. Whilst POP TV and Kanal A are represented by the website 24ur.com, the content of all three national broadcasting programmes (TV Slovenia 1, TV Slovenia 2, TV Slovenia 3) can be reached by clicking on rtvslo.si. As far as Planet TV is concerned, one can find its content on siol.net. To check the level of media pluralism in the broadcasting market, these four websites will be taken into consideration.

Before we analyse the findings of the survey, let us consider the website reach share gathered for June 2021. In comparison to websites operated by print media, 24ur.com, siol.net and rtvslo.si are all positioned in the top 5. The most clickable website in Slovenia is 24.ur (61,0%); in 2nd place is siol.net (51,6%); and rtvslo.si (42,4%) is positioned in 5th place (MOSS 2021). According to this, it is not a surprise that all three were also taken into consideration Media landscape research. As in the case of print media websites, we again keep the neutral option and do a merger of the pro-governmental and anti-opposition category (right-wing perspective). The same applies to the anti-governmental option, which is merged with the pro-opposition category (left-wing perspective).

Picture 4.

Source: Adjusted after Tomšič et al. (2020).

Picture 5.

Source: Adjusted after Tomšič et al. (2020).

Considering a neutral stance, siol.net (operated by Planet TV) stands out with 73,7%; 24ur.com follows with 64,3%; and public rtvslo.si published 55,8% of articles that did not contain any political preference. In comparison to rtvslo.si and 24ur.com, siol.net is also more balanced in terms of political orientation. Whereas11,4% of articles leaned towards the right, 14,9% were left-oriented. Surprisingly, out of all three websites, the public rtvslo.si. had the worst performance in the context of politically oriented articles. In comparison to private 24ur.com (35,8%), more than two-thirds of such articles (44,2%) leaned either to the left or the right. Out of that 44,2% (i.e. 100%), 94,1% looked at issues from the left-wing perspective whilst only 5,9% represented the stance of the ruling right-wing coalition.

The collected statistical data presented using tables and pie diagrams are the outcome of our calculation, aiming to evaluate the state of political pluralism in Slovenia and analyse the circulation of political elites. The key data were found on the official page of the Slovenian government (Portal GOV.SI 2021) as well as on the page of the State Election Commission (Državna volilna komisija 2021).

The fact of the matter is that in the first period from 1990–2000 (considering the first four governments up until the approval and oath of Slovenian Christian Democrats or SKD), the most dominant political party was the left-wing LDS (Liberal Democratic Party), which stayed in the office for 3,432 days or 82% of the time. The rest was left to DEMOS that ruled the state for 729 days or 18% of the time.

As far as the second period is considered, we can say that it was the most balanced in terms of days spent in the office either by the left or right-wing government. The period consisted of five governments. Two represented right-wing politics (Slovenian Democratic Party or SDS and Slovenian Christian Democrats or SKD) whilst the remaining three represented left wing-politics (LDS and Social Democrats or SD). It has to be pointed out that out of 4,265 (i.e. 100%) days, 1655 were intended for right-wing governments (39%) and 2,610 for left-wing governments (61%).

The third period considers the time from the composition of the government led by the left-wing PS (Positive Slovenia) that took place in 2012 up until the formal ending of the 13th government led by the left-wing LMŠ (List of Marjan Šarec), which happened in 2020. This period consists of four different governments. Besides LMŠ and PS (both in force for 547 days), there were also the right-wing SDS and the central-left SMC (Modern Centre Party). Whereas the right-wing government led by SDS only stayed in office for 404 days (14%), the left-wing PS, LMŠ and, SMC coalitions together covered 2,550 days (86%).

Everything considered, out of 13 governments arranged along the period of 11,380 days, 9 governments were led by the left-wing political party whereas 4 governments were composed of right-wing coalition partners. Comprehensively, the left-wing governments were in office 76% of the time (8,592 days), whereas the remaining 24% belonged to the right-wing coalitions (2,782 days). It has to be pointed out that out of 4 right-wing governments, 2 of them (DEMOS and SDS) received the mandate for the formation of a coalition based on the parliamentary election results, whilst the other 2 governments took over the executive branch due to a vote of no confidence (ruling coalition party SKD in 2000 and SDS for the second time in history in 2012). On the other hand, Janša’s government (SDS 2004-2008) up until recently remains the last one that successfully finished a full mandate.

As far as the winners of parliamentary elections are considered, the results reflect the findings illustrated above. Out of 9 parliamentary elections, 6 were won by left-wing political parties whilst the other 3 went to right-wing political parties. When taking into account the fact that from 16th May 1990 up until 13th March 2020, Slovenia had 13 governments in office, considering the number of elections (i.e. 9), one can claim that the circulation of political elites is more than obvious.

Picture 6.

Source: Adjusted after Portal GOV.SI (2021).

Picture 7.

Source: Adjusted after Portal GOV.SI (2021).

Yet, the fact of the matter is that the circulation of political elites was one-sided, meaning that the changes of the government were only visible in terms of different political parties, mainly representing one political spectrum (i.e. the left). This, in particular, applies to the last period (2012-2020), when 3 left-wing political parties (i.e. PS, SMC and LMŠ) led the government although this was not much obvious in the first period (1990–2000), which was marked by the domination of LDS.

Based on that, we can conclude that the level of political pluralism in Slovenia is relatively low in the sense that the circulation of political elites is mainly happening on the left side of the political spectrum. Considering the period between 1990 and 2000, the circulation of political elites was mainly limited within the inner structure of the left-wing LDS. The latter won three consecutive elections (1992, 1996, 2000) whilst ruling the state 82% of the time or 3,432 days. In the last couple of years, one can see that this trend is continuing, meaning that governments are pretty much led by left-wing political parties. However, in comparison to the first period, the circulation is not limited to one political party, as was the case of LDS, but is more dispersed. In this regard, one can think of governments led by the left-wing PS, SMC and LMŠ. Except for the latter, both PS and SMC composed the government after they had won the elections (PS in 2011 and SMC in 2014).

Picture 8.

Source: Adjusted after Portal GOV.SI (2021).

Picture 9.

Source: Adjusted after Portal GOV.SI (2021).

Picture 10.

Source: Adjusted after Državna volilna komisija (2021).

As far as the right-wing political spectrum is concerned, the circulation of political elites is even less visible. This is especially vivid after 2004 when all three right-wing governments (also taking into consideration the current structure) were/are led by the same political party, namely SDS. The same applies to the elections, as both (2004 and 2018) were won by SDS. Thus, the supremacy of the latter on the right-wing political spectrum can only be comparable with the dominance of LDS on the left side.

Referring to Lippmann (2004), Spengler (2010), Tomšič (2007) and Gaur (2019), among others, it can be said that the will of the people is shaped and influenced with and through media. Putting it another way, the public opinion, either leaning to the left or the right, cannot be taken for granted as it is always a production of media. Besides, any public consensus is always made at the expense of exclusion, meaning that marginal groups are left out of consideration (Mouffe in Raeijmaekers and Maeseele 2015). As demonstrated, this is exactly the case of Slovenia, whereby the mainstream media play a significant role in terms of guaranteeing political elites from the left to preserve their dominant position in the state.

Bearing this in mind, the question that arises is whether the right-wing media policy, ranging from legislative proposals to passed amendments, and from the establishment of newspapers to the launch of television channels, is solving the issue of media pluralism. For instance, a stipulation that defines greater involvement of government in the operation of public media, namely RTV (see ZRTVS-1 2005), could be misused in a way to transform public service into the propaganda machine of every ruling coalition. Besides, the right to correction and reply (see Zmed-A 2006), although aiming to call media for greater accountability to civil society, can also be interpreted as the attempt of political authorities to pressure the editorial policy of critical media whilst pushing them to change their rhetoric.

On the other hand, some of the positive examples need to be considered. In the first place, this was the establishment of a parliamentarian programme (TV Slovenija 3), ensuring the citizens the possibility of keeping an eye on what is going on in the parliament. In other words, the launch of TV Slovenija 3 has brought politics in general and the decision-making process in particular closer to the interested audience.

Out of three mechanisms to increase plurality of media suggested by B. Hrvatin and Petković (2008), one also refers to subventions. From this perspective, it is possible to claim that the launch of a media fund is a good idea. Yet, one has to consider whether the expert commission, either appointed by right or left-wing government, will make its decision in an impartial and balanced way. If yes, then television programmes such as Planet TV, referring here to the web portal siol.net and its performance in a recent Media landscape research, will get a reason to perform even better whilst those neglected will be forced either to change their editorial policy or to seek other ways of funding.

To conclude, the fact is that our research findings have some limitations that need to be pointed out. This, in particular, applies to the state of media pluralism, where we rely mainly on the Media landscape research (see Tomšič et al. 2020). In this regard, one has to consider that the above-mentioned study only encompasses articles that were written during the time of the pandemic and that the performance of the political authorities around the world was mainly evaluated through the lenses of this particular issue. As the context of the pandemic is without saying negative, one has to consider conducting similar research under more favourable circumstances. In addition, the research was done in a time of the right-wing government, so we suggest carrying out a similar research once the ruling coalition is led by the left-wing political party. Moreover, referring to the study conducted by Boumans et al. (2018), it would be interesting to analyse the relationship between national press agencies and mainstream media. More precisely, it might be asked to what degree the Slovenian mainstream media rely on the STA (Slovenian national press agency) and how this affects news coverage.

Though our article says differently, it is hardly possible to argue that the state of media pluralism always reflects the state of political pluralism. Leaving aside the autocratic regimes where the media are by rule controlled by the state, the relationship between media and political pluralism in democratic societies may vary from state to state. To test our findings, more similar research in other countries should be done.