<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>In this paper, I address Husserl’s theory of intentionality focusing on the problems of attention. I claim that without phenomenological reduction the specific phenomenological content of modalizations – in intentional acts – would be hard to explain. It would be impossible to understand why constant external factors (for instance, variations in the intensity of a stimulus) are accompanied by fluctuations in attention. It would also be impossible to understand the reasons why only the lived experience of causality – which I sharply distinguish from causality in the psychophysical sense of the term – transforms attention into a factor that allows the understanding of a situation by the subject who lives that experience. I claim at last that only the genetic analysis of Husserl’s late Freiburg period, with its distinction between primary and secondary attention, gives a full account of the relation between the thematic object, focused on an intentional attentive act, and the horizon that surrounds the object and gives it its ultimate meaning.</p>
</abstract>

In this paper, I address Husserl’s theory of intentionality focusing on the problems of attention. I claim that without phenomenological reduction the specific phenomenological content of modalizations – in intentional acts – would be hard to explain. It would be impossible to understand why constant external factors (for instance, variations in the intensity of a stimulus) are accompanied by fluctuations in attention. It would also be impossible to understand the reasons why only the lived experience of causality – which I sharply distinguish from causality in the psychophysical sense of the term – transforms attention into a factor that allows the understanding of a situation by the subject who lives that experience. I claim at last that only the genetic analysis of Husserl’s late Freiburg period, with its distinction between primary and secondary attention, gives a full account of the relation between the thematic object, focused on an intentional attentive act, and the horizon that surrounds the object and gives it its ultimate meaning.

The Husserlian Doctrine about the Modalities of Attention

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"The Husserlian Doctrine about the Modalities of Attention"}

In this paper, I address Husserl’s theory of intentionality focusing on the problems of attention. I claim that without phenomenological reduction the specific...

The Husserlian Doctrine about the Modalities of Attention

Data publikacji: 08 paź 2022

Zakres stron: 69 - 84

Otrzymano: 01 lut 2015

Przyjęty: 01 wrz 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0005

Słowa kluczowe
Attention, Horizon, Static and genetic phenomenology, Marginal consciousness

© 2022 Carlos Morujão, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

The Husserlian Doctrine about the Modalities of Attention

Data publikacji: 08 paź 2022

Zakres stron: 69 - 84

Otrzymano: 01 lut 2015

Przyjęty: 01 wrz 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2022-0005

Słowa kluczoweAttention, Horizon, Static and genetic phenomenology, Marginal consciousness

© 2022 Carlos Morujão, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
Attention, Horizon, Static and genetic phenomenology, Marginal consciousness