<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the <italic>ego-</italic>polarization (the “birth” of the <italic>ego</italic>), the <italic>egoic layer</italic> of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s <italic>Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis.</italic></p></abstract>

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense, points to some limitations of the phenomenological approach to consciousness and mind. I am referring to an aporetic situation that is at the heart of the phenomenological analysis of passivity. On the one hand, phenomenology shows, at least indirectly, a passive life that is beyond the first steps of the activity of the ego in the receptive, affective life. This is something that is beyond the rising of an ego, and from which a phenomenology of the ego-form of subjective life could be addressed. On the other hand, the analytic and conceptual tools of the phenomenological method have no grips on this basic realm of subjective life. As a result, Husserl’s analysis of passivity starts with the evidence of a pre-affective, pre-egoic realm, from which a phenomenology of the ego could be developed. However, Husserl’s analyses end up with the denegation of this dimension, as if it was invisible for the phenomenological method. As a consequence, the starting point of the analysis is not passivity proper, but rather the primitive forms of receptivity, which is already a first layer of the activity of the ego. Instead of an analysis of the ego-polarization (the “birth” of the ego), the egoic layer of conscious life is simply presupposed. A phenomenology of the ego-form is, thus, at the same time promised and denied. This aporetic situation is visible in the alteration of the concept of a passive pre-givenness in Husserl’s Analysis Concerning Passive Synthesis.

Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?"}

In what follows, I intend to address an issue which is at the boundaries of the phenomenological method of reflective explication, and that, in this sense,...

Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?

Data publikacji: 14 paź 2021

Zakres stron: 13 - 35

Otrzymano: 20 wrz 2017

Przyjęty: 11 paź 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0003

Słowa kluczowe
Genetic Phenomenology, Passivity, Pre-affective Constitution, Activity, Husserl

© 2017 Pedro M. S. Alves, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Perception and Passivity Can the Passive Pre-Givenness Be Phenomenalized?

Data publikacji: 14 paź 2021

Zakres stron: 13 - 35

Otrzymano: 20 wrz 2017

Przyjęty: 11 paź 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0003

Słowa kluczoweGenetic Phenomenology, Passivity, Pre-affective Constitution, Activity, Husserl

© 2017 Pedro M. S. Alves, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Genetic Phenomenology, Passivity, Pre-affective Constitution, Activity, Husserl