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<p>The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown-related democratic decline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideological and regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in the same manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish the authority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency provides an ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe that autocratic regimes with a ‘pre-existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. To contribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic-related state of emergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the most important of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy, autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election to use the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory, they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thus undermining democracy.</p>
</abstract>

The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown-related democratic decline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideological and regime (dis)similarity. Why did similar regimes not respond to the pandemic in the same manner by using the opportunity to grab more executive power and diminish the authority of other institutions? While some argue that a state of emergency provides an ideal opportunity for democratic decline due to reduced costs, others believe that autocratic regimes with a ‘pre-existing condition for autocracy’ are more vulnerable. To contribute to this discussion, I examine three examples from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) during the pandemic-related state of emergency and lockdowns of 2020 and 2021. I consider several relevant factors, the most important of which is the prospect of winning the next election. To erode democracy, autocratic incumbents must feel insecure about the outcome of the next election to use the opportunity created by the state of emergency. If they are uncertain of victory, they may prefer to expand their executive powers during the state of emergency, thus undermining democracy.

Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe

Politics in Central Europe

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

The paper’s key puzzle is the variation in lockdown-related democratic decline in the region of Central and Southeast Europe given the incumbents’ ideological...

Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe

Data publikacji: 28 wrz 2023

Zakres stron: 621 - 643

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0029

Słowa kluczowe
democratic decline, executive aggrandisement, hybrid regimes, state of emergency

© 2023 Dušan Pavlović, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Does the state of emergency create an opportunity for democratic erosion? Lessons from post-communist Central and Southeast Europe

Data publikacji: 28 wrz 2023

Zakres stron: 621 - 643

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/pce-2023-0029

Słowa kluczowedemocratic decline, executive aggrandisement, hybrid regimes, state of emergency

© 2023 Dušan Pavlović, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
democratic decline, executive aggrandisement, hybrid regimes, state of emergency