Power-Supply Geopolitics. The Dependence of European Economies on Imports of Fuels from Russia

The international system is a collection of centres of power and states, as well as the positioning of these centres in relation to other actors (as elements of the overarching system). According to L. Dallanegra Pedraza (2010), it is the strong states with entrenched positions in the international arena which lead global relations, while centres of lower rank and significance have no choice but to become subordinated to the former. A decided majority of the relations presented here thus operate in one direction, with weaker centres showing only a limited (or in fact zero) capacity for resistance or resilience. Centres of power, from which relations involving the imposition of rules spread out via bilateral relations and the management of the aforesaid system, may be states, transnational actors, multinational corporations, or even NGOs. But within this global system, relations of domination and subordination are imposed by political and economic powers. Ties between centres of power shape, but are also shaped by, a defined structure and global order, which also has its own spatial aspect. Further influences arise out of the institutional forms present in each centre, and the amount of authority it is possible for that centre to project. The global system of centres of power and, consequently, of relations is uneven and heterogeneous, as the same opportunities for development are not present everywhere, and nor are the same amounts of resources. Beyond this, the global system lacks the true will to achieve equality and justice when it comes to accessing resources or supplying them. Rather, the best it has achieved is the forging of certain alliances to help ensure that many needs are met (Dallanegra Pedraza 2010).

In this article, the author analyses the situation in which the increase in demand for raw materials and their geographically limited availability serve Russia and enable it to exert political pressure on Ukraine (but also on other European countries). On the one hand, the possession of resources should influence the economic growth of the country which exploits and exports them. The relation between the possession of resources and their trade has been analysed since the second half of the twentieth century, based on the theories of dependency, economic dualism, and the New International Economic Order (Sachs, Warner 1995). Russia’s dominant position in the trade of energy raw materials and its poor diversification of supply routes to Europe have proved to be disadvantageous from a geopolitical point of view (threat to continuity of supply, price imbalance).

Societies, and not only in Europe but all over the world, are facing a shortage of energy resources in the face of an unstable energy market, unstable supplies of energy resources for the production of other goods, and the use of raw materials, in geopolitics. The energy issue, has become the most important political and economic factor worldwide (Zimmerer 2011).

Concepts exploring the relation between energy resources and political instability provide examples of various negative phenomena which occur in both supply-control countries and countries with a high demand for energy resources. Large profits from the sale of raw materials are linked to coups, or the occurrence and continuation of armed conflicts. On the other hand, in analyses explaining the large variation in results among natural resource exporters, T. Dunning (2005), to confirm this thesis, pointed to the relatively stable situation in Saudi Arabia and also, in contrast, to Nigeria’s history of continuous conflict after independence.

For many years now, both geographers and political scientists have been analysing the question as to what extent the possession of mineral resources, especially energy resources, affects political stability and economic growth. At the end of the twentieth century, J. Sachs and A. M. Warner (1995) of the centre pointed out that from the 1950s until the 1970s, questions about the relation between resources and prosperity were already a central topic in scientific debate, mainly between Marxists and neo-Marxists. The geopolitical approach thus examines, among other things, relations of dependency and power through the prism of relations of domination, influence, independence, interdependence, territorial integrity, development, political and social stability, and security. In the relations between democratic countries and non-democratic countries, an analysis of the specifics of the power system and its policies as tools for shaping external relations should also be added to the research themes of dependency relations and spatial inequalities regarding the access to, and economy of, raw materials.

Geographical approaches to energy modelling and assessment focus on a range of production and consumption issues. Much of the development and application of energy modelling is aimed at considering the potential of renewable energy sources. In this article, a global mapping analysis will be carried out. It should be noted that geographic work on energy resources and trade rarely conducts analyses simultaneously at different scales (Zimmerer 2011). Geography is crucial to understanding and solving current energy dilemmas. The resource systems of energy production, distribution, and consumption on a global scale, form the basis for the analyses of policy actions on energy issues, as well as related climate and environmental issues (Zimmerer 2011).

Geographical research devoted to the processes of globalisation has long been focused on issues like the relations which pertain internally in the world’s economic system, as regards goods and services, certainly, but also power. Where the functioning of today’s world is concerned, a very up-to-the-minute topic concerns the relations between access to sources of energy and the trade in that energy which is ongoing around the world, as well as the influence exerted in circumstance of uneven distribution, vis-à-vis, the shaping of political ties, above all when it comes to one state being dependent on another. And what becomes emphasised here is the way in which certain states are increasingly dependent on being supplied with (non-renewable) sources and carriers of energy, mostly, therefore, mineral fuels. The consequences of this are not merely the economic ties based around a relations of domination, but also the political ties which mostly fail to achieve symmetry. As Foucault (1984) noted, space is political, and is typified by the presence of privileges and ideologies, and cases of justice and injustice. Centres of power and economic poles operate in such a way that structures based around inequality are formed on a global scale. Disparities and cases of dependence between regions and centres of power are growing (Soja 2010; Foucault 1984). Many post-colonial states have valuable natural resources, which compound the problem of insecurity. The increased risks associated with natural resources have long been discussed in the case study literature (Collier 2010). At the same time, the possession of valuable resources also fosters autocracy and reduces democracy (Collier & Hoeffer 2009). Indeed, certain authors refer to the ‘neo-colonial’ relations between states which export raw materials and those states (in the global South in particular) whose economies depend on these resources, or else on products made from them. The situation is somewhat ambiguous, as many countries of the aforesaid global South are themselves exporters of valuable raw materials; but they still lack the political clout, globally, which would allow them privileged access to recipient countries (primarily in the global North). Developing countries even have fuel reserves, which is why their significance may grow in circumstances of a global crisis.

Geographical research takes an interest not only in the relation between powers in the world trade in commodities, but also in the spatial analysis of large-scale, multi-directional, dependent relations, as these play their part within political relations internationally (Guerrero 2021). A geographical point of view allows a complementary analytical model to be applied, while positioning it within a concrete sphere in which the resources are definable, along with the entities operating in respect of them (Guerrero 2021).

The notion of the political order refers to the way in which individuals, groups, actors/players, institutions, and power-structures are located or placed in space, but also within a range of different dimensions, which are economically, politically, environmentally, socially, and security related. There is a striving to ensure a part is played in decision-making processes, given that strategies and plans may be adopted and pursued in this way (Guerrero 2021). In this sense, the world political system is the outcome of a series of historical processes which has crystallised, geopolitically, into different world orders, with each, during each period of history, being a reflection of the power structure and the division or distribution of that power. At the head of each system sits a superpower seeking to put in place its own hegemony, with its rules of procedure, and imposition of relations, mostly accepted and paid heed to by other states (Taylor & Flint 2002).

Successive cycles of hegemonies of dominant power within the global system see phases of expansion, stabilisation, and decline (or even collapse). From the point of view of territorial structure, a global system is contemporaneous with the spatial differentiation between the ‘centre’ – with a state which is able to lay down principles or rules in line with which power and authority gain real-life articulation, as well as ‘peripheries’ – viewed, and indeed defined, in terms of their being assemblages of dependent territories in which growth processes are capable of being pursued, but nevertheless subordinated to external interests (Wallerstein 2007).

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, a reborn China is becoming one of these centres, with this marking the first time since the early twentieth century that the United States’ hegemony has been threatened by economic, military, and political power other than that of the USSR, or Russia as its successor state. Equally, Russia’s pretensions at playing a global hegemonic role (even if this is the role of hegemon number three) have given rise to a desire to achieve the political, economic, and military (re-)subordination of the former Soviet Republics. The basic cause of the invasion of Ukraine can be discerned here, while the background to that conflict is provided by the global control over the trade in fuels which is capable of strengthening a hegemonic position globally.

A.L. Guerrero claims that energy geopolitics is very closely associated with geoeconomics, where the latter is something which focuses on the different states’ utilisation of the natural resources in their possession or which they have at their disposal, as well as on the power relations which take shape between the haves and have-nots concerning those resources. The consequence of this can be nothing less than conflicts over resources, but also – slightly more subtly – the exerting of a strong influence over the way a given territory is, in practice, ruled (Guerrero 2021). Energy geopolitics is thus able to show, along with the steady change characterising geopolitical world orders, how there is a process of evolution affecting different energy regimes. A desire to achieve control over energy supplies has been and remains a key axis of geopolitics, and one fully capable of shaping both economic and political relations (Guerrero 2021).

Each period of world history has its particular ‘order’ relating to energy production and power supply, and this has always denoted asymmetrical relations between those who either generate or consume (Sánchez Albavera 2006). The development of a new global order as regards energy has been associated with real-life processes of transformation as a consequence of this, and these circumstances are at the heart of current conflicts. The development process characteristic for the modern world continues to be based – overall – around the consumption of ever-greater amounts of energy. That makes control of related resources a key aspect of a new form of geopolitics which has been taking shape.

Changes in the energy regime are time-consuming, with history teaching that some 40–130 years might be needed. There is close linkage here with economic transformation because, as demand for energy rises, there is a need to bring in new sources of energy, search for those whose sources are more economical, modernise the production processes, and so on. An accelerated process of modernisation and work on new sources of energy is most typically a consequence of crises which limit the supply or delivery of energy, and/or entail the danger of supply-chain disruption. As new technology is brought into the supply of power, the consequence is the use of more-economical non-renewable sources of energy and a fall in the cost of power generation.

Tracing the history of development worldwide (especially in the period from the Industrial Revolution onwards), the key sources of energy have been fossil fuels – meaning coal, crude oil, and natural gas. The technological progress which gathered pace during the second half of the eighteenth century (first in the United Kingdom and then elsewhere in Europe and North America) ensured that wood, as the former main source of energy, had to give way to coal. The nineteenth century brought in the establishment of huge industrial regions based around (areas of) the extraction of coal, which was used in generating the vast amounts of energy necessary. Only with the second half of the twentieth century did the true era of global dependence on oil as the main raw material for producing energy really commence. From then onwards, oil steadily rose as a proportion of all fuels being traded. And so it was that political crises in those key places and regions where oil was being extracted led many times to abrupt price increases on the world market, and hence a deterioration in business conditions around the globe.

However, it may already be possible and appropriate to look at the first years of the twenty-first century as the era of natural gas. It is probable that gas resources are now greater than those of oil, while gas is cheaper and less polluting of the atmosphere when consumed. Global commerce involving gas has intensified markedly over just two decades, despite this resource having been earlier underrated – actually, even being burned off as waste at those places and times where oil was taken from the ground. Today, gas is seen as an alternative, able to be utilised during this time of transition to renewable sources of energy which is taking place across the world.

In an era of globalisation, and in line with the process by which a new economic order has been taking shape, it is the significance of non-renewable energy resources which has been paramount in the new geopolitics. The need of each state to safeguard sources of fuel and energy for themselves has ensured that bilateral relations are more a matter of economic interest than political interest. And, irrespective of which particular fuel is involved, we see complicated, multi-level relations of dependence developing at the global level, with these being characterised by dynamic changes in configuration, intensity, and direction. The intensity and scope influences the way in which the order, as regards energy, takes shape; and this is the driving force behind today’s form of geopolitics. Energy resources and their accessibility represent a basis for the economic development of countries and regions, hence the strong dependent relations between producers and consumers, as well as ongoing changes in vulnerability or resilience to cases or circumstances of instability in the system of commerce (Guerrero 2021).

In 2020, the share of global energy consumption accounted for by fossil fuels stood at 80%, while renewables were at 17% (mostly thanks to water power and biomass). The share taken by solar and wind energy was 2.4%. The share of renewable energy in the generation of electricity around the world amounted to 29% – of which the greater part was water powered, while the share taken by wind energy, photovoltaic cells, and biomass was 9%.

The IEA (International Energy Agency) forecast for the decade 2021–2030 anticipates a decline in the overall level of consumption of primary energy globally, this being energy from non-renewable sources, notably coal. At the same time, there is increasing use being made of energy from renewable sources (notably wind, sun – thanks to the use of photovoltaic cells – and water), as well as the nuclear power option (Franke et al. 2022). However, these forecasts were made in advance of the Russian aggression perpetrated against Ukraine. Those still interested in generating energy from coal have found themselves reinvigorated in the aftermath of the invasion.

The ever-greater demand for sources and carriers of energy ensures that the world order, in regard to energy, is in constant flux. On a global scale, and in developed countries in particular, to the end of 2021 there was a steady increase in levels of dependence on non-renewable energy sources, despite an intensive search for – and to some extent the introduction of – new technologies by which energy may be obtained renewably. A dual energy regime is thus being maintained, via which a reliance on fossil fuels continues on the one hand, even as, on the other, every effort is being made to achieve an end to this ‘addiction’. At the same time, as data from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA 2019) make clear, changes on the global energy market do not merely entail resigning from one fuel in favour of another, but rather diversifying the array of fuels used in different sectors of the economy at different times. What is noteworthy here is the way the sector’s ongoing process of transformation is much more far-reaching and comprehensive than it was in the past.

Likewise, the influence of strategies which seek to ensure fuel supplies, extend far beyond the energy sector, and is being exerted on society, the economy, and politics – both domestic and global. This paper resembles many other sources in seeking to describe the current situation as ‘the energy transformation’, with this seen to be having broader significance than the ideas regarding the electricity transition which appeared earlier (IRENA 2019). That said, there is a disparate level of demand for energy sources and their use from one country and region, to another. Models of consumption differ and arise out of the level of economic development and the utilisation of modern technologies in production processes.

The key changes which have taken place in the energy market in the twenty-first century are as follows: –

the introduction of modern methods for making use of the relevant raw materials – including from deposits which are difficult to access (being on the ocean floor or present as oil or gas within shales);

The use of new resources, and the new technologies by which they can be exploited, transported and stored; leads to a reconfigured geographical cycling of energy, both globally and regionally. This is mediated via the installation of new distribution networks, which provide for novel flows of energy. Within space, these processes reflect and are manifested in the development of infrastructure, the emergence of new poles of growth, and changes in regions’ economic structures (Guerrero 2016).

Oil and natural gas have thus far met over 70% of the world’s demand for energy. Demand for electricity, and hence for fossil fuels, goes on rising, with a particular increase having been noted from the mid-twentieth century onwards. And here, at the start of the twenty-first century – and in particular now, in its second decade – certain symptoms of change in the energy and power-supply paradigm have not, so far, sufficed to change the situation where ongoing energy-related development is predicated on hydrocarbons. This situation has involved ongoing (and still increasing) demand for oil and gas, but also now – thanks to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – a likely renewed increase in the use made of coal to generate energy.

Nevertheless, it is in regard to demand for natural gas on the fuel markets that we note the key global change of the twenty-first century thus far. Among the fossil fuels, this is the resource of choice for power generation, hence the ever-growing demand.

The utilisation of natural gas is not considered to do quite as much damage to the environment as does the extraction and use of the other fuels. Costs are also lower at the operational stage. Hence it remains probable that demand for this particular raw material will go on rising for several decades more. Certain authors have thus resorted to the term ‘Golden Age of Gas’ in describing the twenty-first century (Guerrero 2016).

Appearing abruptly, the COVID-19 pandemic produced changes which have made the current situation more difficult, given that there was, at first, quite a fall in the demand for fuels of all kinds, followed in 2022 by a rebound (Enerdata 2022a). Consumption of oil first declined markedly – for the first time since 2009 – by as much as 9%, which had knock-on effects for crude-oil extraction. Oil, nevertheless, remained the key fuel (even in 2020, accounting for 31% of primary energy consumption worldwide). And two-thirds of conventional resources of crude oil are present in Middle East states (where the outlays needed to achieve extraction are lower than anywhere else). This region thus extracts 31% of the world’s oil, while other positions in the hierarchy are taken by the USA (18%), Russia (12%), Africa (8%), South America (7%), and Europe (4.2%, of which 2.4% is attributable to Norway). The Middle East actually uses 14% of all the oil extracted in the world, making this one of the key regions for the refining and processing of crude oil.

As has been noted, the pandemic ensured that 2020 witnessed falls in both the demand for, and the price of, oil. However, cuts in production by OPEC following the pandemic ensured that prices began to rise again. Oil extracted ‘conventionally’ represents 73% of the world’s total, while the non-conventional approach entails removal from bituminous sands and shales, as well as extra-heavy crude oil. The largest resources of this kind are present in Venezuela, Canada, and the USA. A major change has, in fact, been achieved, as the US has managed to ensure that 65% of the country’s extraction of oil now involves shales. Oil is also taken from bituminous sands in Canada, while extra-heavy crude oil is extracted in Venezuela (though the trend is downward due to the economic crisis there). At the same time, the Americas are dominant where the production of biofuels is concerned, with Brazil and the USA together accounting for 59% of global output as of 2020 (Intellinews 2022).

‘Liquid hydrocarbons’ is a term used in certain types of statistics, which includes crude oil from conventional and unconventional sources, biofuels and liquid/liquefied natural gas. Among these, the role for synthetic products (generated from coal) remains very limited, as these account for less than 1% of the total (Intellinews 2022).

A further relevant statistic is that the EU member states are only able to meet 14% of their demand for oil through extraction on their own territory.

Crude oil is obviously one of the key products subject to export, globally. Indeed, more than half of what is extracted worldwide is for export, with the necessary transport taking place by sea (in tankers) or land (along pipelines). Saudi Arabia and Russia are the most important exporters of crude oil in the world, while the most prominent importers are China, the USA, and India. History shows that disturbances in the process by which this raw material is exported are key causes of global economic crises, even though it is actually the political factors which generate the problem. Thus, the rapid rise in oil prices in 1973 represented a political tool which the OPEC states were able to deploy against the United States for its pro-Israel policy and the support it extended to Israel at the time of the Arab-Israeli war. Now, the Russian attack mounted against Ukraine on February 24th, 2022 has provoked a global crisis in both economic and political dimensions, in which a key underpinning instrument is the energy policy Russia has been able to pursue against Europe.

The possibilities for the existence of large and, thus-far, undocumented reserves of natural gas anywhere in the world relate primarily to the Russian Federation, albeit also, to a more limited extent, to the Middle East. Where the market for such natural gas is concerned, the second decade of the twenty-first century brought major change. Growth in the extraction of natural gas from bituminous shales, thanks to a refinement in the fracking technology used to obtain it, gave rise to a hitherto unanticipated situation – that is, the United States was able to meet its entire domestic demand for the fuel. And based on this, it proved possible for the price of gas to be maintained at a relatively steady level through to 2022.

However, 95% of the world’s resources of gas are in ‘conventional’ deposits: that is, oil and gas are stored in rocks given trapping (due to the presence of layers of impermeable rock) which allows for upward flow when downward drilling takes place. Only the USA has substantial resources of shale gas (75% of the world’s total, in fact). Equally, where resources overall are concerned, Russia has 23% of the world’s total, followed in the hierarchy by Iran and Qatar, with these three states together accounting for over half of all known gas in the world. The major consumers of gas are, in turn, the USA, Russia, and China. While consumption of gas has fallen somewhat in real terms (by 1.5%), the share of the world’s overall primary energy consumption which gas accounts for has continued to rise (Franke et al. 2022).

The EU-28 are, together, the world’s primary importers of gas, accounting for 42% of imports globally as of 2020. However, at a state level, the number-one importer is the EU member state of Germany

The value of gas imports into Germany (given as $32.1bn by the OEC) is at a low level, which does not look credible (Map 9). In 2015, the overall values of gas imports was, even then, at 28.2bn euros (Statistisches Bundesamt/Destatis 2016), with Russia’s share in that being 35% (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe 2016). That meant, imports from Russia worth about 10 billion dollars. Since 2016, Germany has not disclosed the amounts of gas it imports from any country.

The amount of coal mined worldwide as a whole is already 5% down from peak levels (albeit with the falls by no means distributed evenly from one country to another). Nevertheless, coal remains the world’s second-placed energy carrier (accounting for 27% of primary energy consumption). China extracts more than half of the total, while Asia imports four-fifths of the world’s hard coal (Franke et al. 2022).

The mining of uranium is 12% down from its peak, even as many countries (in particular Asia) are more and more interested in atomic energy. Kazakhstan is behind the supply of 41% of global extraction of uranium, followed by Australia at 13%, and Namibia at 11%. However, a figure of 55% can be calculated for three members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) taken together, i.e., Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia (ibid.).

Notwithstanding this relatively steady supply of raw, energy materials from different regions of the world, two decades have brought a growing role for Russia in supplying Europe (as well as other regions) with natural gas and oil. It had been assumed that Russia’s supply of resources to Europe (and other countries beyond its borders) would be a phenomenon which would continue to intensify, especially when Nord Stream 1 was given over use, while the completion of Nord Stream 2 was envisaged. At the same time, more and more views made themselves felt, that a yet further increase in Russia’s share of fuel imports into Europe would engender an ever stronger geopolitical relation of dependence, which, of course, would be evermore unfavourable for the economies of many individual countries. The trade in natural gas (and the other fuels) has, in recent years, provided a basis for the shaping and emergence of spatial blocs differing in location, in the trade and accessibility of raw materials (especially gas and oil), as well as networks of economic linkages and political relations (mostly of dependence). The differences were deemed to stand in the way of processes of economic integration, as well as efforts to pursue joint policies, which might allow the main suppliers (notably Russia) to be stood up to.

Nevertheless, political and policy-related efforts to wean Europe’s economies off supplies of gas from Russia have (only) come along in the unambiguous face of a full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by the imposition of economic sanctions on the aggressor, and abrupt efforts to achieve its political isolation. Decisions of this calibre give rise to territorial change, with influence exerted on commodity locations, trade, and accessibility, as well as the model applying where global energy linkages are concerned.

It is possible to construct and develop models describing energy dependence by reference to a variety of different variables and types of relation. The models obtained in this way typically offer a bipolar depiction of the world, in which one side features countries with favourable situations as regards energy, and those other polities whose situation is highly unfavourable, given the lack of (or obstructed) access to the raw materials on which the functioning of the economy is highly dependent. However, between these extreme cases there are intermediate types in which the situation concerning the supply of sources of energy can differ rather widely. This is in relation not only to imports, but also to the internal situation of the given country concerning demand, vulnerability to fluctuations in supply or to changes in the world market more generally, and so on. Nevertheless, the geographical factor (i.e., the distribution of mineral resources around the globe) does much to decide how likely it will be that demand for the raw material is met (UNCTAD 2021).

Analysis of the levels of countries’ dependence on imports of fuels (notably in relation to the ratio between production and consumption in million tonnes crude-oil equivalents) has here allowed for a clear ranking of the world’s countries, and their useful classification into four groups (Figure 2). This has been achieved using 2019 data from World Energy Outlook, 2020 (pdf, annex) and data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) 2022.

Figure 1.

Figure 2.

1) Countries not dependent, or only slightly dependent, on imports of energy. Included here are the countries whose overall domestic production accounts for 90% or more of their overall consumption of energy. Statistics from 2019 revealed 53 such countries worldwide (of which 49 achieved production close to or exceeding consumption). In only four cases did this index amount to being 90 or 100%: as with the Ivory Coast, 90%; and Argentina, 99%. This group of countries includes the second-greatest consumer of energy in the world – the USA (whose index is 101%), its number-three consumer Russia (193%), and also Canada and Brazil (among the top-ten consumers). Australia has an index of 308%, while the only country in Europe which is independent of imports is Norway (496%). The highest value of all is noted for East Timor, whose output of 5.9 million tonnes exceeds its consumption (under 0.2m t) more than thirty-fold. It is clear that East Timor’s demand for energy domestically is at a very low level.

This group of countries includes net exporters of mineral fuels, whose economies are often highly dependent on fuel exports. Equally, these states are at a level of economic development which does not permit the simultaneous high consumption of fuels domestically. The greatest share of all exports accounted for by mineral fuels are typical for such African countries as Equatorial Guinea (93%), Angola (92%), and Algeria (89%); and the Central Asian states of Turkmenistan (86%) and Azerbaijan (also 86%).

Where most major exporters of these fuels are concerned, the states displaying high levels of dependence are as follows: Nigeria and Iraq (86%), Kuwait (83%), Qatar (81%), and Saudi Arabia (65%). Dependent to a somewhat lesser degree are Russia (49%), Norway (48%), the UAE (32%), Australia (27%), Canada (18%), and the USA (12%) [OECD 2020 – table on Exporters-of-Mineral-fuels-2020.xlsx, %SHARE].

2) Countries characterised by a moderate dependence on imports of energy, meaning that their production is at 60–90% of the level of consumption. Included here are China (as the world’s largest energy consumer, with an index value of 82%) and 12 European states, i.e., Albania (80%), Iceland (79%), Denmark (76%), Romania (75%), Sweden (72%), Kosovo (71%), Montenegro (68%), the UK (68%), Ukraine (67%), Serbia (67%), Bosnia & Hercegovina (65%), and Bulgaria (61%). The countries of SE Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, and smaller countries) have a moderate dependence on imports, with this reflecting some energy sources of their own along with a demand for energy which is more limited than in Western Europe.

3) Countries very much dependent on imports, in that their production only accounts for 30–60% of consumption. Included here are India (on 56% - the world’s fourth-largest consumer of energy), as well as the largest consumers in Europe, i.e., Germany (34%), France (51%), Poland (55%), Finland (45%), Austria (37%), and Hungary (35%). The latter two states are regularly given as the most highly import-dependent countries in Europe. Turkey joins this group on 32%.

4) The countries which are most dependent on energy imports, in which production is capable of covering less than 30% of consumption. For a start, in this category are 10+ countries for which their own energy production is at a level of 1% of demand or less. The largest of these (with populations exceeding 10 million) are Burkina Faso, Somalia, Benin, and Haiti. All are poor countries which do not use a great deal of energy. The EIA statistics, in turn, suggest that Gibraltar, Western Sahara, and Tonga produce no energy at all. Equally, this group, with figures up to 30%, also include some very major consumers of energy (where levels of consumption exceed the equivalent of 100m t of oil. The states in question are Japan (13%), South Korea (also 13%), Italy (21%), and Spain (27%).

Where Europe is concerned, the lowest values for the index relate to the aforementioned Gibraltar (0), as well as Malta (1.4%) and Moldova (2.3%). The countries emerging from the data as being most dependent on imports are in southern Europe, including Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal (25%); and the Baltic countries Lithuania (11%), and Latvia and Estonia (19%). Then there is nearby Belarus (9%), as well as Moldova and Belgium (23%), Luxembourg (4%), Cyprus (also on 4%), and the former Soviet state of Armenia (29%).

The above analysis makes it clear that the world’s highest levels of energy consumption are characterised by European states; it is also here that the gap between states’ own production and their consumption is widest. The huge increase in imports of fuel into Europe during the twenty-first century may be accounted for in this way.

Europe is among the biggest importers of fossil fuels, as Figure 2 shows. It has also been confirmed that there is a bipolar configuration, whereby there is a prevalence of net exporters and importers of the raw materials capable of supplying energy. The figure also shows the net balance for trade in mineral fuels per inhabitant, and it is possible to distinguish such major exporters as Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Gabon, Angola, Algeria, Libya, Canada, Australia, and Papua New Guinea. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the net value of exported crude oil expressed per inhabitant is $13,200. The other countries mentioned have figures in the range of $300–$3000 (World Energy Outlook 2020). European countries gain confirmation as the major importers.

In general, however, it is possible to identify four types of importer-state: –

the bloc of energy-dependent European countries with value of imports per head exceeding $300, and which even reaches $3,000 in the sub-bloc of Western European countries;

This portrayal of the spatial distribution of importers and exporters of crude oil lacks stability. As recently as the end of the twentieth century, the number of oil- and gas-exporting countries was lower. But discoveries of new sources of these raw materials and changes in the structure which characterised demand, ensured that the list of key exporters was joined, as we continued into the twenty-first century, by Australia, Brazil, Angola, and Gabon, among others (World Energy Outlook 2020).

The list of leading countries in the world which produce natural gas is dominated by the USA and Russia, while the global amounts produced overall have been rising steadily since the beginning of the twenty-first century (IEA 2020). Of world production of natural gas, 23% is associated with the USA and 20% with Russia. Other main producers of gas are Iran, Qatar, China, and Canada (IEA 2020). Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russia was the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe.

The concentration of resources of this commodity in just a few regions of the world, combined with the enormous demand observed in recent years, has led to the emergence of relations based around a far-reaching dependence of the states which lack deposits of natural gas, on states which are in a position to produce it. The relations in question are thus non-symmetrical, and represent a source of, and opportunity for, political pressure, as has particularly been exerted by Russia, vis-à-vis, on the customers for its gas.

As early as 2008, Andrew C. Hess drew attention to the fact that the explosive growth of Russia’s gas industry at the end of the twentieth century demonstrates how the politics of Eurasia can influence global affairs. First, Russia’s dominant position in the international gas trade can be compared to the position of Saudi Arabia in the production of oil. Between 1998 and 2002, Russia produced approximately half of the world’s gas pipeline exports, which made it the largest supplier of gas to Europe […] For a variety of reasons, natural gas is projected to be the fuel of choice for a wide range of uses, including the generation of electrical power, which is at the center of a global consumption trend whose rate is expected to double by 2030. Along. (Hess 2008)

The above analysis points to the existence of two groups of countries from the perspective of dependence on fossil fuels from Russia, i.e., –

countries which (prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) had economies incapable of functioning without fossil fuels from Russia;

Figure 3.

Figure 4.

The share of imported fuels from Russia as opposed to other countries points to the far-reaching dependence of European economies (and those of China and the countries of Central Asia) upon this source. States in which the role played by Russian fuels in 2020 within the overall quantities imported exceeded 50% were Belarus, Finland, Poland, Latvia, Hungary, and Slovakia (which are all supplied by pipeline). In turn, among the Asian countries, most dependent on such imports were Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and North Korea (again with Russia accounting for more than 50% of all imports). Levels of economic dependence of 20–50% characterised most European states – from the UK, through France, and to almost all European states as far as Turkey. Similarly high figures were to be noted for Central Asia, but also East Asia, including China.

The situation is shown even more clearly when it comes to the values of fuel imports expressed in USD (Figure 4). Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, the country in first place was China with 29.6bn USD. Elsewhere in Asia, major imports characterised South Korea and Japan. However, the European market again dominated in relation to this indicator. In absolute terms, the value of imports of fuels from Russia exceeded 10bn a year in the case of the Netherlands (which, at the same time, is a major world exporter of oil-derived products). Among the remaining European states, it was Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Belarus, and Turkey which presented the highest indices for the values of imports of fuel from Russia.

If these values are expressed per inhabitant (Figures 5, 5a, and 6), then the countries in first place are Belarus and Finland (between 500 and 1,012 USD per person), followed by Poland, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Greece, the Netherlands, and Belgium at 100–500 USD per head. From the maps included here, it is possible to note the huge degree to which Russia dominates the trade in fuels. Almost all European countries were in the past – and in large measure still are – highly dependent on imports from Russia. Various political solutions are being put forward to reduce this level of dependence. Among other things, the European Commission came out with a July 2022 proposal for a new legislative instrument serving the member states called the European Gas Demand Reduction Plan. This assumed a 15% cut in Europe’s consumption of gas by (as soon as) spring 2023. It obliges all member States to limit their demand for gas. After all, though, the EU is facing the risk of supplies of gas from Russia being cut further, even as almost half of its member states have already been hit by Russian cuts (Enerdata 2022a).

The data on imports of both crude and refined oil from Russia point to the key directions of supply being to Europe on the one hand, and China, South Korea, and Japan on the other (Figures 7 and 8). OECD figures show that the breakdown for the USD net value of fuel exports to the Russian economy as of 2020 was 55% in the case of Europe, and 30% in the case of East Asia (meaning China and Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). As of 2020, China was the largest importer of crude oil overall. The export of oil to East Asia takes place via a pipeline known as ESPO (the Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil pipeline). This has a throughput capacity of 80m t per annum, and leads to Daqing (China) and to Kozmino terminal (east of Vladivostok). There is a second terminal on Sakhalin Island on Aniva Bay, involving both oil and the loading of LPG.

Figure 5.

Figure 5a.

Figure 6.

Figure 7.

In 2020, the country in second place from the point of view of imports of crude oil was the Netherlands. This state is Europe’s largest producer of oil products, and a key exporter of them. The other major importers of oil from Russia (whose economies remain very much dependent on this source) are Germany, Poland, Italy, Belarus, and Finland. A similar geographical distribution applies where imports of oil-derived products are concerned.

Russia is also a key supplier of coal on the world market – to Europe and Asia above all (Map 8). From the data presented in Figure 9, it can be seen that China is the foremost importer of Russian coal, followed by South Korea and Japan. It should be stressed that Russia and South Korea are themselves key world producers and consumers of coal. In Europe, Germany is the main customer, which has closed down all the coal mines on its territory. Further major importers are Poland, Ukraine, and the Netherlands.

Figure 8.

Figure 9.

Through to the moment of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, natural gas imported from Russia into Europe met one-third of the continent’s entire demand for the resource. The gas was supplied mainly via pipelines, a network of which had been subject to very intensive development during the early part of the twenty-first century. Expressed in other terms, on the eve of the invasion, Europe was the recipient of 60% of the oil Russia extracted, and 70% of its gas (Figure 10).

Figure 10.

The German and Turkish gas imports from Russia reported by OEC are understated. The map shows the author’s estimated import volume (based on the bp Statistical Review of World Energy 2021). The last two link up with the pipe-distribution network in Germany, with this also making it possible to transfer gas further west in Europe. The value of gas imports to Germany reported by the OEC ($32.1m) is unreliable (understated). In 2015, the total value of gas imports was €28.2bn (Statistisches Bundesamt/Destatis 2016), with Russia’s share being 35% (Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe 2016); therefore, the value of imports from Russia was around $10bn as of 201. Germany does not disclose data on gas imports from individual countries (https://intellinews.com/)

Deliveries of natural gas to European states are now reduced. Russia uses this raw material as a way of exerting pressure on the EU, seeking to ensure a limitation on the economic and political sanctions being imposed on the country following its invasion of Ukraine. On July, 29 2022, yet another EU Member State (this time Latvia) was cut off from supplies of Russian gas (Gazeta Wyborcza 2022).

There is a steady rise in the global demand for fuels (or the category of raw materials capable of supplying energy, if the issue is looked at in the most general way). The sub-category known as fossil fuels continues to represent the main source from which energy can be generated, while also constituting a raw material for many branches of industry (but above all for chemicals). So it is, that countries which produce and export them may, through regulation of supply, pursue political objectives. In fact, it is possible to discern several types of relations pertaining to the trade in fuel.

The first type is the bipolar relation, given that a rather confined group of major exporters of fossil fuels are here set together with importer countries unable to quite meet their own needs unless importation takes place. There are obviously asymmetrical relations between these blocs, and all the more so given the small size of the supply group, which does nothing to offset the major pressure (of differing types) they are able to exert on the far larger group of importers. The instrument by which this ‘squeeze’ can be achieved is always the raw material itself, albeit, perhaps, its price aspect, or else the level of supply or the quality offered. The experience in recent decades has made it quite clear that the countries exporting crude oil and natural gas make use of all of these instruments as they pursue their strategies for seeking political and economic dominance.

The tripolar type of relation differs in that there are intermediary countries alongside the producer countries and the consumer countries. These ‘go-betweens’ are countries which engage in either the re-export of fuels still in their raw-material state, or in the export of products which have arisen out of the processing which takes place in that state. Two cases in point here would be the Netherlands and Singapore, both of which import large amounts of fuels they do not actually consume. It is most typical for them to process crude oil with a view to exporting the products resulting from the processing. Naturally, the economies here are also dependent on the price and supply of fuels in the raw state, even though fluctuations in either prices or levels of supply do not have a decisive influence on the way the needs of their home economies are met – the example of the Netherlands, which is a major exporter of processed products, confirms this.

A third type of relation is multipolar, in this case implying that intensified trading relations pertain within regions of the world (e.g., South America), even as, beyond this, the relations with the ‘superpowers’ of fuel supply (i.e., Russia in this case) are weak. It is a matter of key importance for these countries that there should be global stability where both prices and supply are concerned, to the extent that these factors shape overall global conditions for the trade in fuels.

The situation which has arisen in Europe recalls most closely the bipolar model, with marked dependence of the economies of European states on the supply of fossil fuels from Russia. An imperial-type policy being pursue by the latter ensures that the country deploys its resources of raw materials to force their influence on political relations in the Eurasian region, and with a view to undermining European policy addressing the problems faced by regions which Russia has made subject to military incursion and invasion. Even then, Europe’s support for Ukraine, and the sanctions the EU and others have imposed on Russia, have been sufficient to move Gazprom to cut off its westward export of gas across Poland via the Yamal-Europa pipeline. This followed Russia being impacted by sanctions against the EuRoPol Gaz company, the owner of the Polish section of the pipeline. Beyond this, Ukraine itself interrupted the flow of Russian gas through one of the two points of transit through to the rest of Europe, in this way stopping the supply of one-third of all Russian gas which is piped to Europe via its southern neighbour (Enerdata 2022b). The twin system of the Nord Stream pipelines, comprising two submarine lines 1,224 km in length and a total throughput of 55bn m³ of liquid gas a year, runs from Vyborg (Russia) to Lubmin (near Greifswald) in Germany. The system was actually constructed and operated by the Swiss company Nord Stream, which is, however, under Gazprom ownership to the tune of 51%, while Wintershall Dea and E.ON each have a 15.5% stake, with Gasunie and Engie both with 9% of shares. In 2021, 59.2bn m³ of natural gas was piped into Europe. In contrast, in 2022, Gazprom, as an energy group, reduced its supply via Nord Stream 1 to 12bn m³/year, i.e., to just 20% of potential capacity (Enerdata 2022b).

The response of the European Union to the geopolitical situation in place following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a European plan to reduce the demand for gas. However, this assumes gas being replaced by other fuels, even though it is also based around energy conservation in all sectors of the economy. The objective here was to safeguard supplies to households and such key consumers as hospitals, but also to make sure that supplies reached industry. But what is actually involved is the ongoing supply of the population with core industrial products, as well as efforts to prevent supply-chains in the economy being disrupted or broken, and to ensure the ongoing competitiveness of the EU itself (Enerdata 2022a). The year 2021 saw the whole EU consume some 413.6bn m³ of natural gas (which was up 4% on the 2020 level). Of that, 37% supplied buildings in general, 28% supplied power plants, and 27% supplied the rest of industry. Where crude oil is concerned, the supply is more diversified, with different places of origin involved. As of 2020, the OECD had a strategic reserve (stored in underground cisterns) amounting to some 3 billion barrels. The latter would be the equivalent of 0.4bn t, and this can be compared with a global level of utilisation of oil equal to 4.2bn t a year, with OECD countries accounting for 2bn t) (Enerdata 2022a).

Europe is seeking sources of energy from other regions. Potential exporters which might replace Russia (in the top ten where reserves are concerned) are presented as follows, on the basis of BP data, with the reserves/production (R/P) ratio given in brackets. Venezuela (no data, but has the largest reserves of all, in the face of a level of extraction that is currently minimal), Libya (339), Iran (140), Kuwait (103), Iraq (96), Canada (89), and the USA (73). For comparison, other figures are Russia (28), China (18), the USA and Norway (11) (World Energy Outlook 2020). The above calculations are based on the data in the annex, and refer to a text entitled: The largest oil reserves in the world. These countries can replace Russia on the market, which can be accessed at Forsal (2022).