<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>When a husband migrates, his wife may control more household resources and therefore change how the household spends income. Given the prevalence of seasonal migration in developing countries, even these temporary changes could affect economic development. The extent to which these changes persist after migration spells will magnify these consequences. Using panel data on rural households in Nepal, we examine how a husband's migration interacts with intrahousehold decision-making and consumption patterns both <italic>during</italic> and <italic>after</italic> migration spells. We find that a husband's absence is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in the expenditure decisions over which the wife has full control. This coincides with a shift away from expenditures on alcohol and tobacco in favor of children's clothing and education. Importantly, we find that migrant husbands resume their role in decisions following their return, but decisions are more likely to be made jointly. These persistent effects are consistent with a model in which households are pushed to a new, more-equitable equilibrium and then are driven to form habits, which, in turn, cause the new equilibrium to stick, thus facilitating long-term cultural change in gender norms.</p>
</abstract>

When a husband migrates, his wife may control more household resources and therefore change how the household spends income. Given the prevalence of seasonal migration in developing countries, even these temporary changes could affect economic development. The extent to which these changes persist after migration spells will magnify these consequences. Using panel data on rural households in Nepal, we examine how a husband's migration interacts with intrahousehold decision-making and consumption patterns both during and after migration spells. We find that a husband's absence is associated with a 10 percentage point increase in the expenditure decisions over which the wife has full control. This coincides with a shift away from expenditures on alcohol and tobacco in favor of children's clothing and education. Importantly, we find that migrant husbands resume their role in decisions following their return, but decisions are more likely to be made jointly. These persistent effects are consistent with a model in which households are pushed to a new, more-equitable equilibrium and then are driven to form habits, which, in turn, cause the new equilibrium to stick, thus facilitating long-term cultural change in gender norms.

Temporary migration as a mechanism for lasting cultural change: evidence from Nepal

IZA Journal of Development and Migration

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

When a husband migrates, his wife may control more household resources and therefore change how the household spends income. Given the prevalence of seasonal...

Temporary migration as a mechanism for lasting cultural change: evidence from Nepal

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2021

Zakres stron: -

Przyjęty: 20 lis 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2021-0016

Słowa kluczowe
migration, decision-making, bargaining power, household economics, gender

© 2021 Sarah Janzen et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Temporary migration as a mechanism for lasting cultural change: evidence from Nepal

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2021

Zakres stron: -

Przyjęty: 20 lis 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajodm-2021-0016

Słowa kluczowemigration, decision-making, bargaining power, household economics, gender

© 2021 Sarah Janzen et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
migration, decision-making, bargaining power, household economics, gender