Do free trade agreements promote sneaky protectionism? A classical liberal perspective
30 wrz 2019
O artykule
Kategoria artykułu: Conceptual Paper
Data publikacji: 30 wrz 2019
Zakres stron: 185 - 200
Otrzymano: 21 maj 2019
Przyjęty: 16 lip 2019
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ijme-2019-0017
Słowa kluczowe
© 2019 Jürgen Wandel, published by Sciendo
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.
Synopsis of the frequency of assigned scores
Met | 2 | 2 | 1 |
Almost met | 3 | 2 | 3 |
Partly met | 3 | 0 | 2 |
Unmet | 2 | 6 | 4 |
Synopsis of the assessment of selected trade agreements by criteria of the liberal benchmark model
(Far-reaching) elimination of tariffs as quickly as possible on as many goods as possible and to the lowest levels possible | Almost met, but long implementation period | Almost met | Almost met, yet many backdoors |
Limit the use of the so-called trade remedy or trade defense measures | Unmet | Unmet | Unmet |
Open all government procurement markets to goods and services providers from the other party | Partly met | Unmet | Almost met |
Open all sectors of the economy to investment | Partly met | Unmet | Almost met |
Open all services markets without exception to competition from providers of the other party | Unmet | Unmet | Unmet |
Non-restrictive rules of origin for products and services | Partly met | Unmet | Partly met |
Includes rules that protect digital trade from taxation and misuse and abuse | Almost met | Met | Unmet |
Prohibits governments from imposing localization or other requirements that reduce the efficacy of digital services | Met | Met | Unmet |
Promotes mutual recognition of regulatory compliance | Unmet | Almost met | Partly met |
Includes an enforceable dispute settlement mechanism | Met | Unmet | Met |