<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>The issue of agricultural non-point source pollution has attracted the attention of the state and the masse. In the non-point source pollution control organizations which composed of the governments, farmers and fertiliser sellers, due to the characteristics of rational economic body, the phenomenon of ”market failure” and ”government failure” may occur in the process of non-point source pollution control. In this paper, the author applies game theory to analyse the main behaviour characteristics of the three main bodies, and constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model that the government, farmers and fertiliser sellers participate in. According to the results of the equilibrium solution of the Haysani Axiom model, it is found that the decisions made by the three bodies of the government, the fertiliser seller and the farmer in the behaviour choice stage have a great influence on the behaviour choice of the other two bodies, and the process of each strategy choice by the three bodies is a dynamic game process of the three bodies. Finally, according to the main influencing factors reflected in the equilibrium solution, proposed the related non-point source pollution control countermeasure suggestion to the government main body.</p>
</abstract>

The issue of agricultural non-point source pollution has attracted the attention of the state and the masse. In the non-point source pollution control organizations which composed of the governments, farmers and fertiliser sellers, due to the characteristics of rational economic body, the phenomenon of ”market failure” and ”government failure” may occur in the process of non-point source pollution control. In this paper, the author applies game theory to analyse the main behaviour characteristics of the three main bodies, and constructs the incomplete information dynamic game model that the government, farmers and fertiliser sellers participate in. According to the results of the equilibrium solution of the Haysani Axiom model, it is found that the decisions made by the three bodies of the government, the fertiliser seller and the farmer in the behaviour choice stage have a great influence on the behaviour choice of the other two bodies, and the process of each strategy choice by the three bodies is a dynamic game process of the three bodies. Finally, according to the main influencing factors reflected in the equilibrium solution, proposed the related non-point source pollution control countermeasure suggestion to the government main body.

Analysis of the main body behaviour of non-point source pollution control based on multimodal game model

Ecological Chemistry and Engineering S

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The issue of agricultural non-point source pollution has attracted the attention of the state and the masse. In the non-point source pollution control...

Analysis of the main body behaviour of non-point source pollution control based on multimodal game model

Data publikacji: 18 sty 2022

Zakres stron: 563 - 579

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/eces-2021-0037

Słowa kluczowe
non-point source pollution, game theory, pollution control policy

© 2021 Xin Li et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Analysis of the main body behaviour of non-point source pollution control based on multimodal game model

Data publikacji: 18 sty 2022

Zakres stron: 563 - 579

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/eces-2021-0037

Słowa kluczowenon-point source pollution, game theory, pollution control policy

© 2021 Xin Li et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
non-point source pollution, game theory, pollution control policy