<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Singer claims that there are two ways of challenging the fact that brain-dead patients, from whom organs are usually retrieved, are in fact biologically alive. By means of the first, the so called dead donor rule may be abandoned, opening the way to lethal organ donation. In the second, it might be posited that terms such as “life” and “death” do not have any primary biological meaning and are applicable to persons instead of organisms. This second possibility permits one to acknowledge that brain-dead patients are deceased because they are irreversibly unconscious. In the commentary which follows, I will argue that Singer’s second option is preferable since it (a) provides a higher amount of organs available for transplant, and (b) is better suited to the meaning of “death” which occurs in ordinary language. I will also defend such a concept of death against the objections raised by Michael Nair-Collins in the article <italic>Can the brain-dead be harmed or wronged? On the moral status of brain death and its implications for organ transplantation</italic>.</p></abstract>

Singer claims that there are two ways of challenging the fact that brain-dead patients, from whom organs are usually retrieved, are in fact biologically alive. By means of the first, the so called dead donor rule may be abandoned, opening the way to lethal organ donation. In the second, it might be posited that terms such as “life” and “death” do not have any primary biological meaning and are applicable to persons instead of organisms. This second possibility permits one to acknowledge that brain-dead patients are deceased because they are irreversibly unconscious. In the commentary which follows, I will argue that Singer’s second option is preferable since it (a) provides a higher amount of organs available for transplant, and (b) is better suited to the meaning of “death” which occurs in ordinary language. I will also defend such a concept of death against the objections raised by Michael Nair-Collins in the article Can the brain-dead be harmed or wronged? On the moral status of brain death and its implications for organ transplantation.

Brain death as irreversible loss of a human’s moral status

Department on Professional Ethics, Institute of Philosophy

Ethics & Bioethics

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Brain death as irreversible loss of a human\u2019s moral status"}

Singer claims that there are two ways of challenging the fact that brain-dead patients, from whom organs are usually retrieved, are in fact biologically alive....

Brain death as irreversible loss of a human’s moral status

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2018

Zakres stron: 167 - 178

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2018-0013

Słowa kluczowe
bioethics, transplantation ethics, brain death, moral status, critical interests, ulterior interests

© 2018 Piotr Grzegorz Nowak, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Brain death as irreversible loss of a human’s moral status

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2018

Zakres stron: 167 - 178

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ebce-2018-0013

Słowa kluczowebioethics, transplantation ethics, brain death, moral status, critical interests, ulterior interests

© 2018 Piotr Grzegorz Nowak, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
bioethics, transplantation ethics, brain death, moral status, critical interests, ulterior interests