<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>As a legitimate authoritative directive is a second-order reason, it defeats conflicting reasons by a process of exclusion. Nonetheless, a legitimate authoritative directive can be defeated by more weighty reasons, including, as I argue in this paper, the more weighty reasons it excludes. This is part of a value pluralist conception of authority, according to which there is no general rule for the resolution of conflicting reasons. And I advance this argument in response to the work of Joseph Raz. Although Raz is a value pluralist, he posits a general rule for the resolution of some conflicts: namely, that an exclusionary reason cannot be defeated by a (more weighty) reason it excludes. This represents a weak version of value pluralism. My argument is that Raz does not succeed in his efforts to show that this general rule either better ensures conformity with reason or that it is justified by commitment to autonomy.</p>
</abstract>

As a legitimate authoritative directive is a second-order reason, it defeats conflicting reasons by a process of exclusion. Nonetheless, a legitimate authoritative directive can be defeated by more weighty reasons, including, as I argue in this paper, the more weighty reasons it excludes. This is part of a value pluralist conception of authority, according to which there is no general rule for the resolution of conflicting reasons. And I advance this argument in response to the work of Joseph Raz. Although Raz is a value pluralist, he posits a general rule for the resolution of some conflicts: namely, that an exclusionary reason cannot be defeated by a (more weighty) reason it excludes. This represents a weak version of value pluralism. My argument is that Raz does not succeed in his efforts to show that this general rule either better ensures conformity with reason or that it is justified by commitment to autonomy.

Authority, Excluded Reasons and Moral Conflict

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Authority, Excluded Reasons and Moral Conflict"}

As a legitimate authoritative directive is a second-order reason, it defeats conflicting reasons by a process of exclusion. Nonetheless, a legitimate...

Authority, Excluded Reasons and Moral Conflict

Data publikacji: 05 paź 2023

Zakres stron: 353 - 374

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0017

Słowa kluczowe
authority, excluded reasons, exclusionary reasons, Joseph Raz, value pluralism

© 2022 Allyn Fives, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Authority, Excluded Reasons and Moral Conflict

Data publikacji: 05 paź 2023

Zakres stron: 353 - 374

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0017

Słowa kluczoweauthority, excluded reasons, exclusionary reasons, Joseph Raz, value pluralism

© 2022 Allyn Fives, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
authority, excluded reasons, exclusionary reasons, Joseph Raz, value pluralism