<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.</p></abstract>

Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses and (b) structured entities made out of concepts. Schiffer advances an alternative view: propositions are unstructured pleonastic entities. My purpose is to argue in favour of the main tenets of the Fregean model by countering each of Schiffer’s arguments and sketching the guidelines for a theory of concepts as basic components of propositions.

A defence of Fregean propositions

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"A defence of Fregean propositions"}

Stephen Schiffer 2003 presents six arguments against the Fregean model of propositions, according to which propositions are (a) the referents of that-clauses...

A defence of Fregean propositions

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2018

Zakres stron: 39 - 64

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2006-0013

© 2006 Massimiliano Vignolo, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.