Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Consider the following proposition: (Q) It is possible that all of our perceptual experiences are ‘delusive.’ According to Gilbert Ryle, (Q) is demonstrably absurd. In this paper I address four questions: (1) What is Ryle’s argument against (Q)?; (2) How persuasive is it?; (3) What positions are ruled out if (Q) is absurd?; and (4) How does Ryle’s position compare with contemporary work on skepticism?

eISSN:: 0873-626X
Języki:: Angielski, Portuguese

Częstotliwość wydawania:: 4 razy w roku
Dziedziny czasopisma:: Philosophy, Selected Philosophical Movements, Analytical Philosophy

Kanał RSS czasopisma

Of counterfeits and delusions: Revisiting Ryle on skepticism and the impossibility of global deceit

Data publikacji: 31 gru 2018

Zakres stron: 42 - 64

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2004-0010

© 2004 Douglas McDermid, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.