<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>This paper examines the properties of the anti-manipulation method in voting. Such a method can be used by committees and similar bodies to ensure that votes reflect genuine preferences. The anti-manipulation method is based on the Borda Count and discourages strategic voting by excluding scores that deviate excessively from the mean. The method does not eliminate strategic voting but diminishes the motivation to apply it. We compare the properties of the Borda Count and the anti-manipulation method. The properties, which are most often found in the literature, were chosen for comparison. Thus, the following properties are examined: consistency, vulnerability to the no-show paradox, vulnerability to the subset choice condition, homogeneity, monotonicity, and vulnerability to the reversal bias paradox as well as the Condorcet winner and loser paradoxes. The anti-manipulation method fails to satisfy most of these properties. A real data example, the voting of a certain jury, is used as a counterexample in most cases.</p>
</abstract>

This paper examines the properties of the anti-manipulation method in voting. Such a method can be used by committees and similar bodies to ensure that votes reflect genuine preferences. The anti-manipulation method is based on the Borda Count and discourages strategic voting by excluding scores that deviate excessively from the mean. The method does not eliminate strategic voting but diminishes the motivation to apply it. We compare the properties of the Borda Count and the anti-manipulation method. The properties, which are most often found in the literature, were chosen for comparison. Thus, the following properties are examined: consistency, vulnerability to the no-show paradox, vulnerability to the subset choice condition, homogeneity, monotonicity, and vulnerability to the reversal bias paradox as well as the Condorcet winner and loser paradoxes. The anti-manipulation method fails to satisfy most of these properties. A real data example, the voting of a certain jury, is used as a counterexample in most cases.

Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties

Control and Cybernetics

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

{"article-title":"Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties"}

This paper examines the properties of the anti-manipulation method in voting. Such a method can be used by committees and similar bodies to ensure that votes...

Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties

Data publikacji: 24 lut 2024

Zakres stron: 487 - 499

Otrzymano: 01 paź 2022

Przyjęty: 01 gru 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/candc-2022-0026

Słowa kluczowe
voting, manipulation, strategic voting, Borda count, properties, classical music competitions

© 2022 Honorata Sosnowska, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties

Data publikacji: 24 lut 2024

Zakres stron: 487 - 499

Otrzymano: 01 paź 2022

Przyjęty: 01 gru 2022

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/candc-2022-0026

Słowa kluczowevoting, manipulation, strategic voting, Borda count, properties, classical music competitions

© 2022 Honorata Sosnowska, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
voting, manipulation, strategic voting, Borda count, properties, classical music competitions