<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>This paper takes universities and enterprises as the basic game subjects of collaborative innovation of live e-commerce talent cultivation and defines the involved interest subjects as government, school, enterprise and industry to construct a multi-party evolutionary game model. The model’s evolutionary stable equilibrium point can be calculated using the replicated dynamic equations of multiple parties. MATLAB was used to analyze the numerical simulation to explore the sensitivity of the relevant parameters for the three parties. Finally, according to the game results, a four-point practical path to optimize the live e-commerce talent training program is proposed. The results show that under the satisfaction of the equilibrium point (0, 0, 0), the critical value of the active participation willingness of the four parties is between 0.4 and 0.5, and the final equilibrium point tends to (1, 1, 1). In this paper, the cooperation between schools and enterprises is prompted to change from limited rationality to full rationality in order to realize the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the final game.</p>
</abstract>

This paper takes universities and enterprises as the basic game subjects of collaborative innovation of live e-commerce talent cultivation and defines the involved interest subjects as government, school, enterprise and industry to construct a multi-party evolutionary game model. The model’s evolutionary stable equilibrium point can be calculated using the replicated dynamic equations of multiple parties. MATLAB was used to analyze the numerical simulation to explore the sensitivity of the relevant parameters for the three parties. Finally, according to the game results, a four-point practical path to optimize the live e-commerce talent training program is proposed. The results show that under the satisfaction of the equilibrium point (0, 0, 0), the critical value of the active participation willingness of the four parties is between 0.4 and 0.5, and the final equilibrium point tends to (1, 1, 1). In this paper, the cooperation between schools and enterprises is prompted to change from limited rationality to full rationality in order to realize the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the final game.

Exploring the reform of live e-commerce talent training based on the four-way collaboration of “government, industry, enterprise and school”

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

This paper takes universities and enterprises as the basic game subjects of collaborative innovation of live e-commerce talent cultivation and defines the...

Exploring the reform of live e-commerce talent training based on the four-way collaboration of “government, industry, enterprise and school”

Data publikacji: 25 lis 2023

Zakres stron: -

Otrzymano: 16 lut 2023

Przyjęty: 05 cze 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2023.2.01236

Słowa kluczowe
Evolutionary game models, Replicated dynamic equations, Stable equilibrium points, Sensitivity level, Live e-commerce

© 2023 Xin Wang, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Exploring the reform of live e-commerce talent training based on the four-way collaboration of “government, industry, enterprise and school”

Data publikacji: 25 lis 2023

Zakres stron: -

Otrzymano: 16 lut 2023

Przyjęty: 05 cze 2023

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2023.2.01236

Słowa kluczoweEvolutionary game models, Replicated dynamic equations, Stable equilibrium points, Sensitivity level, Live e-commerce

© 2023 Xin Wang, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
Evolutionary game models, Replicated dynamic equations, Stable equilibrium points, Sensitivity level, Live e-commerce