<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>Under the information asymmetry, we consider the impact of task importance on the income of university managers, introducing the non-linear income function of university managers. Based on the principal-agent theory, we construct a non-linear incentive optimisation model for subject librarians. We discussed how university managers allocate incentive intensity and how the subject librarians allocate the effort level to achieve the best net expected income for university administrators and subject librarians while satisfying the constraints of participation and incentive compatibility. The results show that the optimal incentive contract for subject librarians is related to task importance, ability level, risk aversion characteristics and the randomness of the external environment in university libraries. The relative incentive intensity increases with the increase of task importance, risk aversion, ability level and randomness of information retrieval tasks, and decreases with the increase of randomness of subject service tasks.</p>
</abstract>

Under the information asymmetry, we consider the impact of task importance on the income of university managers, introducing the non-linear income function of university managers. Based on the principal-agent theory, we construct a non-linear incentive optimisation model for subject librarians. We discussed how university managers allocate incentive intensity and how the subject librarians allocate the effort level to achieve the best net expected income for university administrators and subject librarians while satisfying the constraints of participation and incentive compatibility. The results show that the optimal incentive contract for subject librarians is related to task importance, ability level, risk aversion characteristics and the randomness of the external environment in university libraries. The relative incentive intensity increases with the increase of task importance, risk aversion, ability level and randomness of information retrieval tasks, and decreases with the increase of randomness of subject service tasks.

The incentive contract of subject librarians in university library under the non-linear task importance

Kunming University of Science and Technology

School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Three Gorges Vocational College

Applied Mathematics and Nonlinear Sciences

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Under the information asymmetry, we consider the impact of task importance on the income of university managers, introducing the non-linear income function of...

The incentive contract of subject librarians in university library under the non-linear task importance

Data publikacji: 31 mar 2022

Zakres stron: 721 - 730

Otrzymano: 21 maj 2021

Przyjęty: 06 gru 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00161

Słowa kluczowe
principal-agent, incentive contract, subject librarian

© 2021 Chunping Wang et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

The incentive contract of subject librarians in university library under the non-linear task importance

Data publikacji: 31 mar 2022

Zakres stron: 721 - 730

Otrzymano: 21 maj 2021

Przyjęty: 06 gru 2021

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/amns.2021.2.00161

Słowa kluczoweprincipal-agent, incentive contract, subject librarian

© 2021 Chunping Wang et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Słowa kluczowe
principal-agent, incentive contract, subject librarian