<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> We investigate the performance measurement of the implementing agencies of EU Structural Funds in Hungary. Following the advice of Thiel and Leeuw (2002), we focus on the incentives created by the institutional environment of these agencies. The core of this environment is a double principal-agent relationship between the European Commission (EC), the national government and the Managing Authority. We investigate its institutional features and the resulting organisational incentives for Managing Authorities in Hungary. Relying on programme evaluations, we explore how these incentives actually affected the design and use of performance measurement by Authorities in two policy fields: active labour-market policy and higher education. We find that external incentives to focus on absorption and formal compliance created bias against integrating performance measurement into the policy process and tackling problems of performance risk and non-measurability.</p></abstract>

We investigate the performance measurement of the implementing agencies of EU Structural Funds in Hungary. Following the advice of Thiel and Leeuw (2002), we focus on the incentives created by the institutional environment of these agencies. The core of this environment is a double principal-agent relationship between the European Commission (EC), the national government and the Managing Authority. We investigate its institutional features and the resulting organisational incentives for Managing Authorities in Hungary. Relying on programme evaluations, we explore how these incentives actually affected the design and use of performance measurement by Authorities in two policy fields: active labour-market policy and higher education. We find that external incentives to focus on absorption and formal compliance created bias against integrating performance measurement into the policy process and tackling problems of performance risk and non-measurability.

Measuring for Absorption: How the Institutionalisation of EU Cohesion Policy Influences the Use of Performance Indicators in Hungary

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

We investigate the performance measurement of the implementing agencies of EU Structural Funds in Hungary. Following the advice of Thiel and Leeuw (2002), we...

Measuring for Absorption: How the Institutionalisation of EU Cohesion Policy Influences the Use of Performance Indicators in Hungary

Data publikacji: 29 sty 2016

Zakres stron: 125 - 147

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/nispa-2015-0012

Słowa kluczowe
performance measurement, institutional analysis, project management, European Union, Structural Funds

© NISPAcee

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Measuring for Absorption: How the Institutionalisation of EU Cohesion Policy Influences the Use of Performance Indicators in Hungary

Data publikacji: 29 sty 2016

Zakres stron: 125 - 147

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/nispa-2015-0012

Słowa kluczoweperformance measurement, institutional analysis, project management, European Union, Structural Funds

© NISPAcee

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
performance measurement, institutional analysis, project management, European Union, Structural Funds