<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of influential philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that science is constrained by human nature. How exactly our genetic constitution constrains scientific representations of the world remains unclear. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it often leads to the unwarranted conclusion that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects or properties of the world. Secondly, it stands in the way of a nuanced account of the relationship between our cognitive and perceptual wiring and scientific theory. In response, I propose a typology or classification of the different kinds of biological constraints and their sources on science. Using <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_kjps-2017-0002_ref_008_w2aab2b8b2b1b7b1ab1ab8Aa">Boden’s (1990)</xref> notion of a conceptual space, I distinguish between constraints relating to the ease with which we can reach representations within our conceptual space (which I call ‘biases’) and constraints causing possible representations to fall outside of our conceptual space. This last kind of constraints does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world cannot be represented by us – as argued by advocates of ‘cognitive closure’ – merely that some ways of representing the world are inaccessible to us. It relates to what <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_kjps-2017-0002_ref_015_w2aab2b8b2b1b7b1ab1ac15Aa">Clark (1986)</xref> and <xref ref-type="bibr" rid="j_kjps-2017-0002_ref_030_w2aab2b8b2b1b7b1ab1ac30Aa">Rescher (1990)</xref> have framed as ‘the alien scientist hypothesis’ (the possibility that alien scientists, endowed with radically different cognitive abilities, could produce representations of the world that are unintelligible to us). The purpose of this typology is to provide some much needed clarity and structure to the debate about biological constraints on science.</p></abstract>

Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of influential philosophers and cognitive scientists claim that science is constrained by human nature. How exactly our genetic constitution constrains scientific representations of the world remains unclear. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it often leads to the unwarranted conclusion that we are cognitively closed to certain aspects or properties of the world. Secondly, it stands in the way of a nuanced account of the relationship between our cognitive and perceptual wiring and scientific theory. In response, I propose a typology or classification of the different kinds of biological constraints and their sources on science. Using Boden’s (1990) notion of a conceptual space, I distinguish between constraints relating to the ease with which we can reach representations within our conceptual space (which I call ‘biases’) and constraints causing possible representations to fall outside of our conceptual space. This last kind of constraints does not entail that some aspects or properties of the world cannot be represented by us – as argued by advocates of ‘cognitive closure’ – merely that some ways of representing the world are inaccessible to us. It relates to what Clark (1986) and Rescher (1990) have framed as ‘the alien scientist hypothesis’ (the possibility that alien scientists, endowed with radically different cognitive abilities, could produce representations of the world that are unintelligible to us). The purpose of this typology is to provide some much needed clarity and structure to the debate about biological constraints on science.

How Our Biology Constrains Our Science

Tilburg School of Humanities (The Netherlands),

Kairos. Journal of Philosophy & Science

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"How Our Biology Constrains Our Science"}

Reasoning from a naturalistic perspective, viewing the mind as an evolved biological organ with a particular structure and function, a number of influential...

How Our Biology Constrains Our Science

Data publikacji: 06 cze 2017

Zakres stron: 31 - 53

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0002

Słowa kluczowe
Cognitive Constraints, Sensory Constraints, Scientific Scope, Cognitive Scaffolding, Conceptual Space, Cognitive Closure

© 2017 Michael Vlerick, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

How Our Biology Constrains Our Science

Data publikacji: 06 cze 2017

Zakres stron: 31 - 53

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/kjps-2017-0002

Słowa kluczoweCognitive Constraints, Sensory Constraints, Scientific Scope, Cognitive Scaffolding, Conceptual Space, Cognitive Closure

© 2017 Michael Vlerick, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Cognitive Constraints, Sensory Constraints, Scientific Scope, Cognitive Scaffolding, Conceptual Space, Cognitive Closure