1. bookTom 5 (2016): Zeszyt 3 (September 2016)
Informacje o czasopiśmie
License
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2336-9205
Pierwsze wydanie
11 Mar 2014
Częstotliwość wydawania
3 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski
Otwarty dostęp

Over-reaction to Policy Signals, and Central Bank Optimal Communication Policy

Data publikacji: 23 Sep 2016
Tom & Zeszyt: Tom 5 (2016) - Zeszyt 3 (September 2016)
Zakres stron: 165 - 187
Otrzymano: 23 Aug 2015
Przyjęty: 15 May 2016
Informacje o czasopiśmie
License
Format
Czasopismo
eISSN
2336-9205
Pierwsze wydanie
11 Mar 2014
Częstotliwość wydawania
3 razy w roku
Języki
Angielski

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