<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>The impact of institutional arrangements, the “rules of the game”, in terms of Douglass North’s definition, on macroeconomic dynamics has been largely detected in the economic-historical records. However, clarification of the nature of institutional currents and their relationship with the paths of economic growth is a challenge for contemporary economic theory. The paper will present a retrospective of the conceptualization of institutional change as a process that mimics the evolutionary systems, relying on relevant theoretical concepts and selective empirical material that is contained herein. In this sense, the paper gives insight into the important contributions reflecting on the relationship between instiutions and economic growth, the evolutionary theory of socio-economic changes and their possible implications for the current reform process. Total of argumentation offered in the paper indicates stability and inertia of institutional structures, whose dynamics is prone to path dependency. Insisting on universal reform solutions, neutral with respect to local circumstances in the process of stimulating economic growth, turns out to be ineffective.</p></abstract>

The impact of institutional arrangements, the “rules of the game”, in terms of Douglass North’s definition, on macroeconomic dynamics has been largely detected in the economic-historical records. However, clarification of the nature of institutional currents and their relationship with the paths of economic growth is a challenge for contemporary economic theory. The paper will present a retrospective of the conceptualization of institutional change as a process that mimics the evolutionary systems, relying on relevant theoretical concepts and selective empirical material that is contained herein. In this sense, the paper gives insight into the important contributions reflecting on the relationship between instiutions and economic growth, the evolutionary theory of socio-economic changes and their possible implications for the current reform process. Total of argumentation offered in the paper indicates stability and inertia of institutional structures, whose dynamics is prone to path dependency. Insisting on universal reform solutions, neutral with respect to local circumstances in the process of stimulating economic growth, turns out to be ineffective.

Evolution Of “Rules Of The Game”, Macroeconomic Dynamics And Reform Policy

University of Niš, Faculty of Economics, Serbia

Economic Themes

This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

EVOLUCIJA „PRAVILA IGRE“, MAKROEKONOMSKA DINAMIKA I REFORMSKA POLITIKA

The impact of institutional arrangements, the “rules of the game”, in terms of Douglass North’s definition, on macroeconomic dynamics has been largely detected...

Evolution Of “Rules Of The Game”, Macroeconomic Dynamics And Reform Policy

Data publikacji: 14 paź 2015

Zakres stron: 480 - 497

Otrzymano: 07 sie 2014

Przyjęty: 29 gru 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ethemes-2014-0029

Słowa kluczowe
institutions, economic growth, evolution, liberalization, economic reforms

© 2014 Zoran Stefanović, published by De Gruyter Open

This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Evolution Of “Rules Of The Game”, Macroeconomic Dynamics And Reform Policy

Data publikacji: 14 paź 2015

Zakres stron: 480 - 497

Otrzymano: 07 sie 2014

Przyjęty: 29 gru 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/ethemes-2014-0029

Słowa kluczoweinstitutions, economic growth, evolution, liberalization, economic reforms

© 2014 Zoran Stefanović, published by De Gruyter Open

This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Słowa kluczowe
institutions, economic growth, evolution, liberalization, economic reforms