<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>In the context of a normative concretisation of the statute, the term “statute” is not synonymous with the law that can be repeated in light of a concrete case. In this context, the interpreter is the one who (1) “reconstructs” the possibilities contained in the statute, (2) articulates more precisely the contents of these possibilities, and (3) chooses the combination of possibilities that corresponds most closely to the legally relevant features of the life case (which also must be interpreted). Thus the interpreter’s productivity consists in recognizing a legal provision as referring to a <italic>type</italic> of conduct − for example, as recognizing that the statutory signs “exceeding the speed limit” refer to, <italic>inter alia</italic>, a type of behaviour known as driving a car too fast through a town. Moreover, the decision-maker has decided the case just <italic>this</italic> way, which means it is the decision-maker and not the “statutory text” that has excluded the possibility of any other legal solution (e. g. of driving too fast in a state of emergency). The statute refers to cases that will only occur in the future and are at the present moment, in a more or less defined way, envisaged by the legislator. Irrespective of the extent and intensiveness of the envisaging, the interpretation must remain true to the core meaning of the norm and to the semantic possibilities of the statute text.</p></abstract>

In the context of a normative concretisation of the statute, the term “statute” is not synonymous with the law that can be repeated in light of a concrete case. In this context, the interpreter is the one who (1) “reconstructs” the possibilities contained in the statute, (2) articulates more precisely the contents of these possibilities, and (3) chooses the combination of possibilities that corresponds most closely to the legally relevant features of the life case (which also must be interpreted). Thus the interpreter’s productivity consists in recognizing a legal provision as referring to a type of conduct − for example, as recognizing that the statutory signs “exceeding the speed limit” refer to, inter alia, a type of behaviour known as driving a car too fast through a town. Moreover, the decision-maker has decided the case just this way, which means it is the decision-maker and not the “statutory text” that has excluded the possibility of any other legal solution (e. g. of driving too fast in a state of emergency). The statute refers to cases that will only occur in the future and are at the present moment, in a more or less defined way, envisaged by the legislator. Irrespective of the extent and intensiveness of the envisaging, the interpretation must remain true to the core meaning of the norm and to the semantic possibilities of the statute text.

Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm

Baltic Journal of Law & Politics

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm"}

In the context of a normative concretisation of the statute, the term “statute” is not synonymous with the law that can be repeated in light of a concrete...

Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm

Data publikacji: 04 mar 2017

Zakres stron: 43 - 55

Otrzymano: 11 lis 2016

Przyjęty: 13 gru 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0011

Słowa kluczowe
Interpretation, value (re)construction of legal norm, dynamic objective interpretation, textualism, teleological interpretation, legal reasoning, legal study

© 2016 Marijan Pavčnik, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Interpretation as a Value (RE)Construction of the Legal Norm

Data publikacji: 04 mar 2017

Zakres stron: 43 - 55

Otrzymano: 11 lis 2016

Przyjęty: 13 gru 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/bjlp-2016-0011

Słowa kluczoweInterpretation, value (re)construction of legal norm, dynamic objective interpretation, textualism, teleological interpretation, legal reasoning, legal study

© 2016 Marijan Pavčnik, published by De Gruyter Open

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Słowa kluczowe
Interpretation, value (re)construction of legal norm, dynamic objective interpretation, textualism, teleological interpretation, legal reasoning, legal study