<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagination. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.</p></abstract>

Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are not conceivable. Eric Marcus (2004), for example, challenges the conceivability claim. Torin Alter (2007) argues that Marcus’s argument rests on an overly restrictive principle of imagination. I agree that the argument relies on an overly restrictive principle of imagination, but argue that Alter has not put his finger on the right one. In short, Marcus’s argument fails, but not for the reasons Alter gives.

Imagining Zombies

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Imagining Zombies"}

Philosophers have argued that the conceivability of philosophical zombies creates problems for physicalism. In response, it has been argued that zombies are...

Imagining Zombies

Pubblicato online: 31 dic 2018

Pagine: 107 - 116

Ricevuto: 25 set 2013

Accettato: 24 gen 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0006

Parole chiave
Zombies, conceivability, imagination, first-person perspective, third-person perspective

© 2014 Casey Woodling, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Imagining Zombies

Pubblicato online: 31 dic 2018

Pagine: 107 - 116

Ricevuto: 25 set 2013

Accettato: 24 gen 2014

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2014-0006

Parole chiaveZombies, conceivability, imagination, first-person perspective, third-person perspective

© 2014 Casey Woodling, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Parole chiave
Zombies, conceivability, imagination, first-person perspective, third-person perspective