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Volume 24 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Volume 23 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Volume 22 (2019): Issue 1 (December 2019)

Volume 21 (2019): Issue 1 (June 2019)

Volume 20 (2018): Issue 1 (June 2018)

Volume 19 (2017): Issue 1 (December 2017)

Volume 18 (2017): Issue 1 (April 2017)

Volume 17 (2016): Issue 1 (December 2016)

Volume 16 (2016): Issue 1 (October 2016)

Volume 15 (2016): Issue 1 (April 2016)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
1647-659X
First Published
01 Mar 2016
Publication timeframe
3 times per year
Languages
English

Search

Volume 24 (2020): Issue 1 (December 2020)

Journal Details
Format
Journal
eISSN
1647-659X
First Published
01 Mar 2016
Publication timeframe
3 times per year
Languages
English

Search

7 Articles
Open Access

Special Issue Truth and Falsity: Introduction

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 1 - 9

Abstract

Open Access

Lying, computers and self-awareness

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 10 - 34

Abstract

Abstract

From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I have argued that such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on imitating behaviors. Self-awareness as an ontological grounding for moral attribution must be evoked. This can pose a recognition problem from our part, should the sentient system be the only agent capable of acknowledging its own sentience.

Keywords

  • Lying
  • Philosophy of Lying
  • Turing Machine
  • computability
  • Artificial Intelligence (AI)
  • moral agency
  • self-awareness
  • AI singularity
  • AI ethics
Open Access

A Pós-Verdade, Para Além do Verdadeiro e do Falso

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 35 - 41

Abstract

Open Access

Dispensing with Truthfulness: truth and liberty in Rorty’s thought

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 42 - 73

Abstract

Abstract

Rorty saw the course of philosophy in the twentieth century as an effort to part from two major philosophical trends, namely historicism and naturalism, only to inevitably return at the end of a tortuous path to these very same tendencies. If we can concede without major objections (although perhaps with many objections of detail) Rorty’s diagnosis of the trends in contemporary continental and analytical philosophy, which seem to reveal the exhaustion of modern philosophy, based as it has been on epistemology, we must, on the other hand, examine carefully the three main questions that this diagnosis leaves open: (1) How does Rorty reconcile continental idealist subjectivism with materialistic behaviorism? (2) Is it really inevitable that philosophy (and philosophers) blinded by Geist are unable to question prevalent beliefs? (3) Finally, is the acceptance of a liberalism that is not able to give reasons for itself the most effective and pragmatic liberalism? In answering these questions, it may not be possible to avoid a non-dogmatic, but pragmatic, metaphysics: a vocabulary of vocabularies that allows Rorty (and us) to speak of the problems of justice in Plato and Rawls, of the soul in Aristotle and Descartes, of the dystopias in Moro and Orwell. On pragmatic terms, perhaps a modest version of a metaphysic’s “vocabulary” turns out to be as legitimate and practical as any other vocabulary.

Keywords

  • Metaphysics
  • Mind
  • Rorty
  • historicism
  • liberalism
Open Access

Is testability falsifiability?

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 74 - 90

Abstract

Open Access

On how statistics is used and abused to find truth in Science

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 91 - 104

Abstract

Open Access

A parrésia em Foucault - tecimentos

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 105 - 142

Abstract

7 Articles
Open Access

Special Issue Truth and Falsity: Introduction

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 1 - 9

Abstract

Open Access

Lying, computers and self-awareness

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 10 - 34

Abstract

Abstract

From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I have argued that such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on imitating behaviors. Self-awareness as an ontological grounding for moral attribution must be evoked. This can pose a recognition problem from our part, should the sentient system be the only agent capable of acknowledging its own sentience.

Keywords

  • Lying
  • Philosophy of Lying
  • Turing Machine
  • computability
  • Artificial Intelligence (AI)
  • moral agency
  • self-awareness
  • AI singularity
  • AI ethics
Open Access

A Pós-Verdade, Para Além do Verdadeiro e do Falso

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 35 - 41

Abstract

Open Access

Dispensing with Truthfulness: truth and liberty in Rorty’s thought

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 42 - 73

Abstract

Abstract

Rorty saw the course of philosophy in the twentieth century as an effort to part from two major philosophical trends, namely historicism and naturalism, only to inevitably return at the end of a tortuous path to these very same tendencies. If we can concede without major objections (although perhaps with many objections of detail) Rorty’s diagnosis of the trends in contemporary continental and analytical philosophy, which seem to reveal the exhaustion of modern philosophy, based as it has been on epistemology, we must, on the other hand, examine carefully the three main questions that this diagnosis leaves open: (1) How does Rorty reconcile continental idealist subjectivism with materialistic behaviorism? (2) Is it really inevitable that philosophy (and philosophers) blinded by Geist are unable to question prevalent beliefs? (3) Finally, is the acceptance of a liberalism that is not able to give reasons for itself the most effective and pragmatic liberalism? In answering these questions, it may not be possible to avoid a non-dogmatic, but pragmatic, metaphysics: a vocabulary of vocabularies that allows Rorty (and us) to speak of the problems of justice in Plato and Rawls, of the soul in Aristotle and Descartes, of the dystopias in Moro and Orwell. On pragmatic terms, perhaps a modest version of a metaphysic’s “vocabulary” turns out to be as legitimate and practical as any other vocabulary.

Keywords

  • Metaphysics
  • Mind
  • Rorty
  • historicism
  • liberalism
Open Access

Is testability falsifiability?

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 74 - 90

Abstract

Open Access

On how statistics is used and abused to find truth in Science

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 91 - 104

Abstract

Open Access

A parrésia em Foucault - tecimentos

Published Online: 11 Oct 2021
Page range: 105 - 142

Abstract

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