<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>Methodological problems often arise when a special case is confused with the general principle. So you will find affordances only for ‚artifacts’ if you restrict the analysis to ‚artifacts’. The general principle, however, is an ‚invitation character’, which triggers an action. Consequently, an action-theoretical approach known as ‚pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science is recommended. According to this approach, the human being is not a passive-receptive being but actively produces those action effects that open up the world to us (through ‚active inferences’). This ‚ideomotor approach’ focuses on the so-called ‚epistemic actions’, which guide our perception as conscious and unconscious cognitions. Due to ‚embodied cognition’ the own body is assigned an indispensable role. The action theoretical approach of ‚enactive cognition’ enables that every form can be consistently processualized. Thus, each ‚Gestalt’ is understood as the process result of interlocking cognitions of ‚forward modelling’ (which produces anticipations and enables prognoses) and ‚inverse modelling’ (which makes hypotheses about genesis and causality). As can be shown, these cognitions are fed by previous experiences of real interaction, which later changes into a mental trial treatment, which is highly automated and can therefore take place unconsciously. It is now central that every object may have such affordances that call for instrumental or epistemic action. In the simplest case, it is the body and the facial expressions of our counterpart that can be understood as a question and provoke an answer/reaction. Thus, emotion is not only to be understood as expression/output according to the scheme ‚input-processing-output’, but acts itself as a provocative act/input. Consequently, artifacts are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for affordances. Rather, they exist in all areas of cognition—from Enactive Cognition to Social Cognition.</p>
</abstract>

Methodological problems often arise when a special case is confused with the general principle. So you will find affordances only for ‚artifacts’ if you restrict the analysis to ‚artifacts’. The general principle, however, is an ‚invitation character’, which triggers an action. Consequently, an action-theoretical approach known as ‚pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science is recommended. According to this approach, the human being is not a passive-receptive being but actively produces those action effects that open up the world to us (through ‚active inferences’). This ‚ideomotor approach’ focuses on the so-called ‚epistemic actions’, which guide our perception as conscious and unconscious cognitions. Due to ‚embodied cognition’ the own body is assigned an indispensable role. The action theoretical approach of ‚enactive cognition’ enables that every form can be consistently processualized. Thus, each ‚Gestalt’ is understood as the process result of interlocking cognitions of ‚forward modelling’ (which produces anticipations and enables prognoses) and ‚inverse modelling’ (which makes hypotheses about genesis and causality). As can be shown, these cognitions are fed by previous experiences of real interaction, which later changes into a mental trial treatment, which is highly automated and can therefore take place unconsciously. It is now central that every object may have such affordances that call for instrumental or epistemic action. In the simplest case, it is the body and the facial expressions of our counterpart that can be understood as a question and provoke an answer/reaction. Thus, emotion is not only to be understood as expression/output according to the scheme ‚input-processing-output’, but acts itself as a provocative act/input. Consequently, artifacts are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for affordances. Rather, they exist in all areas of cognition—from Enactive Cognition to Social Cognition.

Epistemic affordances in gestalt perception as well as in emotional facial expressions and gestures

Gestalt Theory

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Methodological problems often arise when a special case is confused with the general principle. So you will find affordances only for ‚artifacts’ if you...

Epistemic affordances in gestalt perception as well as in emotional facial expressions and gestures

Publié en ligne: 31 août 2021

Pages: 179 - 198

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/gth-2021-0016

Mots clés
Embodiment, pragmatic turn, action theory, ideomotor learning, affordances, instrumental action, epistemic action, active inference, forward modelling, inverse modelling, microcognition, cognitive modelling, microgenesis, enactive cognition, social cognition, social referencing, emotion

© 2021 Klaus Schwarzfischer, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Epistemic affordances in gestalt perception as well as in emotional facial expressions and gestures

Publié en ligne: 31 août 2021

Pages: 179 - 198

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/gth-2021-0016

Mots clésEmbodiment, pragmatic turn, action theory, ideomotor learning, affordances, instrumental action, epistemic action, active inference, forward modelling, inverse modelling, microcognition, cognitive modelling, microgenesis, enactive cognition, social cognition, social referencing, emotion

© 2021 Klaus Schwarzfischer, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Mots clés
Embodiment, pragmatic turn, action theory, ideomotor learning, affordances, instrumental action, epistemic action, active inference, forward modelling, inverse modelling, microcognition, cognitive modelling, microgenesis, enactive cognition, social cognition, social referencing, emotion