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<p>What are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a sensory state should satisfy for it to constitute a representational state? That is, what are the limits of intentionality? This is the problem of demarcation. The goal of this paper is to assess a specific demarcation proposal for the minimal conditions of intentionality—the constancy mechanism proposal. Accordingly, it is a minimal condition for the intentionality of a given state that the sensory system should employ a constancy mechanism in the production of this state. First of all, I introduce the problem of demarcation and show its relevance for the debate on the viability of naturalist theories of mental representation. After that, I present the explanatory role requirement for the positing of representational states by intentional explanations of behaviour and show how it constitutes a criterion for the assessment of demarcation proposals for the limits of intentionality. Finally, I assess the constancy mechanism proposal and show that its viability is seriously jeopardised by the minimal distance problem.</p>
</abstract>

What are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a sensory state should satisfy for it to constitute a representational state? That is, what are the limits of intentionality? This is the problem of demarcation. The goal of this paper is to assess a specific demarcation proposal for the minimal conditions of intentionality—the constancy mechanism proposal. Accordingly, it is a minimal condition for the intentionality of a given state that the sensory system should employ a constancy mechanism in the production of this state. First of all, I introduce the problem of demarcation and show its relevance for the debate on the viability of naturalist theories of mental representation. After that, I present the explanatory role requirement for the positing of representational states by intentional explanations of behaviour and show how it constitutes a criterion for the assessment of demarcation proposals for the limits of intentionality. Finally, I assess the constancy mechanism proposal and show that its viability is seriously jeopardised by the minimal distance problem.

Can Constancy Mechanisms Draw the Limits of Intentionality?

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Why the Minimal Distance Problem Threatens the Constancy Mechanism Proposal

What are the minimal conditions for intentionality that a sensory state should satisfy for it to constitute a representational state? That is, what are the...

Can Constancy Mechanisms Draw the Limits of Intentionality?

Publié en ligne: 17 janv. 2023

Pages: 133 - 156

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0008

Mots clés
constancy mechanism proposal, minimal distance problem, minimal intentionality, problem of demarcation

© 2022 Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Can Constancy Mechanisms Draw the Limits of Intentionality?

Publié en ligne: 17 janv. 2023

Pages: 133 - 156

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0008

Mots clésconstancy mechanism proposal, minimal distance problem, minimal intentionality, problem of demarcation

© 2022 Sérgio Farias de Souza Filho, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
constancy mechanism proposal, minimal distance problem, minimal intentionality, problem of demarcation