<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>This article claims that events, facts and states of affairs need to be differentiated. It takes as a starting point Chisholm’s (1976) claim that only his ontology of states of affairs explains effectively thirteen sentences related to propositions and events. He does this by reducing propositions and events to states of affairs. We argue that our ontology also solves those problems. We defend a hierarchized Platonist ontology that has concrete entities (objects and events) and abstract entities (properties, facts and states of affairs). The distinctions we propose allow us to explain the pre-analytic data analyzed by Chisholm without reducing entities. We claim that our ontology provides a different way of explaining that data, and is, thus, promissory.</p></abstract>

This article claims that events, facts and states of affairs need to be differentiated. It takes as a starting point Chisholm’s (1976) claim that only his ontology of states of affairs explains effectively thirteen sentences related to propositions and events. He does this by reducing propositions and events to states of affairs. We argue that our ontology also solves those problems. We defend a hierarchized Platonist ontology that has concrete entities (objects and events) and abstract entities (properties, facts and states of affairs). The distinctions we propose allow us to explain the pre-analytic data analyzed by Chisholm without reducing entities. We claim that our ontology provides a different way of explaining that data, and is, thus, promissory.

Why are Events, Facts, and States of Affairs Different?

Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Why are Events, Facts, and States of Affairs Different?"}

This article claims that events, facts and states of affairs need to be differentiated. It takes as a starting point Chisholm’s (1976) claim that only his...

Why are Events, Facts, and States of Affairs Different?

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 99 - 122

Reçu: 14 janv. 2016

Accepté: 27 janv. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2017-0029

Mots clés
Events, facts, states of affairs, ontology, Chisholm

© 2017 Ana Clara Polakof, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Why are Events, Facts, and States of Affairs Different?

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 99 - 122

Reçu: 14 janv. 2016

Accepté: 27 janv. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2017-0029

Mots clésEvents, facts, states of affairs, ontology, Chisholm

© 2017 Ana Clara Polakof, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Events, facts, states of affairs, ontology, Chisholm