<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and stress the extent to which this is so in both cases, in order to attain a better appreciation of the Quinean heritage of IA.</p></abstract>

Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and stress the extent to which this is so in both cases, in order to attain a better appreciation of the Quinean heritage of IA.

Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage"}

Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the interpretation of...

Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 343 - 360

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2012-0003

Mots clés
Quine’s philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments, Platonism, naturalism, inference to the best explanation

© 2012 Jacob Busch et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Indispensability Arguments and Their Quinean Heritage

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 343 - 360

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2012-0003

Mots clésQuine’s philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments, Platonism, naturalism, inference to the best explanation

© 2012 Jacob Busch et al., published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Mots clés
Quine’s philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments, Platonism, naturalism, inference to the best explanation