<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open future-objective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we might, <italic>prima facie</italic>, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility.</p></abstract>

I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open future-objective present’ models of the universe. It has been relatively uncontroversial until recently to hold that presentism is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel. I argue that recent arguments to the contrary do not show that presentism is consistent with time travel. Moreover, the necessary truth of other open future-objective present models which we might, prima facie, have supposed to be more amenable to the possibility of time travel, turn out also to be inconsistent with this possibility.

Time travel and the open future

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Time travel and the open future"}

I argue that the thesis that time travel is logically possible, is inconsistent with the necessary truth of any of the usual ‘open future-objective present’...

Time travel and the open future

Publié en ligne: 31 déc. 2018

Pages: 223 - 232

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2005-0009

© 2005 Kristie Miller, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.