<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> Modern empirical research considers happiness to be identical with a subjective feeling of pleasure. This refers to both assessments of actual satisfactions of need and representations of possible satisfactions of need. Thereby, the aspects of cognitive representations of happiness are mainly focused, while the performing subject remains disregarded. The phenomenological approach tries to counteract such a situation. Phenomenology allows us to differentiate ‘striving towards happiness’ and the ‘experienced happiness’ as different polarities of this phenomenon. Based on this three aspects can be distinguished: (1) the present experience of happiness as an experience of satisfying actual urgent needs; (2) the temporally enduring form of (self-)satisfaction in the individual life; (3) the ethical form of happiness as felicity (Glückseligkeit) implying the teleological determination of human existence realized through socialization. In this paper, these aspects are considered phenomenological through intentional genetic analysis and taking into account some psychoanalytic results. This article aims at showing that happiness, particularly in the ethical form of felicity, cannot be considered as merely an individual issue, but is rather closely related to the sociality of human experience and to the intersubjective constitution of our shared reality.</p></abstract>

Modern empirical research considers happiness to be identical with a subjective feeling of pleasure. This refers to both assessments of actual satisfactions of need and representations of possible satisfactions of need. Thereby, the aspects of cognitive representations of happiness are mainly focused, while the performing subject remains disregarded. The phenomenological approach tries to counteract such a situation. Phenomenology allows us to differentiate ‘striving towards happiness’ and the ‘experienced happiness’ as different polarities of this phenomenon. Based on this three aspects can be distinguished: (1) the present experience of happiness as an experience of satisfying actual urgent needs; (2) the temporally enduring form of (self-)satisfaction in the individual life; (3) the ethical form of happiness as felicity (Glückseligkeit) implying the teleological determination of human existence realized through socialization. In this paper, these aspects are considered phenomenological through intentional genetic analysis and taking into account some psychoanalytic results. This article aims at showing that happiness, particularly in the ethical form of felicity, cannot be considered as merely an individual issue, but is rather closely related to the sociality of human experience and to the intersubjective constitution of our shared reality.

In Sachen Glück. Ein genetisch-phänomenologischer Ansatz / Concerning Happiness. Reflexions from the Genetic Phenomenological Point of View

Gestalt Theory

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.

Modern empirical research considers happiness to be identical with a subjective feeling of pleasure. This refers to both assessments of actual satisfactions of...

In Sachen Glück. Ein genetisch-phänomenologischer Ansatz / Concerning Happiness. Reflexions from the Genetic Phenomenological Point of View

Article Category: Teil III. Erfahrungsdimensionen Des Menschen Als Soziales Wesen

Publié en ligne: 21 déc. 2017

Pages: 281 - 301

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/gth-2017-0020

© 2017

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License.