Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education

Zelda Brutti

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Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education

Zelda Brutti

| 29 abr 2020

IZA Journal of Labor Economics

Volumen 9 (2020): Edición 1 (March 2020)

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Publicado en línea: 29 abr 2020

Páginas: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajole-2020-0003

Palabras clave
decentralization, education inequality, development inequality

© 2020 Zelda Brutti, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Municipal development in the empirical sample. Notes: The figure plots the MDI values for the year 2001 for our sample of cities, distinguishing between those that acquired autonomy in 2002 (darker) and those that did not (lighter). The two distributions overlap in transparency (darkest). Normal curves are overlaid.

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores. Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on municipal autonomy (left) and on the interaction between autonomy and development (right), estimated at different postreform periods with baseline model (2). Black squares indicate over-time average estimates, and spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. The reform transition period is shaded in gray.

The overall effect of municipal autonomy on test scores, by MDI and time. Notes: The figure plots the marginal effects of municipal autonomy on test scores, by level of municipal development (on x-axis) and at different postreform periods (see different marker shapes). Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals.

Leads and lags. Notes: The figure plots interactions between autonomy and year dummies (“naive model”) and three-way interactions between autonomy, local development, and year dummies (baseline model); point estimates represent differences with respect to 2002. Spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Pre-reform and transition years are shaded in gray.

Evolution of test scores for the two groups of cities over time. (a) Autonomous highly developed cities take off over time. (b) Autonomous low-developed cities fall behind over time. (c) Autonomy widens the inequality fork over time. Notes: The figure shows the test score deviations from the national average. Autonomous cities are solid, and nonautonomous ones are dashed. Highly developed cities are in darker color, low-developed ones are in lighter color. Pre-reform and transition years are shaded in gray.

The effect of municipal autonomy on number of test takers (% change). Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on municipal autonomy (left) and on the interaction between autonomy and development (right), estimated at different postreform periods. Black squares indicate over-time average estimates, and spikes represent 95% confidence intervals.

The effect of municipal autonomy on share of disadvantaged-background test takers. Notes: The figure plots the coefficients on municipal autonomy (left) and on the interaction between autonomy and development (right), estimated at different postreform periods. Black squares indicate over-time average estimates, and spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. In the period 2004–2007, socioeconomic status data were not collected.

Maps of Colombia: a) Colombia’s departments; b) Colombia’s municipalities in black, those which were assigned autonomy over education in 2002; c) Distribution of Municipal Development Index in 2001. Note: In maps b) and c), the rural southeast is omitted to increase readability in the densely populated area.

Municipal development index in the empirical sample. Notes: The figure plots the 2001 MDI values for our sample of cities. The normal curve is overlaid.

Evolution of test scores for the two groups of cities over time. Notes: The figure shows the evolution of test score averages over time. Autonomous cities are solid, nonautonomous ones are dashed; highly developed cities are darker, and low-developed ones are lighter. In subfigures (a) and (b) at the bottom, differences between the postreform gap and the pre-reform (2001) gap are indicated (H0: diff = 0). Pre-reform and transition years are shaded in gray.

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores - with controls

	Controls
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Population	+ health	+ rurality	+ inequality	Baseline
Autonomy	−2.68 p<0.01 (0.93)	−2.45 p<0.01 (0.91)	−2.69 p<0.01 (0.90)	−2.65 p<0.05 (1.15)	−2.53 p<0.01 (0.87)
Autonomy × MDI	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)	0.05 p<0.01 (0.02)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)
Population (10k)	0.17 p<0.01 (0.05)	0.16 p<0.01 (0.05)	0.18 p<0.01 (0.05)	0.18 p<0.01 (0.06)
Health (registered)		−0.54 (0.45)	−0.55 (0.46)	−0.49 (0.43)
Health (low BW)		−164.08 p<0.01 (59.28)	−178.02 p<0.01 (59.27)	−175.47 p<0.01 (61.71)
Rurality index			−5.19 p<0.01 (1.60)	−4.05 p<0.05 (1.71)
Gini index				1.52 p<0.01 (0.49)
Gini index (land)				−0.50 (1.12)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8,734	8,716	8,716	7,910	8,734
N groups	692	692	692	692	692
R-sq.	0.51	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51
Mean y	42.34	42.34	42.34	42.34	42.34

Education Responsibilities and transfers by level of government

Central government
Set school curriculum	Set teacher wages	Set general guidelines	Financial transfers to local authorities

Local authorities
Up to 2002 (Law 60/1993)		From 2002 onward (Law 715/2001)
		Autonomous municipalities
Transfers:	84% to department 16% to municipality	Transfers:	100% to municipality

Teacher hiring, training and	Teacher hiring, training and
placement School infrastructure and materials School transport and any auxiliary program	Departments andmunicipalities, underdepartments’supervision	placement School infrastructure and materials School transport and any auxiliary program	Municipality only

		Nonautonomous municipalities
		Transfers:	97% to department3% to municipality

		Teacher hiring, training and placement School infrastructure and materials School transport and any auxiliary program	Department only(maintenance dutiesfor municipality)

The effect of municipal autonomy on number of test takers (% change)

	Period average		Over-time evolution
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	naïve	Baseline	2002–2003	2004–2005	2006–2007	2008–2009	2010–2012
Autonomy	−0.16 p<0.01 (0.04)	−0.03 (0.20)	−0.08 (0.12)	−0.19 (0.48)	0.11 (0.20)	−0.16 (0.26)	0.13 (0.21)
Autonomy ×MDI		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.01 p<0.10 (0.00)
MunicipalityFE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Timedummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8,734	8,734	2,742	2,665	2,707	2,705	3,367
N groups	692	692	692	692	692	692	692
R-sq.	0.27	0.27	0.05	0.10	0.35	0.09	0.57

Development-specific time trends: department-level SEs

	IDM-specific trends				Department-level SEs
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	</> 40	Tertiles	Quartiles	Quintiles	Baseline	Baseline
Autonomy	−1.58 p<0.10 (0.87)	−1.71 p<0.05 (0.75)	−1.66 p<0.10 (0.88)	−1.67 p<0.05 (0.81)	−2.53 p<0.01 (0.89)	−2.53 p<0.01 (0.87)
Autonomy × MDI	0.04 p<0.05 (0.02)	0.04 p<0.01 (0.01)	0.04 p<0.05 (0.02)	0.04 p<0.05 (0.02)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
IDM-specific T trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No
N	8,734	8,734	8,734	8,734	8,734	8,734
N groups	692	692	692	692	692	692
R-sq.	0.53	0.53	0.54	0.53	0.51	0.51
Mean y	42.34	42.34	42.34	42.34	42.34	42.34

Leads and lags

	(1)	(2)
	Naive	Baseline
y2000 × Aut. (× MDI)	−0.42 p<0.10 (0.25)	−0.01 p<0.10 (0.00)
y2001 × Aut. (× MDI)	−0.33 (0.22)	−0.01 p<0.10 (0.00)
y2003 × Aut. (× MDI)	−0.31 p<0.10 (0.19)	−0.01 p<0.05 (0.00)
y2004 × Aut. (× MDI)	−0.33 p<0.01 (0.10)	−0.01 p<0.01 (0.00)
y2005 × Aut. (× MDI)	−0.14 (0.18)	0.00 (0.00)
y2006 × Aut. (× MDI)	0.20 (0.31)	0.00 (0.01)
y2007 × Aut. (× MDI)	0.02 (0.17)	0.00 (0.00)
y2008 × Aut. (× MDI)	0.43 p<0.05 (0.19)	0.01 p<0.05 (0.00)
y2009 × Aut. (× MDI)	0.68 p<0.01 (0.20)	0.01 p<0.01 (0.00)
y2010 × Aut. (× MDI)	1.12 p<0.01 (0.27)	0.03 p<0.01 (0.00)
y2011 × Aut. (× MDI)	1.11 p<0.01 (0.38)	0.03 p<0.01 (0.01)
y2012 × Aut. (× MDI)	0.68 p<0.01 (0.25)	0.02 p<0.01 (0.00)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes
N	8,734	8,734
N groups	692	692
R-sq.	0.51	0.51
Mean y	42.34	42.34

Education finance and administration quality in autonomous cities

	High-D	Low-D	Difference (%)		N	N cities

Education finance
Total spending	1,175.24 (28.11)	1,088.50 (61.19)	86.74 (66.24)	(+8%)	242	35
Salaries	939.99 (21.00)	861.49 (45.35)	78.50 (49.41)	(+9%)
Infrastructure and materials	97.38 (6.44)	109.75 (13.66)	−12.37 (15.10)	(−11%)
Others	87.18 (6.77)	70.21 (13.12)	16.97 (15.65)	(+24%)
Student–teacher ratios	27.33 (0.23)	24.75 (0.36)	2.58 p<0.01 (0.51)	(+10%)	145	35
Transfers received	1,147.48 (48.92)	1,130.76 (25.60)	16.72 (60.20)	(+2%)	334	35

The effect of municipal autonomy on share of low-SES test takers

	Period average		Over-time evolution
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	naïve	Baseline	2002–2003	(2004–2007)	2008–2009	2010–2012
Autonomy	0.01 (0.01)	0.06 (0.04)	0.02 (0.08)		0.12 p<0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.07)
Autonomy × MDI		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)		0.00 p<0.05 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes
N	6,088	6,088	2,742		2,705	3,367
N groups	692	692	692		692	692
R-sq.	0.19	0.19	0.01		0.13	0.34

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores

	Period average		Over-time evolution
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Naive	Baseline	2002–2003	2004–2005	2006–2007	2008–2009	2010–2012
Autonomy	0.67 p<0.01	−2.53 p<0.01	−0.67	−1.17*	−1.47 p<0.05	−2.73 p<0.01	−5.54 p<0.01
	(0.21)	(0.87)	(0.62)	(0.67)	(0.70)	(1.00)	(1.44)
Autonomy × MDI		0.06 p<0.01	0.02	0.03*	0.04 p<0.01	0.07 p<0.01	0.14 p<0.01
		(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8,734	8,734	2,742	2,665	2,707	2,705	3,367
N groups	692	692	692	692	692	692	692
R-sq.	0.51	0.51	0.51	0.77	0.69	0.44	0.44
Mean y	42.34	42.34	41.33	41.54	42.69	41.89	42.41

Descriptive statistics

	All cities	Autonomous	Nonautonomous

Test-related
Test scores (pre-reform)	41.44 (1.52)	41.74 (1.34)	41.42 (1.53)
Test scores (postreform)	42.51 (2.30)	43.39 (2.35)	42.46 (2.29)
Number of test takers	296.16 (483.57)	1,839.40 (1,116.16)	213.70 (214.11)
Share of low-SES test takers	0.88 (0.10)	0.78 (0.11)	0.87 (0.10)
Municipal characteristics
Municipal Development Index 2001	36.03 (10.81)	50.67 (10.25)	35.25 (10.27)
Population in 2002 (thousands)	36,834.28 (52,225.38)	221,149.10 (106,137.50)	26,855.00 (18,259.58)

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores – other subjects

Subject	Period average		Over-time evolution
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Naive	Baseline	2002–2003	2004–2005	2006–2007	2008–2009	2010–2012
Criticalreading
Autonomy	0.28 p<0.01 (0.11)	−0.56 (0.42)	−0.47 p<0.10 (0.27)	−0.01 (0.78)	0.33 (0.75)	0.10 (0.59)	−2.13 p<0.01 (0.66)
Autonomy × MDI		0.02 p<0.05 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.01)
Sciences
Autonomy	0.21 p<0.01 (0.08)	−0.58 p<0.10 (0.32)	−0.65 (0.52)	−0.13 (0.38)	−0.06 (0.41)	−0.08 (0.39)	−1.65 p<0.01 (0.55)
Autonomy × MDI		0.02 p<0.05 (0.01)	0.02 p<0.10 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.04 p<0.01 (0.01)
Timedummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	8,734	8,734	2,742	2,665	2,707	2,705	3,367
N groups	692	692	692	692	692	692	692
R-sq.	0.74	0.74	0.46	0.75	0.65	0.40	0.65

Results on “discontinuity samples” around the autonomy threshold

	Discontinuity samples
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	± 20,000	± 30,000	± 40,000	± 50,000	Baseline
Autonomy	−6.25 p<0.01 (0.58)	−3.15 p<0.05 (1.25)	−2.65 p<0.05 (1.18)	−2.45 p<0.05 (1.17)	−2.53 p<0.01 (0.87)
Autonomy × MDI	0.15 p<0.01 (0.02)	0.07 p<0.05 (0.03)	0.06 p<0.05 (0.03)	0.06 p<0.05 (0.03)	0.06 p<0.01 (0.02)
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Time dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
N	294	473	740	1,086	8,734
N groups	23	37	58	85	692
R-sq.	0.72	0.70	0.66	0.63	0.51
Mean y	43.00	42.79	42.80	42.60	42.34

eISSN:: 2193-8997
Idioma:: Inglés

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Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education

Publicado en línea: 29 abr 2020

Páginas: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajole-2020-0003

Palabras clave
decentralization, education inequality, development inequality

© 2020 Zelda Brutti, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure A1

Figure A2

Figure A3

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores - with controls

Education Responsibilities and transfers by level of government

The effect of municipal autonomy on number of test takers (% change)

Development-specific time trends: department-level SEs

Leads and lags

Education finance and administration quality in autonomous cities

The effect of municipal autonomy on share of low-SES test takers

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores

Descriptive statistics

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores – other subjects

Results on “discontinuity samples” around the autonomy threshold

Cities drifting apart: Heterogeneous outcomes of decentralizing public education

Publicado en línea: 29 abr 2020

Páginas: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajole-2020-0003

Palabras clavedecentralization, education inequality, development inequality

© 2020 Zelda Brutti, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

Figure 6

Figure 7

Figure A1

Figure A2

Figure A3

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores - with controls

Education Responsibilities and transfers by level of government

The effect of municipal autonomy on number of test takers (% change)

Development-specific time trends: department-level SEs

Leads and lags

Education finance and administration quality in autonomous cities

The effect of municipal autonomy on share of low-SES test takers

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores

Descriptive statistics

The effect of municipal autonomy on test scores – other subjects

Results on “discontinuity samples” around the autonomy threshold

Palabras clave
decentralization, education inequality, development inequality