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<p>One argument against epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution. A particularly powerful form of this argument was developed by William James. James argued against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that, if it were correct, it would be inexplicable why the things that we find pleasurable are mostly beneficial to us while the things we find painful are mostly harmful. The aim of the present paper is to defend and extend James’s argument. James’s argument is here defended against criticisms due to Karl Popper, John Eccles and William Robinson. Recently, an argument similar to James’s has been developed by Hedda Hassel Mørch. Mørch argues that the phenomena to which James drew our attention can be explained if we say pleasure and pain have phenomenal powers. In the present paper it is argued that, as it stands, the argument developed by Mørch is not satisfactory. It is argued that Mørch’s account needs to be supplemented with the thesis that the self has certain causal powers. A similar addition, it is argued, needs to be made to a position defended by Bradford Saad. The paper argues that, supplemented with the appropriate attributions of causal powers to the self, James’s argument against epiphenomenalism is effective.</p>
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One argument against epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution. A particularly powerful form of this argument was developed by William James. James argued against epiphenomenalism on the grounds that, if it were correct, it would be inexplicable why the things that we find pleasurable are mostly beneficial to us while the things we find painful are mostly harmful. The aim of the present paper is to defend and extend James’s argument. James’s argument is here defended against criticisms due to Karl Popper, John Eccles and William Robinson. Recently, an argument similar to James’s has been developed by Hedda Hassel Mørch. Mørch argues that the phenomena to which James drew our attention can be explained if we say pleasure and pain have phenomenal powers. In the present paper it is argued that, as it stands, the argument developed by Mørch is not satisfactory. It is argued that Mørch’s account needs to be supplemented with the thesis that the self has certain causal powers. A similar addition, it is argued, needs to be made to a position defended by Bradford Saad. The paper argues that, supplemented with the appropriate attributions of causal powers to the self, James’s argument against epiphenomenalism is effective.

Phenomenal Powers or a Power of the Self?

Disputatio

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Developing an Evolutionary Argument against Epiphenomenalism

One argument against epiphenomenalism arises from the theory of evolution. A particularly powerful form of this argument was developed by William James. James...

Phenomenal Powers or a Power of the Self?

Publicado en línea: 05 jul 2024

Páginas: 115 - 134

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0005

Palabras clave
epiphenomenalism, evolutionary argument, explanation, William James

© 2023 John Wright, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Phenomenal Powers or a Power of the Self?

Publicado en línea: 05 jul 2024

Páginas: 115 - 134

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2023-0005

Palabras claveepiphenomenalism, evolutionary argument, explanation, William James

© 2023 John Wright, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
epiphenomenalism, evolutionary argument, explanation, William James