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<p>In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.</p>
</abstract>

In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I begin with an updated version of MacFarlane’s Boogling argument. My second argument is that the ‘overriding response’ that constitutive norm theorists offer to putative counterexamples is unpersuasive and dialectically risky. Third and finally, I suggest that constitutive norm theorists, in appealing to the analogy of games, actually undermine their case that they can make sense of assertions that fail to follow their putative constitutive norm. These considerations, I suggest, together show that the constitutive norm project founders not because any single norm is not descriptively correct of our assertion practices, but rather, because giving a constitutive norm as the definition of assertion alone is insufficient.

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Disputatio

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{"article-title":"Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion"}

In this article I introduce constitutive norm accounts of assertion, and then give three arguments for giving up on the constitutive norm project. First I...

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Publicado en línea: 29 ago 2022

Páginas: 27 - 40

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0002

Palabras clave
Assertion, constitutive norms, philosophy of language, rule-breaking, Timothy Williamson

© 2022 Matthew J. Cull, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Three Arguments against Constitutive Norm Accounts of Assertion

Publicado en línea: 29 ago 2022

Páginas: 27 - 40

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2022-0002

Palabras claveAssertion, constitutive norms, philosophy of language, rule-breaking, Timothy Williamson

© 2022 Matthew J. Cull, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Assertion, constitutive norms, philosophy of language, rule-breaking, Timothy Williamson