<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.</p></abstract>

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation cannot allow for certain kinds of reliable misrepresentation, and that this is a problem for those views. Artiga 2013 defends teleosemantics from this argument. He agrees with Mendelovici 2013 that teleosemantics cannot account for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation, but argues that this is not a problem for the view. This paper clarifies and improves the argument in Mendelovici 2013 and responds to Artiga’s arguments. Tracking theories, teleosemantics included, really do need to allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation.

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

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{"article-title":"Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation"}

Reliable misrepresentation is getting things wrong in the same way all the time. In Mendelovici 2013, I argue that tracking theories of mental representation...

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 57 - 92

Recibido: 19 nov 2013

Aceptado: 27 mar 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0003

Palabras clave
Teleosemantics, representation, intentionality, misrepresentation, mental content

© 2016 Angela Mendelovici, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Why Tracking Theories Should Allow for Clean Cases of Reliable Misrepresentation

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 57 - 92

Recibido: 19 nov 2013

Aceptado: 27 mar 2016

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2016-0003

Palabras claveTeleosemantics, representation, intentionality, misrepresentation, mental content

© 2016 Angela Mendelovici, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Teleosemantics, representation, intentionality, misrepresentation, mental content