<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.</p></abstract>

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of Paul Snowdon 1992, I argue that in order to demonstratively refer to an item via conscious awareness of a distinct intermediary the subject must have some understanding that she is aware of a distinct intermediary. This becomes an issue for common-factor theories insofar as it is also widely agreed that the general, pre-philosophical or ‘naïve’ view of experience does not accept that in normal perceptual cases one is consciously aware of non-environmental (inner, mental) features. I argue then that the standard common-factor view of experience should be committed to attributing quite widespread referential errors or failures amongst the general, non-philosophical populace – which seems an unattractively radical commitment. After clarifying the various assumptions I am making about experience and demonstrative thoughts, I consider a number of possible responses on behalf of the common-factor theorist. I finish by arguing that my argument should apply to any common-factor theory, not just avowedly ‘indirect’ theories.

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Becario del Programa de Becas Posdoctorales de la UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought"}

I raise a problem for common-factor theories of experience concerning the demonstrative thoughts we form on the basis of experience. Building on an insight of...

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 171 - 193

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0005

Palabras clave
Visual Experience, Demonstrative Thought, Common-factor, Intentionalism, Paul Snowdon

© 2011 Thomas Raleigh, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Visual Experience and Demonstrative Thought

Publicado en línea: 31 dic 2018

Páginas: 171 - 193

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2011-0005

Palabras claveVisual Experience, Demonstrative Thought, Common-factor, Intentionalism, Paul Snowdon

© 2011 Thomas Raleigh, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Palabras clave
Visual Experience, Demonstrative Thought, Common-factor, Intentionalism, Paul Snowdon