Volumen 7 (2017): Heft 1 (June 2017)

This study analyses the feasibility of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative from an institutionalist perspective. The initiative is undertaken as a ‘geo-functional institutionalist’ project, and this strengthens its feasibility. Firstly, the initiative aims to institutionalize a new international structure paralleling the existing Western-dominated one through which China could re-organize its position as an ‘agenda entrepreneur’ in the world without any clash with the West. Secondly, the initiative follows a functionalist strategy. It offers a ‘win-win’ functionalist framework without any hegemonic ambition; thus, the initiative attracts the attention of the rest of the world. China also follows a pure functionalist and bilateral/regional way to deal with the heterogeneity problem among the target countries. However, China’s institutionalization attempt might be isomorphic with the existing Western-dominated system in terms of its hegemonic structure due to the cognitive limitations in finding alternatives, and this might ruin the feasibility of the initiative.

In order to examine the impact of cultural and institutional distance on China’s OFDI towards the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) area, the paper selects 28 countries along The Belt and Road. The empirical results using panel data from 2006-2014 indicate that institutional distance is negatively correlated with China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). At the same time, cultural distance interacts with bilateral trade, resulting in a “benefit of foreignness” effect.

As a consequence of the international crisis in 2008-2009, the role of exports in economic growth came into focus in most countries. Exports of EU Member States gained momentum from 2010 onward but with certain changes in their structure and direction. In several countries, the turn towards non-EU areas, such as China or Latin America was part of the state export strategy. On the one hand, our article describes these foreign trade strategies and their institutional framework of the Iberian, Baltic and Central European governments, detecting possible similarities. On the other hand, we analyse recent export data. This way we can get a picture on the structure and direction of exports of periphery economies and this can be compared to the aims of the given states. Our hypothesis is that there is a gap between the reality and the intentions of the governments. The size of this gap varies and is influenced by certain factors such as the different involvement of multinational companies in foreign trade or the different economic structure of these countries. In our paper we list which countries adopted a government strategy and with what aim. We provide a short literature review on state trade promotion policies and discuss these policies and their institutions in the Baltic, Visegrád and Iberian countries.

Following the political changes in 2000, Serbia has rapidly started to catch up with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in various aspects of the transition process. One of these very important aspects were foreign investments, both ‘direct’ and ‘portfolio’ ones, that had a significant impact on the development of Serbian economy by recovering economic structure and raising competitiveness in world markets, followed by improving the balance of payments and technological, scientific and managerial base. Foreign investments as an “economic engine” enable accelerated realization of national economic goals which include re-industrialization and renewal of industrial capacity. The openness of the Serbian market and the lack of financial resources allow China and other states concerned under favourable conditions invest in the development of Serbian economy. In this way, Chinese investments have become a driving force for the promotion of economic and other relations between the two countries. On the other hand, however, Chinese investments have proven to be an ideal test for the realization of the objectives of the development strategy of the ‘New Silk Road’ which among other things include the improvement of China’s position on world markets, including the EU market. For the proper understanding of Sino-Serbian relations, this study first gives a short explanation of the Chinese strategy of the New Silk Road. Then, it includes an analysis of Serbia’s position towards China. Analysis of the development of Serbian-Chinese economic relations, especially in the field of foreign investment and within the framework of multilateral cooperation mechanism ‘16+1’, occupies the central part of the study. The study concludes with an evaluation of comparative advantages and certain disadvantages for the Chinese foreign investment in Serbian economy, which in itself has certain significance for the realization of the New Silk Road strategy.

This article presents an overview of current and potential investment from China into the Slovak Republic within the broader CEEC region cooperation based on the 16+1 platform. Based on a business study on the automotive industry in the CEEC region, and particularly Slovakia as one of the industrial sectors for possible Chinese investment with immense potential, the article aims to identify the main advantages and disadvantages of the region as a foreign direct investment destination. The article also analyses the impact of FDI inflows on the Slovak economy. We come to the conclusion that the recent FDI inflow from China to Slovakia has been statistically insignificant, which may, however, change in case the envisaged Chinese investment into the steel industry in Slovakia will be realised. With respect thereto, the article also points at the need to set out a new revised framework for the international legal protection of Chinese investment in the EU. It has been established that further research is required to assess the impact of Chinese FDI on the Slovak economy.

This contribution articulates the synergies and divergences of the various formats of cooperation between China and the European countries. The EU and China have a strong interest in each other’s flagship initiatives, namely the Investment Plan for Europe, and the One Belt, One Road Initiative (Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road). The authors argue that there are certain synergies between these initiatives. Furthermore, the new initiative EU-China Connectivity Platform is aimed to explore these synergies. The authors explore the recent developments in the EU-China investments, trade cooperation and the challenges of the ever-growing CEEC-China partnership in different formats, including the new platform of 16+1. The authors examine these implications in relation to the need to expand and adapt the content and approach of the EU-China Bilateral Investment agreement. The article concludes that the CEEC-China relation does not go against the EU; moreover, neither the CEE countries nor China have any motivation to try to weaken the EU.