<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>By its very name, phenomenology seems to invoke a priority claim on phenomena. And yet it has not been necessary to wait for phenomenology in oder to have a proper account of phenomena. One need only to take a look at the history of philosophy, from Plato to Kant, as well as at the history of sciences, from physics to psychology, so as to register a wide range of uses concerning the concept of phenomenon. The understanding of what a phenomenon is, in a phenomenological sense, should therefore at least not be completely compatible with any other, if phenomenology has to exist as a discipline and as a method. That is one of the issues at stake in the debate between phenomenology and neokantianism, between Husserl, to a certain extent Brentano, and Natorp. It is on this debate that we shall draw attention, if we wish to grasp the reasons behind the phenomenological conception of the phenomenon, especially at the time of the <italic>Logische Untersuchungen</italic>.</p></abstract>

By its very name, phenomenology seems to invoke a priority claim on phenomena. And yet it has not been necessary to wait for phenomenology in oder to have a proper account of phenomena. One need only to take a look at the history of philosophy, from Plato to Kant, as well as at the history of sciences, from physics to psychology, so as to register a wide range of uses concerning the concept of phenomenon. The understanding of what a phenomenon is, in a phenomenological sense, should therefore at least not be completely compatible with any other, if phenomenology has to exist as a discipline and as a method. That is one of the issues at stake in the debate between phenomenology and neokantianism, between Husserl, to a certain extent Brentano, and Natorp. It is on this debate that we shall draw attention, if we wish to grasp the reasons behind the phenomenological conception of the phenomenon, especially at the time of the Logische Untersuchungen.

Cover up that phenomenon, which I can’t endure to look on. About the right to see everything (or not) in phenomenology: Husserl between Brentano and Natorp

Phainomenon

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

By its very name, phenomenology seems to invoke a priority claim on phenomena. And yet it has not been necessary to wait for phenomenology in oder to have a...

Cover up that phenomenon, which I can’t endure to look on. About the right to see everything (or not) in phenomenology: Husserl between Brentano and Natorp

Online veröffentlicht: 14. Okt. 2021

Seitenbereich: 69 - 93

Eingereicht: 17. Nov. 2017

Akzeptiert: 20. Nov. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0005

Schlüsselwörter
Phenomenon, Transcendence, Intentionality, Psychology, Subject-Object Relationship

© 2017 Emanuele Mariani, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Cover up that phenomenon, which I can’t endure to look on. About the right to see everything (or not) in phenomenology: Husserl between Brentano and Natorp

Online veröffentlicht: 14. Okt. 2021

Seitenbereich: 69 - 93

Eingereicht: 17. Nov. 2017

Akzeptiert: 20. Nov. 2017

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/phainomenon-2017-0005

SchlüsselwörterPhenomenon, Transcendence, Intentionality, Psychology, Subject-Object Relationship

© 2017 Emanuele Mariani, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
Phenomenon, Transcendence, Intentionality, Psychology, Subject-Object Relationship