<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">

<p>I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, <italic>Q</italic>, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to <italic>Q</italic>. Call this the <italic>epistemic-improvement view</italic>. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into <italic>Q</italic> if one already knows the answer to <italic>Q</italic>. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into <italic>Q</italic> if one already believes some complete answer to <italic>Q</italic>.</p>
</abstract>

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the epistemic-improvement view. I consider and ultimately reject two alternative accounts of the constitutive aim of inquiry—namely, the thesis that inquiry aims at knowledge and the thesis that inquiry aims at (justified) belief—and I use my criticisms as a foil for clarifying and motivating the epistemic-improvement view. I also consider and reject a pair of normative theses about when inquiry goes awry or is inappropriate. The first is the normative thesis defended by Dennis Whitcomb who claims that inquiry goes awry if it culminates in a belief that falls short of knowledge and that one should not inquire into Q if one already knows the answer to Q. The second is the normative thesis defended by Jane Friedman who claims that one should not inquire into Q if one already believes some complete answer to Q.

The Aim of Inquiry

Disputatio

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

{"article-title":"The Aim of Inquiry"}

I defend the thesis that the constitutive aim of inquiring into some question, Q, is improving one’s epistemic standing with respect to Q. Call this the...

The Aim of Inquiry

Online veröffentlicht: 23. Nov. 2021

Seitenbereich: 95 - 119

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0006

Schlüsselwörter
Inquiry, knowledge, belief, opinion, epistemic improvement

© 2021 Avery Archer, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

The Aim of Inquiry

Online veröffentlicht: 23. Nov. 2021

Seitenbereich: 95 - 119

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/disp-2021-0006

SchlüsselwörterInquiry, knowledge, belief, opinion, epistemic improvement

© 2021 Avery Archer, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.

Schlüsselwörter
Inquiry, knowledge, belief, opinion, epistemic improvement