1. bookVolume 10 (2021): Issue 3 (September 2021)
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
First Published
11 Mar 2014
Publication timeframe
3 times per year
Languages
English
access type Open Access

Great Power, Great Responsibility: Addressing the Underestimated Issue of Central Bank’s Social Responsibility

Published Online: 06 Sep 2021
Page range: 23 - 39
Received: 06 Jul 2020
Accepted: 15 Dec 2020
Journal Details
License
Format
Journal
First Published
11 Mar 2014
Publication timeframe
3 times per year
Languages
English
Abstract

This paper deals with the neglected issue of central banks’ social responsibility. Since central banks exert the “structural power” on economies as well as on societies, their power should be regulated and controlled by society through a reliable framework of social responsibility. To that aim, this article sheds light on the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ of central bank’s social responsibility: I suggest reforms in order to increase central banks’ social legitimacy, while being consistent with the mapping out of a new framework of social responsibility.

Keywords

JEL Classification

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