<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p>Collective bargaining has come under renewed scrutiny, especially in Southern European countries, which rely predominantly on sectoral bargaining supported by administrative extensions of collective agreements. Following the global financial crisis, some of these countries have implemented substantial reforms in the context of adjustment programmes, seen by some as a ‘frontal assault’ on collective bargaining. This paper compares the recent top-down reforms in Portugal with the more gradual evolution of the system in the Netherlands. While the Dutch bargaining system shares many of the key features that characterise the Portuguese system, it has shown a much greater ability to adjust to new challenges through concerted social dialogue. This paper shows that the recent reforms in Portugal have brought the system more in line with Dutch practices, including in relation to the degree of flexibility in sectoral collective agreements at the worker and firm levels, the criteria for administrative extensions, and the application of retro- and ultra-activity. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the top-down approach taken in Portugal will change bargaining practices, and importantly, the quality of industrial relations.</p></abstract>

Collective bargaining has come under renewed scrutiny, especially in Southern European countries, which rely predominantly on sectoral bargaining supported by administrative extensions of collective agreements. Following the global financial crisis, some of these countries have implemented substantial reforms in the context of adjustment programmes, seen by some as a ‘frontal assault’ on collective bargaining. This paper compares the recent top-down reforms in Portugal with the more gradual evolution of the system in the Netherlands. While the Dutch bargaining system shares many of the key features that characterise the Portuguese system, it has shown a much greater ability to adjust to new challenges through concerted social dialogue. This paper shows that the recent reforms in Portugal have brought the system more in line with Dutch practices, including in relation to the degree of flexibility in sectoral collective agreements at the worker and firm levels, the criteria for administrative extensions, and the application of retro- and ultra-activity. However, it remains to be seen to what extent the top-down approach taken in Portugal will change bargaining practices, and importantly, the quality of industrial relations.

Frontal assault versus incremental change: A comparison of collective bargaining in Portugal and the Netherlands

IZA Journal of Labor Policy

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Collective bargaining has come under renewed scrutiny, especially in Southern European countries, which rely predominantly on sectoral bargaining supported by...

	Netherlands	Portugal – pre 2012; and from 2017	Portugal – between 2012 and 2017
Test of public interest	Yes - but rarely called upon explicitly	No, decision is entirely discretionary, not based on objective and verifiable criteria	No
Representativeness criteria	Share of workforce in signatory firms should exceed 60% (or 55% with additional scrutiny and 50% in exceptional circumstances)	No	2012 - 2014: Share of workforce in signatory firms should exceed 50% of total employment in relevant sector. 2015 - 2017: share of workforce in signatory firms should exceed 50%; or at least 30% of employer association members (firms) should have no more than 250 employees (the latter criterion being met in almost all cases)
Exemptions	Application procedure to government or though dispensation rules in collective agreements	No	No

	Netherlands	Portugal – pre 2012	Portugal – since 2012
Scope	Ultra-activity of collective agreement, not for parties bound by extensions	Ultra-activity applies to both collective agreement and extensions.	Ultra-activity applies to both collective agreement and extensions.
Duration	Unlimited - unless stated otherwise in collective agreement	Time-limited unless stated otherwise in collective agreement: five years up to 2009 and 18 months since 2009	Time-limited unless stated otherwise in collective agreement: 12 months
Application	Workers who were employed by firm prior to expiration	Workers who were employed by firm prior to expiration	Workers who were employed by firm prior to expiration

Frontal assault versus incremental change: A comparison of collective bargaining in Portugal and the Netherlands

Published Online: Nov 13, 2019

Page range: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajolp-2019-0008

Keywords
collective bargaining, bargaining coverage/structure/coordination, trust, comparative economic systems

© 2019 Alexander Hijzen, Pedro S. Martins and Jante Parlevliet, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Figure 1

Retro-activity

Extensions: conditions and exemptions

Ultra-activity

Frontal assault versus incremental change: A comparison of collective bargaining in Portugal and the Netherlands

Published Online: Nov 13, 2019

Page range: -

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/izajolp-2019-0008

Keywordscollective bargaining, bargaining coverage/structure/coordination, trust, comparative economic systems

© 2019 Alexander Hijzen, Pedro S. Martins and Jante Parlevliet, published by Sciendo

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Public License.

Figure 1

Retro-activity

Extensions: conditions and exemptions

Ultra-activity

Keywords
collective bargaining, bargaining coverage/structure/coordination, trust, comparative economic systems