Volume 7 (2017): Edizione 1-2 (June 2017)

The aim of this paper is to read Antisthenes’ speeches Ajax and Odysseus from the perspective of “Socratic discourses”, that is as a text which could represent an alternative form of the search for a good life. The putative theme of the speeches is the contest for the arms of Achilles. But readers can find at a deeper level another subject: Ajax and Odysseus show two moral characters involved in the debate over the correct meaning of excellence (aretē) or practical wisdom (phronēsis).

This paper deals with the ethical views of the 17^th century Czech thinker Jan Amos Komenský, also known as Johann Amos Comenius. Comeniologic studies are focused on different aspects of his contribution to education, theology and philosophy but surprisingly there are only a few studies on his ethical standpoints. Jan Patočka classified Comenius’s work in three periods: prepansophic, pansophic and panorthotic. Here the focus is on the panorthotic works in order to trace the different conceptions of ethics, virtue and other ethical concepts specially the virtue of prudence (prudentia/phronesis). Furthermore, to have a broader perspective, a short analysis of his prepansophic period book The Labyrinth of the World and the Paradise of the Heart is also included in order to contrast the evolution of the concept of prudence and the ethical sphere in his world-view. The methodology is based on conceptual analysis, the contrast of different references to ethics in his late period books. At the same time, this work is an attempt to extract secular elements for understanding his ethics, although the organic link between philosophy, theology and politics is recognized in his thought.

The paper focuses on some important philosophical issues of Kant’s philosophical legacy, especially on Kant’s thoughts on man and his acting in community with other human beings, his fellows, (Conjectural Beginning of Human History) from the aspect of morality based on moral-practical terms and categories. The field of Kant’s practical-critical thoughts is not only unusually broad but also full of ideological dynamics offered in a precise and modern linguistic form. The paper claims that Kant offers his own answer for the fourth question “Was ist der Mensch” (“What is man?”), introduced in Logic (Kant, 1992, p. 538) and at the same it also introduces a historical dimension to the issue of man, included in his short writings, in a compact form.

This first part of a two-part series exploring implications of the natural differences between the sexes for the cultural evolution of marriage assesses whether Kant should be condemned as a sexist due to his various offensive claims about women. Being antithetical to modern-day assumptions regarding the equality of the sexes, Kant’s views seem to contradict his own egalitarian ethics. A philosophical framework for making cross-cultural ethical assessments requires one to assess those in other cultures by their own ethical standards. Sexism is inappropriate if it exhibits or reinforces a tendency to dominate the opposite sex. Kant’s theory of marriage, by contrast, illustrates how sexism can be egalitarian: given the natural differences between the sexes, different roles and cultural norms help to ensure that females and males are equal. Judged by the standards of his own day and in the context of his philosophical system, Kant’s sexism is not ethically inappropriate.

G. E. Moore’s critical analysis of right action in utilitarian ethics and his consequentialist concept of right action is a starting point for a theory of moral/right action in ethics of social consequences. The terms right and wrong have different meanings in these theories. The author explores different aspects of right and wrong actions in ethics of social consequences and compares them with Moore’s ideas. He positively evaluates Moore’s contributions to the development his theory of moral/right action.

In this article, the author presents an overview of the 20^th century Polish humanist Mieczysław Wallis who searches for answers to the question of the essence of humanity. The philosopher saw it in human axiological activities building a world of specifically human creations thus giving Man a meaningful existence. An axiological perspective of human subjectivity – the search for the purpose and meaning of human existence in the implementation of aesthetical and ethical values can be seen as a methodological proposal worthy of deeper consideration which could facilitate solving modern ethical and bio-ethical problems.

The author argues that love should play a central role in philosophy (and ethics). In the past, philosophical practice has been too narrowly defined by theory and explanation. Although unquestionably important, they do not belong to the very core of our philosophizing. Philosophy is primarily a way of life, centered on the soul and the development of our humanity – in its most diverse aspects and to its utmost potential. For such a life to be possible, love must play a central role in philosophy and philosophy should be understood not in the traditional sense as “the love of wisdom,” but in a new way – as the wisdom of love.

The author reflects on the issue of the value of human life in the contexts of current “posthuman” era. There is a host of evidence that the value of human for human beings themselves has been radically reduced or ignored, or replaced by other non-human values, and even neglected. The axiological crisis of humanity, as envisioned by Nietzsche, has become the existential and moral crisis of humanity today. No matter how contemporary technological culture challenges the traditional values, the ancient questions of “how to live?”, “what makes us happy?”, and “what makes life significant?” are still here with us and provide even greater challenges to every individual. The author points to pluralist ways of how to deal with these questions including the “stoic pragmatism” among them.

Charity is often viewed as a paradigm of morality. I suggest, however, that charitable action is morally problematic – even morally wrong. Following a brief characterisation of charity, it will be suggested that it wrongly puts recipients in a position of dependency and dispensers in a self-congratulatory position of political quietism.

In this paper I give a short overview about the general implications of issues of human nature within the field of human enhancement. The first section of my contribution deals with a certain intertwining of human enhancement and the intrinsic claims of human nature, showing that a non-statistical concept of human nature can play a crucial role in the debate on human enhancement. After that, my aim is to validate that particular enhancements (e.g. neuro-enhancement) fall under the same normative criteria as “normal enhancement”, only requiring a special contextual awareness to co-exist with it ethically. Methodically, my intention is to draw on quasi-naturalist approaches, which argue that our nature as humans is not a “mixed bag”, but seems to be wholly constituted by its species-related characteristics. As a result, we can state that our evaluations of living beings or life forms, which are also evaluations of our methods of medical treatments and of our ethical attitudes, depend on our picture of human nature.