<abstract xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><p> In this paper we analyze the Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) preimage resistance security notion for hash functions firstly introduced in [Kelsey, J.-Kohno, T.: Herding hash functions and the Nostradamus attack, in: Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT ’06, 25th Annual Internat. Conf. on the Theory and Appl. of Cryptographic Techniques (S. Vaudenay, ed.), St. Peters- burg, Russia, 2006, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 4004, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2006, pp. 183-200]. We give a formal definition of this property in hash function family settings and work out all the implications and separations be- tween the CTFP preimage resistance and other standard notions of hash function security (preimage resistance, collision resistance, etc.). This paper follows the work of [Rogaway, P.-Shrimpton, T.: Cryptographic hash-function basics: Def- initions, implications, and separations for preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance, in: Fast Software Encryption, 11th Interna- tional Workshop-FSE ’04 (B. Roy et al., eds.), Delhi, India, 2004, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 3017, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp. 371-388], where they define seven basic notions of hash function security and examine all the relationships among these notions. We also define a new property for security of hash function families-always CTFP preimage resistance, which guarantees CTFP security for all the hash functions in the family.</p></abstract>

In this paper we analyze the Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) preimage resistance security notion for hash functions firstly introduced in [Kelsey, J.-Kohno, T.: Herding hash functions and the Nostradamus attack, in: Advances in Cryptology-EUROCRYPT ’06, 25th Annual Internat. Conf. on the Theory and Appl. of Cryptographic Techniques (S. Vaudenay, ed.), St. Peters- burg, Russia, 2006, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 4004, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2006, pp. 183-200]. We give a formal definition of this property in hash function family settings and work out all the implications and separations be- tween the CTFP preimage resistance and other standard notions of hash function security (preimage resistance, collision resistance, etc.). This paper follows the work of [Rogaway, P.-Shrimpton, T.: Cryptographic hash-function basics: Def- initions, implications, and separations for preimage resistance, second-preimage resistance, and collision resistance, in: Fast Software Encryption, 11th Interna- tional Workshop-FSE ’04 (B. Roy et al., eds.), Delhi, India, 2004, Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., Vol. 3017, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 2004, pp. 371-388], where they define seven basic notions of hash function security and examine all the relationships among these notions. We also define a new property for security of hash function families-always CTFP preimage resistance, which guarantees CTFP security for all the hash functions in the family.

On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance

Department of Computer Science Faculty of Mathematics, Physics and Informatics Comenius University SK–842-48 Bratislava SLOVAKIA

Tatra Mountains Mathematical Publications

{"article-title":"On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance"}

In this paper we analyze the Chosen Target Forced Prefix (CTFP) preimage resistance security notion for hash functions firstly introduced in [Kelsey, J.-Kohno,...

On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance

Pubblicato online: 13 nov 2012

Pagine: 115 - 135

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10127-010-0034-5

Parole chiave
hash function, chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance, provable security.

This content is open access.

On chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance

Pubblicato online: 13 nov 2012

Pagine: 115 - 135

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/v10127-010-0034-5

Parole chiavehash function, chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance, provable security.

This content is open access.

Parole chiave
hash function, chosen target forced prefix preimage resistance, provable security.